Now let’s look at Peter Stillman, a philosopher at Vassar who’s written extensively on Marx and
Hegel.
In Marx Myths and Legends, Stillman contributed an essay entitled The Myth of Marx’s
Economic Determinism, in which he argues that Marx’s writing was not, after all, based in economic
determinism, and that such claims are founded on “weak” interpretations.
In Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx says, to paraphrase, that men enter
into relations independent of their will, and moreover that it is “not the consciousness of men that
determine their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.” By
asserting that man’s consciousness is a reflection and consequence of his social conditions, there is a
pretty strong argument to be made that Marx was espousing economic determinism (in fact, this
passage is one of the main arguments that economic determinism was Marx’s stance, and it’s pretty
convincing).
Stillman explains four types of determinism that can be argued from this passage.
That a human’s will and actions are caused by their circumstances.
That social interactions are caused by economics.
That history itself is predetermined.
That if political economy is a science (and science is about understanding and thus predicting
outcomes) then political economy, and thus society, can be predicted, ie determined.
Marx’s further assertions in Capital that capitalist production has “natural laws” and in the
Manifesto that the victory of the proletariat is “inevitable” are further indicators of a deterministic
outlook within Marx’s writings.
Marx also states: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they
do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found,
given and transmitted from the past.”
This idea that we bear the weight of the past is an essential and foundational part of historical
materialism. However, argues Stillman, this is merely a state of society in which the past contextualises
and limits the choices before us, not an argument that the society constructed by our past is causally
determinative to the point of robbing us of choice altogether; that is to say, we don’t merely react to the
externalities of history, we make history.
Stillman also argues that when Marx rejects the Hegellian notion that “life is determined by
consciousness” by asserting that “consciousness is determined by life” he is merely rejecting the idea
of consciousness independent of life; that is, he is rejecting the otherworldly structure of consciousness
that may superceded and thus order life. This is no surprise to any Marxist, of course: Marx
consistently writes of the importance of looking to the material to order the material. Consciousness
devoid of sensuousness is discounted by Marx, but that is not to the same as a claim that consciousness
is directly determined and ordered by sensuousness.
“Circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances” is a phrase by Marx
which would show, according to Stillman, that to Marx there is a reciprocal ordering of consciousness
and sensuousness, which is a far cry from a solid claim of determinism.
While these are all refutations of economic determinism as a factor in Marx’s works, Stillman
notes that these require meeting economic determinists on their level. To have arrived at these
arguments they had to have picked a few select quotes from Marx devoid of context to arrive at their
arguments. More importantly, though, according to Stillman, is to divorce yourself from applying your
questions to Marx, and to look at what questions Marx himself sought to answer.
“Marx does not focus on – indeed, he does not even address – the issue of whether human
beings have free will.”
Marx may have touched on the ways in which history and economic conditions have limited
mankind’s relations and choices in society, and he may have employed rhetorical devices to rally
people to the party (“the inevitability” of proletarian victory for instance), but Marx himself did not
believe that philosophy was worthwhile as an independent branch of knowledge. For Marx, philosophy
was merely one aspect of the broader questions of society, and as such he never sought to pontificate on
or question the ungrounded philosophical inquiries that occupy so much of Western academia. Marx
never sought to argue determinism nor indeterminism.
“Marx’s dialectic does not involve any kind of “thesis, anti-thesis, synthesis” triad: he nowhere
uses that language. Nor does he use the language of cause-and-effect. Rather, what Marx’s dialectic
involves is a careful analysis of the categories of bourgeois and human society.”
Marx, argues Stillman, never seeks to argue for causality or inevitability. Dialectic analysis is
fluid, evolving over time. To Marx, humans are “active creators and shapers of their natural and
social worlds who find their scope for free action drastically constrained by systems of private
property.”
“When Marx presents capitalism as a totality using dialectics, his “science” is an interpretive
science whose elements are systematically connected – “science” in the sense of Hegel’s Wissenschaft,
not modern natural science.”
Marx’s writings are primarily concerned with the plethora of constraints (largely imposed by
capitalism) which limit the free action of humanity and society. His revolutionary writing seeks to
abolish those constraints, and to imagine a future in which humans are free to act of their own will. (3/4)
This one I think is a pretty fun essay, it’s Peter Jones refuting Noam Chomsky’s work in
biological determinism.
Biological Determinism and Epistemology in Linguistics: Some Considerations on the
“Chomskyan Revolution” is an essay in which Jones argues that Chomsky’s views are not only
incompatible with Marxism but “to any discipline in which the social and historical are essential and
irreducible categories in the understanding and explanation of human behaviour, institutions, and
thought.”
Jones asserts that biological determinism in general (not just Chomsky’s views) is incoherent,
self-contradictory, and an inadequate foundation for human sciences.
This paper is not about Chomsky’s political contributions (however you may feel about that),
but rather about linguistics (for those who are unfamiliar with autonomous syntax, Chomsky wrote
extensively about the innate biological function of language in humanity).
Chomsky argues that the mind must be examined as any other biological structure. For
Chomsky, there is extant in the human brain specific capabilities of understanding; fields that are
“accessible” by the mind.
“Chomsky believes that the speed and precision with which children pick up new words “leaves
no real alternative to the conclusion that the child somehow has the concepts available before
experience with language and is basically learning labels for concepts that are already part of his or
her conceptual apparatus””
This extends to all forms of understanding, all sciences. That everything a human may think,
every choice a human may make, every idea a human may have or execute are all predetermined
through genetic material. This extends even to social interactions and moral and ethical considerations;
that there is a set limit of social interactions available to be accessed by the human brain, which, in this
understanding of consciousness, exists merely as a series of biological functions predetermined by its
genetic makeup.
Chomsky asserts: “A consistent materialist would consider it as self-evident that the mind has
very important innate structures, physically realized in some manner” and thus that all aspects of a
human’s development are governed through biological determinism.
A Marxist view is at direct odds with Chomsky’s assertion of biological determinism: to the
Marxist view, as we’ve seen above, human’s are products of social and historical conditions, their
relations and interactions influenced (if not directly caused) by the economic and the political.
Chomsky refutes this, claiming instead that it is all a function of the biological. (Biological
determinism is the predominant form of determinism in modern scientific thought, and is the form of
determinism most argued even in Marxist circles, despite its contraposition with economic
determinism).
By Chomsky’s arguments, no being that is not innately connected to the human syntax (for
instance an alien, or some other species that does not share the genetic disposition for human syntax)
would thus never be able to learn human language.
Chomsky’s argument, says Jones, relies heavily on Hume’s rejection of empiricism. Experience
is not the source of human knowledge to a biological determinist. rather, human knowledge is
determined by a “mental organ,” and any deficits in knowledge are explained by an absence or lack in
the available data (think of a child learning language; they have access to the same mental organ as an
adult, but their syntax is not developed, as they have not been exposed to enough data–conversations
with others).
Chomskyan biological determinism, thus, is an understanding that knowledge itself is innate.
The brain’s very genetics, it’s physical makeup, determines what is and is not knowable.
The main conundrum in Chomskyan theory, according to Jones, is that truth then, can only be
arrived at through the coincidental intersection between knowledge and reality.
Jones argues that biological determinism is vulgar materialism (influenced heavily by Cartesian
mechanical philosophy). “Its materialism lies in the acceptance of the existence of a mind-independent
material reality, its vulgarity in the simple reduction of the mental to the material (the biological).” (4/4)
This is just a small sampling of Marxist positions on determinism, be it economic determinism
or biological determinism. This as an oft-argued point, and one that has no consensus. However, as was
made clear above, Marx himself was more concerned with the destruction of the constraints that
capitalism places on mankind’s ability to make choices with their lives and the shaping of history.
Now let’s look at Peter Stillman, a philosopher at Vassar who’s written extensively on Marx and Hegel.
In Marx Myths and Legends, Stillman contributed an essay entitled The Myth of Marx’s Economic Determinism, in which he argues that Marx’s writing was not, after all, based in economic determinism, and that such claims are founded on “weak” interpretations.
In Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx says, to paraphrase, that men enter into relations independent of their will, and moreover that it is “not the consciousness of men that determine their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.” By asserting that man’s consciousness is a reflection and consequence of his social conditions, there is a pretty strong argument to be made that Marx was espousing economic determinism (in fact, this passage is one of the main arguments that economic determinism was Marx’s stance, and it’s pretty convincing).
Stillman explains four types of determinism that can be argued from this passage.
Marx’s further assertions in Capital that capitalist production has “natural laws” and in the Manifesto that the victory of the proletariat is “inevitable” are further indicators of a deterministic outlook within Marx’s writings.
Marx also states: “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past.”
This idea that we bear the weight of the past is an essential and foundational part of historical materialism. However, argues Stillman, this is merely a state of society in which the past contextualises and limits the choices before us, not an argument that the society constructed by our past is causally determinative to the point of robbing us of choice altogether; that is to say, we don’t merely react to the externalities of history, we make history.
Stillman also argues that when Marx rejects the Hegellian notion that “life is determined by consciousness” by asserting that “consciousness is determined by life” he is merely rejecting the idea of consciousness independent of life; that is, he is rejecting the otherworldly structure of consciousness that may superceded and thus order life. This is no surprise to any Marxist, of course: Marx consistently writes of the importance of looking to the material to order the material. Consciousness devoid of sensuousness is discounted by Marx, but that is not to the same as a claim that consciousness is directly determined and ordered by sensuousness.
“Circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances” is a phrase by Marx which would show, according to Stillman, that to Marx there is a reciprocal ordering of consciousness and sensuousness, which is a far cry from a solid claim of determinism.
While these are all refutations of economic determinism as a factor in Marx’s works, Stillman notes that these require meeting economic determinists on their level. To have arrived at these arguments they had to have picked a few select quotes from Marx devoid of context to arrive at their arguments. More importantly, though, according to Stillman, is to divorce yourself from applying your questions to Marx, and to look at what questions Marx himself sought to answer.
“Marx does not focus on – indeed, he does not even address – the issue of whether human beings have free will.”
Marx may have touched on the ways in which history and economic conditions have limited mankind’s relations and choices in society, and he may have employed rhetorical devices to rally people to the party (“the inevitability” of proletarian victory for instance), but Marx himself did not believe that philosophy was worthwhile as an independent branch of knowledge. For Marx, philosophy was merely one aspect of the broader questions of society, and as such he never sought to pontificate on or question the ungrounded philosophical inquiries that occupy so much of Western academia. Marx never sought to argue determinism nor indeterminism.
“Marx’s dialectic does not involve any kind of “thesis, anti-thesis, synthesis” triad: he nowhere uses that language. Nor does he use the language of cause-and-effect. Rather, what Marx’s dialectic involves is a careful analysis of the categories of bourgeois and human society.”
Marx, argues Stillman, never seeks to argue for causality or inevitability. Dialectic analysis is fluid, evolving over time. To Marx, humans are “active creators and shapers of their natural and social worlds who find their scope for free action drastically constrained by systems of private property.”
“When Marx presents capitalism as a totality using dialectics, his “science” is an interpretive science whose elements are systematically connected – “science” in the sense of Hegel’s Wissenschaft, not modern natural science.”
Marx’s writings are primarily concerned with the plethora of constraints (largely imposed by capitalism) which limit the free action of humanity and society. His revolutionary writing seeks to abolish those constraints, and to imagine a future in which humans are free to act of their own will. (3/4)
This one I think is a pretty fun essay, it’s Peter Jones refuting Noam Chomsky’s work in biological determinism.
Biological Determinism and Epistemology in Linguistics: Some Considerations on the “Chomskyan Revolution” is an essay in which Jones argues that Chomsky’s views are not only incompatible with Marxism but “to any discipline in which the social and historical are essential and irreducible categories in the understanding and explanation of human behaviour, institutions, and thought.”
Jones asserts that biological determinism in general (not just Chomsky’s views) is incoherent, self-contradictory, and an inadequate foundation for human sciences.
This paper is not about Chomsky’s political contributions (however you may feel about that), but rather about linguistics (for those who are unfamiliar with autonomous syntax, Chomsky wrote extensively about the innate biological function of language in humanity).
Chomsky argues that the mind must be examined as any other biological structure. For Chomsky, there is extant in the human brain specific capabilities of understanding; fields that are “accessible” by the mind.
“Chomsky believes that the speed and precision with which children pick up new words “leaves no real alternative to the conclusion that the child somehow has the concepts available before experience with language and is basically learning labels for concepts that are already part of his or her conceptual apparatus””
This extends to all forms of understanding, all sciences. That everything a human may think, every choice a human may make, every idea a human may have or execute are all predetermined through genetic material. This extends even to social interactions and moral and ethical considerations; that there is a set limit of social interactions available to be accessed by the human brain, which, in this understanding of consciousness, exists merely as a series of biological functions predetermined by its genetic makeup.
Chomsky asserts: “A consistent materialist would consider it as self-evident that the mind has very important innate structures, physically realized in some manner” and thus that all aspects of a human’s development are governed through biological determinism.
A Marxist view is at direct odds with Chomsky’s assertion of biological determinism: to the Marxist view, as we’ve seen above, human’s are products of social and historical conditions, their relations and interactions influenced (if not directly caused) by the economic and the political. Chomsky refutes this, claiming instead that it is all a function of the biological. (Biological determinism is the predominant form of determinism in modern scientific thought, and is the form of determinism most argued even in Marxist circles, despite its contraposition with economic determinism).
By Chomsky’s arguments, no being that is not innately connected to the human syntax (for instance an alien, or some other species that does not share the genetic disposition for human syntax) would thus never be able to learn human language.
Chomsky’s argument, says Jones, relies heavily on Hume’s rejection of empiricism. Experience is not the source of human knowledge to a biological determinist. rather, human knowledge is determined by a “mental organ,” and any deficits in knowledge are explained by an absence or lack in the available data (think of a child learning language; they have access to the same mental organ as an adult, but their syntax is not developed, as they have not been exposed to enough data–conversations with others).
Chomskyan biological determinism, thus, is an understanding that knowledge itself is innate. The brain’s very genetics, it’s physical makeup, determines what is and is not knowable.
The main conundrum in Chomskyan theory, according to Jones, is that truth then, can only be arrived at through the coincidental intersection between knowledge and reality.
Jones argues that biological determinism is vulgar materialism (influenced heavily by Cartesian mechanical philosophy). “Its materialism lies in the acceptance of the existence of a mind-independent material reality, its vulgarity in the simple reduction of the mental to the material (the biological).” (4/4)
This is just a small sampling of Marxist positions on determinism, be it economic determinism or biological determinism. This as an oft-argued point, and one that has no consensus. However, as was made clear above, Marx himself was more concerned with the destruction of the constraints that capitalism places on mankind’s ability to make choices with their lives and the shaping of history.