at no point is a human being having their body temporarily removed from existence.
This seems to be the thing that a lot of ideas forwarding the existence of persistent self come back to; the apparent dissolution of the body or brain. But this same idea rests on the implication that an entity can somehow experience non-existence; that a person who went through the teleporter would perceive the brief picoseconds when they were Not. Even leaving aside the technical question of whether the teleporter can dissasemble, transport and reassemble you faster than the sensory input of being dissasembled can reach your brain, this implication is shaky at best.
Things that are Not cannot experience their Notness. Thus, I'd say that from the perspective of the teleported person, there would be no time at which they were Not. Their brief Notness would be a quality only tangible to outside observers.
I don't agree that the "self" is stored in the brain. The body, the whole entire body, is an system of parts. Our gut is as responsible for how our brains function as our brain is responsible for the words that come out of our mouths. If the bacteria in our gut can cause depression then you literally can't remove the gut from the brain without affecting the personality of the human.
Given this, my conception of the "self" is of the body and its connection to the brain. If you cut a off my leg you have affected my self. I am now 1 legged and will take that into my sense of self presumably after a period of significant distress at the loss of a piece of myself.
This seems to be the thing that a lot of ideas forwarding the existence of persistent self come back to; the apparent dissolution of the body or brain. But this same idea rests on the implication that an entity can somehow experience non-existence; that a person who went through the teleporter would perceive the brief picoseconds when they were Not. Even leaving aside the technical question of whether the teleporter can dissasemble, transport and reassemble you faster than the sensory input of being dissasembled can reach your brain, this implication is shaky at best.
Things that are Not cannot experience their Notness. Thus, I’d say that from the perspective of the teleported person, there would be no time at which they were Not. Their brief Notness would be a quality only tangible to outside observers.
Ok so. If I copy you onto a data disk right now, then shoot you with a disintegrator gun. Then reconstruct you in 5 years time. Are you still the same person?
No of course not. You are a replica of the person that I shot in the head. You inability to experience your "notness" in the 5 years interval is meaningless to the discussion.
If I copy you onto a data disk right now, then shoot you with a disintegrator gun. Then reconstruct you in 5 years time. Are you still the same person?
Assuming no one stepped on the disk, why wouldn't I be?
Identical twins have different experiences. Their identities, even their biological makeup, diverge based on those different experiences. If you took a being and replicated it, then when their experiences diverged they would become functionally different beings. But if they both remember being the "original," both have an equally valid claim to that title.
I don't think many identical twins remember being the same zygote.
That's a non-falsifiable statement. And even if we assume it's true, do third parties' perceptions of a being matter more than that being's own self-definition?
I think so. Isn't our ability to understand the "self" at least in part governed by our ability to zoom out and look at ourselves from the third person perspective?
We do the mirror test on animals to measure their ability to understand their sense of self. This is literally about test their ability to view from a third party perspective.
To some extent our idea of the self is attached to our ability to perceive that perspective.
Isn’t our ability to understand the “self” at least in part governed by our ability to zoom out and look at ourselves from the third person perspective?
Yes, but that means there would be a tension in calling a being that percieved itself as original, "not original." It thinks of itself as the original, even if now there are two of it. Who are you to tell it that it's wrong? Do you have the right to deny it that identification?
There would be tension though. The third party would perceive the originality of the original vs the replica-ness of the replica. As soon as this is brought into focus for the replica what you are going to get is some sort of internal tension and crises about the self. Potentially manifested in denial, or it may manifest in other mental issues.
If both beings are identical and both have the same memories up to stepping into the teleporter, then "replicaness" or "originalness" is a purely theoretical label that can only be applied by outside observers, and even then only if one steps out of the teleporter before the other, and even then - as with this discussion, probably not without a lot of disagreement.
IDk, it all just seems to reinforce to me how "originality," like the idea of The Self itself, is a very flimsy concept.
I don't think it would identify as the original if it rationalises the situation correctly from a third party perspective. It would recognise that the original is dead, and that it is a replica.
What this would then do to a person's sense of self is... Uncertain. I would very much be concerned about the mental repercussions that occur and think it would require advanced study to see whether it causes mental illness. I would not be surprised if the body rationalises this as a trauma and a sense of physical dysphoria begins to occur.
That kind of thinking is entirely theoretical though given that we don't have the technology to test it and might never.
How do you define original if I'm functionally the same (and perceive myself as so) coming out of the disk as going into it? Am I not the same because the literal matter composing my body may be different? But the matter that composes our bodies changes daily. Minute-by-minute even. So that doesn't really hold up.
If you destroy a body in one place then recreate it perfectly in another place, then the "destruction" and the "death" are the silly abstract concepts. It's just movement.
If I'm upsetting you though, apologies. That wasn't the intention. I won't respond past this.
This seems to be the thing that a lot of ideas forwarding the existence of persistent self come back to; the apparent dissolution of the body or brain. But this same idea rests on the implication that an entity can somehow experience non-existence; that a person who went through the teleporter would perceive the brief picoseconds when they were Not. Even leaving aside the technical question of whether the teleporter can dissasemble, transport and reassemble you faster than the sensory input of being dissasembled can reach your brain, this implication is shaky at best.
Things that are Not cannot experience their Notness. Thus, I'd say that from the perspective of the teleported person, there would be no time at which they were Not. Their brief Notness would be a quality only tangible to outside observers.
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How would you reconcile this paradox? And what, if the original person is no more, do you say to the being that it insists it is the original person?
dont fucking build a "disassemble human atom by atom" button, shoot any :melon-musk: type who attempts to build such a button
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i would love a story about someone who botches their teleportation and their clone becomes their mortal enemy on a hunt throughout the universe
I don't agree that the "self" is stored in the brain. The body, the whole entire body, is an system of parts. Our gut is as responsible for how our brains function as our brain is responsible for the words that come out of our mouths. If the bacteria in our gut can cause depression then you literally can't remove the gut from the brain without affecting the personality of the human.
Given this, my conception of the "self" is of the body and its connection to the brain. If you cut a off my leg you have affected my self. I am now 1 legged and will take that into my sense of self presumably after a period of significant distress at the loss of a piece of myself.
Ok so. If I copy you onto a data disk right now, then shoot you with a disintegrator gun. Then reconstruct you in 5 years time. Are you still the same person?
No of course not. You are a replica of the person that I shot in the head. You inability to experience your "notness" in the 5 years interval is meaningless to the discussion.
Assuming no one stepped on the disk, why wouldn't I be?
You would be dead. A copy of you would exist.
I still don't see how you can meaningfully distinguish the two.
Do you also have a hard time distinguishing between identical twins? Come on.
Identical twins have different experiences. Their identities, even their biological makeup, diverge based on those different experiences. If you took a being and replicated it, then when their experiences diverged they would become functionally different beings. But if they both remember being the "original," both have an equally valid claim to that title.
I don't think many identical twins remember being the same zygote.
Remembering being the original and actually being the original are different things.
Again, how so?
Because any third party can see the difference. And you can rationalise the difference from understanding that third parties can see the difference.
That's a non-falsifiable statement. And even if we assume it's true, do third parties' perceptions of a being matter more than that being's own self-definition?
I think so. Isn't our ability to understand the "self" at least in part governed by our ability to zoom out and look at ourselves from the third person perspective?
We do the mirror test on animals to measure their ability to understand their sense of self. This is literally about test their ability to view from a third party perspective.
To some extent our idea of the self is attached to our ability to perceive that perspective.
Yes, but that means there would be a tension in calling a being that percieved itself as original, "not original." It thinks of itself as the original, even if now there are two of it. Who are you to tell it that it's wrong? Do you have the right to deny it that identification?
There would be tension though. The third party would perceive the originality of the original vs the replica-ness of the replica. As soon as this is brought into focus for the replica what you are going to get is some sort of internal tension and crises about the self. Potentially manifested in denial, or it may manifest in other mental issues.
If both beings are identical and both have the same memories up to stepping into the teleporter, then "replicaness" or "originalness" is a purely theoretical label that can only be applied by outside observers, and even then only if one steps out of the teleporter before the other, and even then - as with this discussion, probably not without a lot of disagreement.
IDk, it all just seems to reinforce to me how "originality," like the idea of The Self itself, is a very flimsy concept.
I don't think it would identify as the original if it rationalises the situation correctly from a third party perspective. It would recognise that the original is dead, and that it is a replica.
What this would then do to a person's sense of self is... Uncertain. I would very much be concerned about the mental repercussions that occur and think it would require advanced study to see whether it causes mental illness. I would not be surprised if the body rationalises this as a trauma and a sense of physical dysphoria begins to occur.
That kind of thinking is entirely theoretical though given that we don't have the technology to test it and might never.
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How do you define original if I'm functionally the same (and perceive myself as so) coming out of the disk as going into it? Am I not the same because the literal matter composing my body may be different? But the matter that composes our bodies changes daily. Minute-by-minute even. So that doesn't really hold up.
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If you destroy a body in one place then recreate it perfectly in another place, then the "destruction" and the "death" are the silly abstract concepts. It's just movement.
If I'm upsetting you though, apologies. That wasn't the intention. I won't respond past this.
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