Identical twins have different experiences. Their identities, even their biological makeup, diverge based on those different experiences. If you took a being and replicated it, then when their experiences diverged they would become functionally different beings. But if they both remember being the "original," both have an equally valid claim to that title.
I don't think many identical twins remember being the same zygote.
That's a non-falsifiable statement. And even if we assume it's true, do third parties' perceptions of a being matter more than that being's own self-definition?
I think so. Isn't our ability to understand the "self" at least in part governed by our ability to zoom out and look at ourselves from the third person perspective?
We do the mirror test on animals to measure their ability to understand their sense of self. This is literally about test their ability to view from a third party perspective.
To some extent our idea of the self is attached to our ability to perceive that perspective.
Isn’t our ability to understand the “self” at least in part governed by our ability to zoom out and look at ourselves from the third person perspective?
Yes, but that means there would be a tension in calling a being that percieved itself as original, "not original." It thinks of itself as the original, even if now there are two of it. Who are you to tell it that it's wrong? Do you have the right to deny it that identification?
There would be tension though. The third party would perceive the originality of the original vs the replica-ness of the replica. As soon as this is brought into focus for the replica what you are going to get is some sort of internal tension and crises about the self. Potentially manifested in denial, or it may manifest in other mental issues.
If both beings are identical and both have the same memories up to stepping into the teleporter, then "replicaness" or "originalness" is a purely theoretical label that can only be applied by outside observers, and even then only if one steps out of the teleporter before the other, and even then - as with this discussion, probably not without a lot of disagreement.
IDk, it all just seems to reinforce to me how "originality," like the idea of The Self itself, is a very flimsy concept.
I don't think it would identify as the original if it rationalises the situation correctly from a third party perspective. It would recognise that the original is dead, and that it is a replica.
What this would then do to a person's sense of self is... Uncertain. I would very much be concerned about the mental repercussions that occur and think it would require advanced study to see whether it causes mental illness. I would not be surprised if the body rationalises this as a trauma and a sense of physical dysphoria begins to occur.
That kind of thinking is entirely theoretical though given that we don't have the technology to test it and might never.
Identical twins have different experiences. Their identities, even their biological makeup, diverge based on those different experiences. If you took a being and replicated it, then when their experiences diverged they would become functionally different beings. But if they both remember being the "original," both have an equally valid claim to that title.
I don't think many identical twins remember being the same zygote.
Remembering being the original and actually being the original are different things.
Again, how so?
Because any third party can see the difference. And you can rationalise the difference from understanding that third parties can see the difference.
That's a non-falsifiable statement. And even if we assume it's true, do third parties' perceptions of a being matter more than that being's own self-definition?
I think so. Isn't our ability to understand the "self" at least in part governed by our ability to zoom out and look at ourselves from the third person perspective?
We do the mirror test on animals to measure their ability to understand their sense of self. This is literally about test their ability to view from a third party perspective.
To some extent our idea of the self is attached to our ability to perceive that perspective.
Yes, but that means there would be a tension in calling a being that percieved itself as original, "not original." It thinks of itself as the original, even if now there are two of it. Who are you to tell it that it's wrong? Do you have the right to deny it that identification?
There would be tension though. The third party would perceive the originality of the original vs the replica-ness of the replica. As soon as this is brought into focus for the replica what you are going to get is some sort of internal tension and crises about the self. Potentially manifested in denial, or it may manifest in other mental issues.
If both beings are identical and both have the same memories up to stepping into the teleporter, then "replicaness" or "originalness" is a purely theoretical label that can only be applied by outside observers, and even then only if one steps out of the teleporter before the other, and even then - as with this discussion, probably not without a lot of disagreement.
IDk, it all just seems to reinforce to me how "originality," like the idea of The Self itself, is a very flimsy concept.
I don't think it would identify as the original if it rationalises the situation correctly from a third party perspective. It would recognise that the original is dead, and that it is a replica.
What this would then do to a person's sense of self is... Uncertain. I would very much be concerned about the mental repercussions that occur and think it would require advanced study to see whether it causes mental illness. I would not be surprised if the body rationalises this as a trauma and a sense of physical dysphoria begins to occur.
That kind of thinking is entirely theoretical though given that we don't have the technology to test it and might never.