A materialist conception of free will is very compatible with all that - the potential expressions of will are bound by historical realities, but free will within those bounds is legitimate and real.
It's the placement of where choices are made - a non-free will perspective places them purely on external factors. A free will perspective places some portion of choice within the individual.
The thing is I don’t see how there can be potentialities beyond what happened already. It’s impossible to predict the future, but the amalgamation of all the material factors is purely responsible for the future.
A materialist conception of free will is very compatible with all that - the potential expressions of will are bound by historical realities, but free will within those bounds is legitimate and real.
As I wrote elsewhere I don’t see how introducing the concept adds anything to a materialist analysis of choices and why we make them.
It's the placement of where choices are made - a non-free will perspective places them purely on external factors. A free will perspective places some portion of choice within the individual.
The thing is I don’t see how there can be potentialities beyond what happened already. It’s impossible to predict the future, but the amalgamation of all the material factors is purely responsible for the future.
I don't really see how that contradicts my position
I agree with what you wrote, but it could be interpreted as more libertarian