It's literally like this:
Materialists/Physicalists: "The thoughts in your head come from your conditions and are ultimately the result of your organs and nervous system. Your consciousness is linked to your brain activity and other parts of your body interacting with the physical real world."
Dualists: "Ok but what if there were an imaginary zombie that has the same organs and molecular structure as a living person but somehow isn't alive on some metaphysical level. If this zombie is conceivable, that means it must be metaphysically true somehow."
Materialists: "That's circular and imaginary, isn't it?"
Other dualists: "Ok but what if I were in a swamp and lightning strikes a tree and magically creates a copy of me but it's not actually me because it doesn't have my soul."
Am I reading this stuff wrong or are these actually the best arguments for mind-body dualism
If I put the same code on a micro controller it will run the same as the other. If I activate a muscle neuron in a lab it will behave the same as an equal muscle neuron will. An exact copy is impossible to create, but if it were possible it would be the same, but it would not mean it would have to behave the same. Since we don't quite enough if quantum effects in which the results are random can have chaotic effects leading to different outcomes. It would still be the same, but would not clear up anything about a soul, which existence is arbitrary in any case.
Of course the individual experiences of the "original" and "identical physical impossible copy" are different. Since they have no connection between them. It doesn't clear up anything at all.