I feel like I understand communist theory pretty well at a basic level, and I believe in it, but I just don't see what part of it requires belief in an objective world of matter. I don't believe in matter and I'm still a communist. And it seems that in the 21st century most people believe in materialism but not communism. What part of "people should have access to the stuff they need to live" requires believing that such stuff is real? After all, there are nonmaterial industries and they still need communism. Workers in the music industry are producing something that nearly everyone can agree only exists in our heads. And they're still exploited by capital, despite musical instruments being relatively cheap these days, because capital owns the system of distribution networks and access to consumers that is the means of profitability for music. Spotify isn't material, it's a computer program. It's information. It's a thoughtform. Yet it's still a means of production that ought to be seized for the liberation of the musician worker. What does materialism have to do with any of this?
I've appreciated your comments so far, and if it isn't rude I wanted to know your thoughts on something.
Your insistence on belief, does belief come before an environmental change?
As well, in evolutionary biology, evolution is define as a change in allele frequencies. Evolution does not act on individuals but rather populations. Evolution is not forward looking either, it is a result of to prior generation and how it is affected through several mechanisms (natural selection, genetic drift, mutation, and gene flow) which is why discourse about 'superior' beings or 'more evolved' doesn't make sense, it's at heart contextual.
If humans are affected by natural selection in the same way as other organisms (but at a slower rate or near zero rate) then what analogue is there for conscious animals (let's say dogs, crows, dolphins, elephants, gorillas, etc.) and belief? Claiming to know the belief of animals is tricky as neuroscience is not very developed at the moment. Inferences could certainly be made as long as their provisional nature is accepted.
To be clear, I see parts of your view as anthropocentric. This isn't a negative claim, only to clarify my understanding which is more probably than not wrong.
No, that's idealism. Belief is constructed by the physical substrate. I think some of our contention is under the question "what is environmental?" Many people think the environment is that which is outside of the person, and they bind person and body and set the boundary to outside the body. My arm is part of my environment, my nervous system is part of my environment, in fact, my beliefs are ultimately part of my environment. I am part of my own environment, dialectically speaking, because I am a product of my environment and my environment is a product of me.
This is poetics. Evolution doesn't act at all. Evolution, in fact, doesn't exist as such. Evolution is the name we give to a boundary that we defined that contains a subset of processes that we observe in the environment. Mutation doesn't occur within populations or even individuals but rather in individual protein complexes and "traits" of individuals are constructed from those individual protein complexes and those individuals make up the populations. When you analyze this process dialectically, it becomes very clear that the boundary between environment and organism is almost entirely artificial and invented by humans.
That's why the liberal/Christian concept of self-improvement is meaningless. Simultaneously, I have subjective experience, I have desires and aversions, and I can change my behavior to maximize my desires and minimize my diversions. Is that objectively better? Does objectivity exist? Useless questions. What matters is that my experience can change in ways that I can subjectively qualify.
Which they are.
To imagine only the human animal can have a belief is exceptionalism.
What are beliefs except for stored representations of heuristics for behaviors? Whether you are aware of those beliefs or not is barely testable, but also not prima facie relevant. The most relevant aspect of belief seems to be that it can change. If we accept the premise that some behaviors are coded for in DNA (like the Sphex wasp), then we can different between beliefs and non-beliefs by investigating whether an organism can "learn". What does it mean to learn? Ultimately it means to process stimulus into changes in stored representations that impact behaviors. If you can learn, then it implies that you have beliefs and that those beliefs can change.
Of course they are. I'm an anthro. I can only reason from my experience. There is not other for us to reason. If dolphins could communicate with us, their views would be dolphin-centric and every attempt I made to understand their position would be through a reasoning-through-metaphor and ultimately translated to my anthropocentric view, because I cannot become a dolphin. There is no objective position, there is no position held by humans that isn't anthropocentric. We can say that there are certain assumptions that are unfounded because they do no rely on logical argument but instead rely entirely on the assumption that because it applies to humans it must apply to other animals, but when describing belief, I think we have a pretty well reasoned position about what belief is and how we test for it that does not rely on the assumption that the human experience is universalizable.
Wrong is a normative framing. I think your view doesn't fit the evidence and relies on specific ideological positions, most of which are the foundation of Western thought - objectivity, material reductionism, epistemology, the nature of truth, etc. I went through that, and in a lot of ways I'm still going through it, but I'm finding other ways of thinking about the world that match the evidence better. Dialectics is one of those.
I appreciate the response. I suppose the only issue I have is the confidence and declarative nature of the statements you make.
I don't know if anthropocentric views are incommensurable and need to be translated through metaphor. Nagel talks about this in "What is it like to be a bat?" I don't think it makes sense to think we are at the stage where we know exactly what we don't know.
I think what you said about artificial distinctions and boundaries makes sense, I only use them as they are useful. Would you say there is a limitedness to their usefulness? If so is there some epistemic system which would be more useful? Maybe one where we accept our limits as our experience is seemingly limited to our being human.
I suppose I hold out for the possibility of some emergent phenomena hitherto unknown and avoid declarative statements.
EDIT: To comment on what you said about your experience and you being anthropocentric, are those claims themselves not artificial distinctions made and used as heuristics? Or does some level of observation of which operates on the relation of oneself of constitute an artificial distinction?
When I said I was probably wrong I don't think I was making a normative claim. You can specify further to help me understand. I saw it as a probabilistic claim where say you have a distribution, a gaussian curve, and this statement has some qualities which are within some range in that curve which when communicated in simple language is easiest to convey as 'wrong'. The intent was to open a space for discussion and to make it easier to share your views as I explicitly mentioned a space where that could happen, i.e. in the space of me considering myself to not have accurately understood. Then it wouldn't be wrong but more so not exact enough to my satisfaction.