China had an even more severe drug problem before the revolution:

Another country that once had an addiction problem—one that lasted for almost 200 years and involved an incredible 25 per cent of its population—is China.

China was forced into addiction by the Opium Wars. Contrary to popular belief, these wars—from 1839 to 1842 —did not originate because China wanted to export opium. They began when China resisted England's demand to import opium in exchange for Chinese products—mostly tea, silk, and porcelain. China lost these wars, and among other indignities was forced to exchange its goods for opium. As a result it became a highly narcoticized country, a victim of ruthless Western economic and political policy. By 1850 an entire fifth of the revenue of the British Government of India — the source of opium — came from Chinese consumption of this drug.

Unlike the CPP, which had decided to engage in tailism by aiding and staunchly supporting a reactionary capitalist government that made it clear from the beginning about their intentions to just outright violently exterminate drug addicts, most of whom were the urban poor working class (what communist parties are supposed to help represent and save from addiction), Mao’s Communist Party had a vastly different program to tackle the issue:

Equally significant in the Chinese drive to eliminate narcotic addiction were its methods of plugging the source, China is 80 percent rural, and an unknown but significant part of the land had been turned into poppy cultivation. The first major economic and political mass campaign of the Government was land reform, and this aim was coordinated with elimination of poppy growth. Distribution of land from large landholders to landless peasants was accompanied by the need to convert the opium cash crops to badly needed food crops. Today China produces enough opium to meet its medical needs, but no more.

Smuggled opium was still a source of the drug, and China acted to stop this supply with a policy of “carrot and stick.” Leniency was recommended for employees and workers of opium traffickers; but heavy penalties existed for those controlling the traffic, manufacture, or growth of opium.

China's attitude toward the individual reformed addict was one of good willed congratulations, and represents another important reason why the narcotic problem was overcome. The rehabilitation of opium addicts began with their registration. Arrangements by city‐wide antiopium committees for addict rehabilitation included treatment to break the habit at home, in clinics and in hospitals.

At every stage of personal rehabilitation the ideological motivation was stressed. Given China's attitudes, this ideology was strong on political, social, and economic information. But the important thing is that the anti drug campaign recognized that the desire and will of the addict is ultimately the controlling factor of addiction. China's policy was not simply to deprive a person of drugs, but to replace the need for narcotics with a forceful, national commitment. Equally significant, the former addict was fully accepted back into Chinese life without official stigma or prejudice.

Additionally:

Clinics were opened for the treatment of addicts, and indigent addicts were treated free of charge. An estimated one-third of the addicts "kicked" their habits by going "cold turkey." According to a report from Canton in 1952, of 5,723 registered addicts, 4,709 (or 82 percent) had been cured, with an astounding 4,265 of those (90.5 percent) having been cured at home. Chemotherapy was employed in some clinics and hospitals, but it is unclear which drugs were used. Most cures involved a gradual reduction of dosage, and took approximately 12 days to complete.

A single theme ran throughout the Chinese anti-opium campaign. This was that the addicts were victims of an oppressive system, and not criminals or social deviants. The anti-opium campaign was only part of an overall social policy which attempted to rid the country of many forms of oppression. In small meetings and mass rallies the people were told that now they had the opportunity to destroy remnants of the past such as opium addiction. The peasants and workers strongly supported this Mass Line and it was their unified, collective pressure which in the final analysis conquered opium addiction in China. Starting at the level of the chia (approximately ten family groups) they met to discuss the problem of addiction as it applied to their locale. Women's Federation and Youth League groups organized committees to aid the government, and wives and mothers were mobilized to put pressure on their addicted husbands and sons.

This mass support, so essential to the success of the antiopium campaign, was generated by the overall social reform which eliminated the cycle of poverty and frustration throughout China. Every citizen was guaranteed -- for the first time -- the right to enough food to live on, the right to a decent place in which to live, the right to a job, and the right to a basic equality of opportunity. These guarantees in turn supplied the people with a sense of purpose and faith in the future. Not only were the current addicts treated, but this sense of national purpose worked to insure that a new generation of addicts would not arrive to replace them. Today, the problem of addiction is so remote as to be an historical curiosity.

Meanwhile, the CPP’s leadership tried to falsely portray the right-wing Duterte as a progressive Hugo Chávez-like leader to the masses while also whitewashing Duterte's record in the party’s support of him:

One example: there is an allusion to Sison suggesting Philippine president Duterte could be a Chávez-like figure. But Sison was not just simply wrong in his assessment of what Duterte’s presidency would be like — he helped to bring it about. During the campaigning period, Sison spoke highly of Duterte, claimed a Duterte presidency would be good for “national unity” and, unique in Philippine history, had (via Skype) a publicized sympathetic talk with the presidential candidate. During the same period, the NPA released several POW’s to Duterte, further bolstering his claim he would be able to reach a peace agreement with them. All this helped create sympathy for Duterte among the National-Democratic mass base.

After Duterte became president, Sison called for a “critical honeymoon period” between Duterte and the National-Democrats. Sison suggested that Duterte would soon sign an agreement with the NDF and implement far-reaching social reforms. The CPP spoke of an “alliance” being forged between it and the president. Leading figures from the Nation-Democratic movement entered the cabinet, despite the rapidly escalating violence of the “war on drugs.”

This violence did not come as a surprise. From the late eighties on, Duterte was the mayor of Davao City. Long before he became president, he organized a death squad that murdered hundreds, mostly petty criminals, drug addicts, and street children. Despite this, Duterte and National-Democratic leaders cultivated cordial links.

The total death count of Duterte’s “war on drugs” is in the thousands and is still increasing. Sison carries part of the responsibility for this.

The CPP for decades has also engaged in Shining Path-like tactics, including the assassination of rival leftists, while the right continues to consolidate power: https://jacobin.com/2018/09/community-party-philippines-sison-ndf-murder