2/2 Just how material the process of mind reading may be has become clearer in the light of recent neurological findings. For instance, many researchers now argue that the unique human ability to read the mind of those with whom we in-teract is ultimately based on a much more general feature of the brain that is not confined to humans: the so-called “mirror neurones” (Gallese and Goldman 1998).Perhaps the term is misleading. What is being referred to is an observation that has been made possible by modern neural imagery. The term mirror neurones means that exactly the same neurones are activated in our brains when, for example, we see someone raising their arm to point at the ceiling as when we perform the action ourselves. In other words, the action of alter requires from us a part of the same physiological process: the neural part as the action of ego.Indeed, a moment’s reflection makes us realize that, even without the arcane and somewhat contested biology of mirror neurones, the very nature of human communication mustinvolve something like this (Decety and Somerville 2003).3Let us consider a simple act of linguistic communica-tion. Here I follow Sperber and Wilson’s theory of relevance fairly closely (Sperber and Wilson 1986). For my message to come across when I say, for example: “Today we honor the memory of Roy Rappaport” a mechanism must occur that enables you to penetrate my brain and align yours so that its neuronal organization resembles mine. In order to do this, we both had to use a tool, sound waves in this case, but it cannot possibly be the sound waves, as such, that carried my meaning to you. Sound waves, poor things, are just sound waves. The reality is that sound waves enable me to modify your brain, or mind, so that its neuronal organization in part resembles mine, admittedly in a very limited way. And, of course, the ability to communicate in this way—to connect our neurones—is what makes culture possible because cul-ture must ultimately be based on the exchange of informa-tion. This can then be combined with other information and then transformed or reproduced through time and across space in a uniquely human way.The parallel neuronal modification implied by communica-tion has further important implications. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that it is possible for an individual to create ex nihilo a representation. Such a representation could then be said to be under that individual’s control because the process that produced it would be hers alone. However, when the representation comes from someone else’s brain (i.e., when it comes via the process of communication, which is in fact always the case, though to varying extents), the representation of one brain colonizes another. This process, whether it is conscious or subconscious, is the basis of all communication. In such a case, the created neuronal activ-ity of one brain is the material existing in another. By this means, the brains of different individuals interpenetrate materially so that the boundaries that we believe to be obvi-ous become problematic. What I am saying is very similar to what some writers, especially Ed Hutchins, call “distributed cognition” (Hutchins 1995). However, I would distance my argument from them on one minor point. Hutchins, in talking about this phenomenon, likes to refer to minds “not bounded by the skin” as if some sort of extra-biological process ex-isted. I am too literal-minded to feel comfortable with such phraseology, which makes the process in question appear surreal. The process of interpenetration I am discussing is straightforward and biological.

My other difference from the distributed cognition folks is not a disagreement; I simply would like to push their insights further. Hutchins is famous for his demonstration of the way the knowledge necessary to navigate a big ship is not held in the head of any one crew member; it is distributed in a group. In an action such as coping with an emergency, each individual does his job as best he can in the light of his own knowledge, but in doing so he relies on other individu-als who have other bits of knowledge necessary to navigate the ship that he does not and does not need to have. This is what Hutchins calls distributed cognition. For this type of reliance on the knowledge of others to be possible, the differ-ent individuals need to trust that the others know what they are doing and are well intentioned. This means that people can then act on what they know is incomplete knowledge, but which they trust is completed by the knowledge others have, to the extent of acting on that which they do not need fully to understand. It is not that they rely wholly on others; they rely on others at the very moment they rely on their own knowledge.

By using this particular formulation, I deliberately align what I am saying with the point made by a group of phi-losophers who, following Hilary Putnam and the “deference” theorists, stress that social life is based on trust of others; basically on the default assumption that these others with whom we are in contact are normally competent and coopera-tive. In other words, because of our theory of mind adapta-tion, we continually interpenetrate as we communicate and hold as true information that makes sense only because it is also contained or continuous with that in other minds (Put-nam 1975; Burge 1993; Orrigi 2000). This is the nature of human cognition, which is essentially social. Such a state of affairs makes it possible that the content of knowledge stored in an individual is not to be understood nor consciously sought to be understood, but this individual is likely to be aware of the solidarity on which the whole system of social cognition is based, and this may be greatly valued. This is a point to which I shall return."

I hope that helps some! I find it extremely fascinating.