so i've wondered for a long time about how leftists use the terms 'materialism' and 'idealism', and how it relates to those terms usage in broader philosophical discussions on epistemology.

i may be incorrect in my interpretations, but it seems to me that leftist uses of the term (even its usage in some of marx's writings, from what little i've read) are such that 'materialist' means 'understands that the material conditions of a society drive its development via dialectical processes' and that 'idealist' means 'focuses on artificial/socially constructed ethical or legal principles (such as 'freedom' and 'democracy' and 'rule of law' and 'free speech') rather than material conditions of society like quality of life, literacy, etc.'.

the broader philosophical definitions of these terms are slightly different, however.

epistemologically, a 'materialist' is someone who believes that we can (and do) directly apprehend the mind-independent external world. this is contrary to epistemological idealism, which argues that we can only ever know the contents of our own mind. we can use these contents to infer things about 'true reality' but can never truly verify them.

ontologically, materialism argues that all of reality can be described in terms of physics, or that all facts of the universe are causally dependent on or reducible to physical processes. this is again opposed to Idealism, which argues that existence is in some way irreducibly and fundamentally mental.

so my first question for you beautiful posters is, are my perceptions of these definitions and usages overall correct or incorrect? How exactly does Marx (or Engels or any other marxist philosopher) use these terms, and do they intend an epistemological, ontological, or other interpretation? am i missing something fundamental about the philosophical definitions or about the colloquial/leftist usage? What's the deal with that 'philosophy is pointless, the goal is to change the world' quote, is understanding reality not a benefit for efficiently manipulating it?

My next point, is that it seems to me like Marx and Engel's Dialectical Materialism, or at least the political program and methods of Socialism/Communism, are not necessarily at all incompatible with either philosophical Idealism or Materialism, in terms of epistemology or ontology. Neither is necessarily incompatible with basic empiricism, but is rather a difference in interpretation of what our empirical knowledge is. Whether reality is fundamentally mental or matter, it consists of opposing energies and dialectical processes that play out in our experience with the extrinsic appearance of physical matter. Whether the world is in the mind or 'really out there', our experiences of it are the same.

A bit ago i stumbled across this article that seemed to be making a similar point, a point i've never really seen made by anyone else before. I haven't read past the abstract yet, and It seems like someone random person's college dissertation or thesis or something so I'm probably not well read enough to interpret this without context, so i was wondering if anyone had seen any similar discourse? What would Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, or Mao say about this line of thought? is it a heresy against socialism, a useless detour into pointless philosophical questions that serve no practical purpose for the revolution, or is it something potentially useful in framing Marxism's relationship to epistemology and ontology?

  • bubbalu [they/them]
    ·
    1 year ago

    For the most part, Marxism sidesteps a lot of epistemology and the materialist/sophist debate; Immanent truth is less important than the question 'what brings the world closer to communism?' (this is mainly cribbed from J Mouffawad-Paul in 'The Communist Necessity') For example, a Marxist is less likely to care whether race is ontologically/biologically real vs. constructed and more likely to care about liberation from racial oppression. A framing that is helpful to me is that Marxism seeks to produce an objective and actionable understanding of socially constructed phenomena.

    Mao summarizes this succinctly in 'On Practice':

    Marxists hold that man's social practice alone is the criterion of the truth of his knowledge of the external world. What actually happens is that man's knowledge is verified only when he achieves the anticipated results in the process of social practice (material production, class struggle or scientific experiment).

    Mao is fundamentally a 'materialist' in the sense that you describe; he believes that there is an objectively existing external world. He believes our sense impressions are an accurate-enough reflection of the external world. However, he argues that the synthesis of sense impressions and social practice are more significant than that first level of 'phenomenal' knowledge. Again from on Practice:

    In the process of practice, man at first sees only the phenomenal side, the separate aspects, the external relations of things. For instance, some people...come to Yenan...they see its topography, streets and houses; they meet many people, attend banquets, evening parties and mass meetings...the separate aspects and the external relations of things. This is called the perceptual stage of cognition, namely, the stage of sense perceptions and impressions. That is, these particular things in Yenan act on the sense organs of the members of the observation group, evoke sense perceptions and give rise in their brains to many impressions together with a rough sketch of the external relations among these impressions: this is the first stage of cognition. At this stage, man cannot as yet form concepts, which are deeper, or draw logical conclusions.

    As social practice continues, things that give rise to man's sense perceptions and impressions in the course of his practice are repeated many times; then a sudden change (leap) takes place in the brain in the process of cognition, and concepts are formed. Concepts are no longer the phenomena, the separate aspects and the external relations of things; they grasp the essence, the totality and the internal relations of things. Between concepts and sense perceptions there is not only a quantitative but also a qualitative difference. Proceeding further, by means of judgement and inference one is able to draw logical conclusions...This stage of conception, judgement and inference is the more important stage in the entire process of knowing a thing; it is the stage of rational knowledge.

    Quoting Lenin's 'Conspectus of Hegel's Science of Logic', Mao concludes "abstraction of matter, of a law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short, all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and completely."

    Which is to say that all sense impressions imperfectly reflect an objective, mind-external world, and that we need to work through subjectivity and imperfect impressions to grasp it. The tool we use to grasp it is ideology.

    Idealism in the sense meant by Mao and marxists generally is much different than the one you highlight. In 'On Contradiction', Mao describes idealism as the belief that "sees things as isolated, static and one-sided. It regards all things in the universe, their forms and their species, as eternally isolated from one another and immutable. Such change as there is can only be an increase or decrease in quantity or a change of place." He ascribes this outlook to "mechanical materialism in the 17th and 18th centuries and...vulgar evolutionism at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries." Which is to say 'idealism' to Marxists encompasses philosophical materialism/simple empiricism.

    First and foremost, Marxism is a teleology (revolution), that developed an epistemology (dialectical materialism) to meet that end. This has an added benefit of making Marxism and its offshoots falsifiable: ask 'does practicing this theory bring us closer or farther from revolution?'