Lightning war/shock and awe/whatever you wanna call it is a western concept for sure but that doesn't mean Russia wouldn't have preferred to finish this quickly. The first month of the war was very obviously an attempt to quickly take out the Ukrainian govt and replace it - which failed because they heavily under-estimated the amount of resilience the Ukrainian state and military has built since 2014. Russia is now fighting a war of attrition and way better positioned for it than Ukraine but it wasn't their intention and it took months for them to swallow the fact that it was gonna be necessary (hence the mobilisation only coming months after).

like sorry but this is just revisionism of what happened in 2022

thinking about when Paul Bremer fired Iraq's entire army, and they left bases with their arms and ordnance and no prospects

I would say that some part of the Russian experience comes from the Soviet campaign in the aid of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. You captured the major Afghan ring road and more or less all the major cities, but then what? The reactionary mujahideen simply retreated to the countryside in the same way the Taliban did following the later American invasion. Funded by American weapons in the same way that NATO now funds Ukraine, the entire strategic paradigm shifts towards an endless defensive slog against counter-insurgency. You can't abandon your own established holdings, the major cities and its peoples, to consolidate properly for both PR/morale and humanitarian reasons and so the conflict is a long bleed. Once an equilibrium is established, you cannot strike out against the mujahideen-occupied countryside without drawing resources used to defend your established urban holdings. The Soviet and US Afghan Wars are examples of how precisely a long war should not be conducted.

The only long war in contemporary history which brutal attrition was the intention is a war that most ML don't study because it's a miserable inter-fraternal conflict between socialist states, the Sino-Vietnamese War.

The primary literature I'll reference is from a Chinese gusano professor, Xiaoming Zhang, who worked for the US Air War College (and ironically was later recently targetted by the FBI China Initiative and subsequently lost his job): "Zhang, X. 2015. Deng Xiaoping's Long War: The Conflict between China and Vietnam, 1979-1991. University of North Carolina Press." As it was sponsored by the literal US DoD (the first book I've ever read where there's a disclaimer that says: "The views expressed in this book are mine and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Department of the Air Force, the U.S. Department of Defense, or the U.S. government."), it is obviously ideologically reactionary but because it is meant to provide for the US military an account of PLA strategic planning and thus largely focuses on military analysis, that part is therefore worth reading.

The Sino-Vietnamese War is actually the war in all with the most parallels to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Deng's intentions for the war with Vietnam was principally "attitude adjustment." Vietnam had sided with the USSR in the Sino-Soviet Split and this was seen as a betrayal of China's support in the Vietnam War. It started with an initial invasion that was then, by Vietnamese argumentation, repelled. This is what NATOpedia classifies as the "official" Sino-Vietnamese War and in the Vietnamese narrative, it repelled an invader that was planning to sweep their their way through Hanoi all the way down to the Mekong Delta. But then the conflict kept going on.

As the author writes:

The Vietnamese leadership never seemed to comprehend the PRC’s strategy and war objectives, persistently maintaining that the 1979 invasion simply constituted a prelude to Beijing’s long-term scheme of infringing on Vietnamese sovereignty and independence. After China announced its withdrawal on 5 March, Hanoi called for a nationwide general mobilization for the war and began constructing defensive positions in and around Hanoi. By the end of May, the PLA had reverted to its normal alert status. Vietnam, however, remained on guard, stationing a large number of PAVN troops (allegedly 300,000) along border with China at a time when the economy was “in a worse state than at any time since 1975.”

As a result, Hanoi’s attempts to fight simultaneously in Cambodia and on its northern border took a growing national economic and social toll, subsuming Hanoi’s effort to modernize its economy and, more important, undermining its geopolitical ambitions. According to Fred Charles Iklé, “Governments tend to lose sight of the ending of wars and the nation’s interests that lie beyond it,” and many are “blind in failing to perceive that it is the outcome of the war, not the outcome of the campaigns within it” that determines how well their policies serve the nation’s interests. The Vietnamese leadership clearly failed to grasp the gravity of the situation and continued depending on the Soviet Union until its collapse in 1991. If the Vietnamese should draw any lessons from the 1979 war with China, one is, as one Vietnamese general later remarked, “We must learn how to live with our big neighbor.

By the conclusion of the border war in 1991-93, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, liberated from the US occupation and unified for over 20 years had still been unable to properly focus on its Doi Moi economic reforms, announced in 1986, due to the ongoing conflict:

In the end, only in 1990, after Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia, did the PLA pull its forces back from the occupied Vietnamese hills. Vietnam’s national pride and domestic politics made Hanoi’s leadership unable to tolerate Chinese occupation of any Vietnamese territory, even hills in the remote border region, and it therefore responded to Chinese military pressure with a tit-for-tat strategy. After 1984, Vietnam vigorously resisted Chinese military encroachments, initiating attacks and counterattacks with huge forces even when its economy was weak. Although the fighting took place far from Vietnam’s political and industrial heartland, the conflict encumbered the country’s economy for a long period of time. For China, battlefield costs were fractional at a time of economic prosperity. In this way, China strategically outmaneuvered Vietnam. Since the Hanoi leadership played into Beijing’s hands, China’s military pressure appears to have worked.

In June 1990, during his meeting with the Chinese ambassador in Hanoi, (General Secretary of the CPV) Nguyen Van Linh claimed to have been a student of Mao’s revolutionary theory and stated his great appreciation for China’s aid during Vietnam’s struggles against the French and Americans. He then admitted that Vietnam had wronged China and was willing to correct its mistakes. With respect to Cambodia, the Vietnamese leader expressed confidence that the situation would be resolved peacefully but urged both Vietnam and China to work together to prevent the West and the UN from meddling in Cambodia in the future. The exclusion of the Khmer Rouge from a future Cambodian government, Nguyen Van Linh admitted, was impractical.

The author also makes an allegation of an "agreement" between the two Communist Parties, which is rather interesting in light of the much hyped public Vietnamese antagonism towards China by the West:

A secret deal may have been made regarding how to address the unpleasant thirteen years so that the interlude would not imperil future Sino-Vietnamese relations. The two sides allegedly reached a tacit agreement that prohibited the media from publishing stories and scholars from conducting studies about the border conflict in hopes that the recent hostility would then fade from memory on both sides of the border. Both countries could then concentrate on rejuvenating their relationship. Once again, Vietnam looked to China for direction and guidance, and the relationship was described officially as “good neighbors, good friends, good comrades, good partners” (haolinju, haopengyou, haotongzhi, haohuoban).

Hexbear has been plagued by the coconut pill; it seems like everyone reverted to pre-2016 r/chapotraphouse. I've seen so many pro electoralism posts and the posts attacking Russia for "letting this happen" have the same reek as reddit armchair generals.

This is a GOOD post

Losing unambiguously Russian territory and having the enemy's flag raised over your villages and towns is totally humiliating for the Russian military and state, when the goal of this war is to demilitarise Ukraine and make Russians safer from Ukrainian nationalist extremism. Two years in and this is still possible - shows that they haven't managed to achieve their war aims yet. You can deny this if you want and act like I'm being a WaPo journalist about it if you want but this will make Russians living near the border feel a lot less like their government can protect them and it makes the Russian victory feel less inevitable.

They dealt with the previous incursions really quickly and effectively, too, so why not this one?

Ukraine is having manpower issues but they still have a lot of bodies to feed into the meatgrinder. If they carry on doing as they are doing, taking heavy losses and losing ground nonetheless, they're clearly just going to lose. This is a smarter move than just continuing to cede territory and lose men on the front. That being said, it won't change the overall strategic outlook for sure.

Yes, but if the Russian military knew what it was doing then it would have put this to bed within hours like the previous two Ukrainian incursions. I think they got complacent given how the Donbass front is going and paid the price.

That's your view but imagine you're a Russian living near that border and the govt is still failing to protect you or give the impression of protection when they launched this war 2 years ago on the basis of shielding ethnic Russians in Ukraine from Ukrainian nationalist extremism. How would that make you feel about the whole premise of the war, how long is it gonna take, how much confidence would it inspire that your sons are dying and being maimed for a good enough reason?

I think honestly that it might be a play to push Russia on negotiations - not that the Ukrainians are in the driver's seat regarding those, at all, but they're putting out feelers for peace and this is a move designed to prove that Russia hasn't gotten its war goals achieved at all (protecting ethnic Russians, in Ukraine and outside it). This makes it easier for the Russians to call for a negotiated settlement because it makes it more obvious that they're not really close to achieving their war aims and might not be for a long time yet - so why not try and work it out over a table?