“As soon as the Bolsheviks break away from the masses and lose contact with them, they should cover themselves with bureaucratic rust, so that they lose all strength and become an empty shell,” Stalin warned
Today, even the vicious enemies of Soviet power do not deny the rapid economic development of the Soviet country in the pre-war years. True, the slanderers are trying to denigrate the labor feat of the Soviet people, keeping silent about the popular enthusiasm of the builders of the first Stalinist five-year plans and assuring that the Soviet economy was created only with the help of gross violence. However, it is impossible to deny the existence of factories, factories, entire industries, large cities created during the Stalinist five-year plans that still exist today.
But the anti-Soviets do not want to hear when evidence is presented about the democratic character of the Soviet political system. Having distorted the concept of "democracy", which from time immemorial meant "rule of the people," the apologists of capitalism assert that the bourgeois system, which consolidates the omnipotence of the exploiting minority, is the pinnacle of democracy. Since the victory of capitalism in Russia put an end to true democracy and no traces of the former democracy remain, it is easier for slanderers to prove, especially to the generation born after 1991, that the USSR was a kingdom of tyranny and terror.
The slanderers who control the mass consciousness of modern Russia are especially hated by the evidence of Stalin's role in the implementation of democratic political transformations. They hysterically declare that Stalin and democracy are incompatible concepts. Perhaps for this reason, citing indisputable archival documents about the political reforms of the 30s, carried out on the initiative of I.V. Stalin, the historian Yuri Zhukov called his book "Another Stalin". The idea of Stalin as a fighter for the democratization of Soviet society contradicts the ideas embedded in the mass consciousness. Indeed, in accordance with them, the Soviet system, created on the basis of communist doctrine, is the embodiment of tyranny.
Meanwhile, Stalin's struggle for democratic political reforms naturally and logically followed from his Marxist-Leninist ideas about the development of democracy as socialism was being built, as well as about the correspondence of the political institutions of society to the nature of its economic relations. In the mid-1930s, Stalin raised the question of the need for democratic changes in the country's constitutional structure, which would reflect the grandiose changes that had taken place in the economy and social life of Soviet society.
How the 1936 Constitution was created
The current authorities and the bourgeois media try not to remember the Stalinist Constitution. If it is mentioned, it is portrayed as a "smokescreen" designed to hide the mass repressions prepared in advance. So, in his book about Stalin, E. Radzinsky wrote: "Before the New Year, Stalin arranged a holiday for the people: he gave him the Constitution, written by poor Bukharin." This short phrase contains several factual errors. First, the Constitution was adopted not “just before the New Year,” but on December 5, 1936. Secondly, the new Constitution was not "given" from above. Its adoption was preceded by many months of nationwide discussions of the draft constitution. Thirdly, Bukharin was not the author of the Constitution, but only headed one of the subcommissions on its preparation.
The myth of Bukharin as the creator of the Soviet Constitution is constantly repeated today on all television channels. The host of the Top Secret program Svyatoslav Kucher called Bukharin the "Creator of the Constitution". Even during one of the popular programs "Clever and Clever", its participants were taught that the Constitution of 1936 was written by Bukharin.
In fact, the Constitution was not the product of one man's efforts. The development of individual sections of the Basic Law of the USSR was carried out by 12 subcommissions, and their proposals were summarized by the editorial commission, which consisted of twelve chairmen of the subcommissions. At the same time, the facts indicate that the initiative to revise the 1924 constitution, and then to create a new constitution, came from I.V. Stalin. At a meeting of the Politburo on May 10, 1934, at the suggestion of Stalin, a decision was made to amend the country's Constitution. Stalin headed the entire editorial commission, as well as the subcommittee on general issues.
In a conversation with the author of this article, the former chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR A.I. Lukyanov told how in 1962, fulfilling the instructions of the then leadership of the country, he had the opportunity for several months to study archival materials concerning Stalin's work on the draft Constitution. A detailed note on this issue of several hundred pages was written by Lukyanov and presented by him to the Presidium of the Central Committee.
From the materials with which he got acquainted, it followed that in the course of their work, the members of the editorial commission brought Stalin various versions of the so-called rough draft of the draft constitution. After that, Stalin re-ruled her articles over and over again.
A.I. Lukyanov emphasized: “Joseph Vissarionovich understood very well that the essence of socialist democracy is to ensure real human rights in society. And when N. Bukharin, who headed the legal subcommittee, proposed to preface the text of the constitution with the "Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Citizens of the USSR," Stalin did not agree with this and insisted that the rights of a Soviet citizen be enshrined directly in the articles of the constitution. Moreover, they were not just proclaimed, but guaranteed in the most detailed way. So for the first time in world practice, the Basic Law of the country introduced the rights to work, rest, free education and health care, social security in old age and in case of illness. "
Anatoly Ivanovich Lukyanov further noted: “It was amazing how meticulously Stalin worked on the wording of each article of the constitution. He revised them many times before bringing the final text up for discussion. So the 126th article, which deals with the right of citizens to unite, Stalin wrote himself and rewrote and revised several times. " In total, Stalin personally wrote eleven of the most significant articles of the Basic Law of the USSR.
According to Lukyanov, Stalin, trying to develop the democratic foundations of the Soviet system, carefully looked at the historical experience of world parliamentarism. A record of his speech has been preserved in the archives: “There will be no congresses ... The Presidium is the interpreter of laws. The legislator is a session (parliament) ... The executive committee is not good, there are no more congresses. Soviet of Working People's Deputies. Two chambers. Supreme Legislative Assembly ". By agreement with I.V. Stalin V.M. Molotov, in his report at the VII Congress (February 1935), spoke of a gradual movement "towards a kind of Soviet parliaments in the republics and towards an all-Union parliament."
At the same time, Lukyanov emphasized, it should be borne in mind that Stalin did not mechanically copy the models of parliamentary practice, but took into account the experience of the Soviets accumulated over two decades. He personally included in the text of the Constitution the 2nd and 3rd articles, stating that the political basis of the USSR is made up of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies, which grew and became stronger as a result of the overthrow of the power of the landowners and capitalists and the conquest of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and that all power in the USSR belongs to the working people of the city and villages, represented by the Soviets, who do not know the division of powers and have the right to consider any issues of national and local importance.
Another important principle was the supremacy of the Soviets over all accountable state bodies based on mass representation (more than 2 million deputies) and the right of the Soviets to decide, directly or through their subordinate bodies, all issues of state, economic and socio-cultural development.
By March 1936, work on the text was largely completed. In April, the "Rough Draft" of the Constitution of the USSR was developed. It, in turn, was revised into the "Preliminary draft of the Constitution of the USSR", which on May 15, 1936 was adopted by the constitutional commission. Then the project was approved by the June (1936) plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and on June 11 - by the Presidium of the USSR Central Executive Committee, which ordered its publication.
The draft Constitution of the USSR was published in all newspapers of the country, broadcast on the radio, published in separate brochures in one hundred languages of the peoples of the USSR with a circulation of over 70 million copies. The scope of the nationwide discussion of the draft is evidenced by the following data: it was discussed at 450 thousand meetings and 160 thousand plenums of the Soviets and their executive committees, meetings of sections and deputy groups; over 50 million people (55% of the country's adult population) took part in these meetings and sessions; during the discussion, about 2 million amendments, additions and proposals to the project were made. The latter circumstance testifies to the fact that the discussion of the draft was not formal.
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However, many leaders from the leading cadres of the party resisted the adoption of the new Constitution. Ignoring the changes in Soviet society, they came into conflict with the dictates of history, opposing them with their own selfish interests under the pretext of fighting to preserve the "class foundations" of Soviet society. Although on May 10, 1934, at a meeting of the Politburo, the Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR A.S. Yenukidze was instructed to prepare proposals for a new election procedure, he stubbornly hindered the development of this resolution. (About Yenukidze's opposition to Stalin's constitutional reform is described in detail in Yuri Zhukov's book "Another Stalin".) At first, Yenukidze tried to drag out the issue of constitutional changes. Having hardly agreed to direct and equal elections, Yenukidze never included the clause on secret elections in the draft proposal,
Later it became known that Yenukidze, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR G.G. Yagoda, as well as a group of military leaders, began to prepare a conspiracy. Their initial goal was to destabilize the situation in the country, to unleash repressions, which would make it impossible to implement democratic constitutional reforms. At the same time, preparations were under way for a coup d'état. One of the victims of the conspirators was a member of the Politburo and head of the Leningrad party organization S.M. Kirov. (See Appendix to "SR" Clues dated March 31, 2011, No. 3. "Shot in Smolny".)
Although the plans of the conspirators were thwarted by the removal of Yenukidze and then Yagoda from power, resistance to the USSR Constitution and the new election procedure did not stop. Some party leaders tried to use the party cleansing and the campaign against the "disguised class enemy" that unfolded after the assassination of S.M. Kirov, for whipping up suspicion in society and reprisals against their potential competitors.
These sentiments manifested themselves even after the adoption of the Stalinist Constitution during the February-March (1937) plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). In their speeches, members of the Central Committee S.V. Kosior, R.I. Eikhe, P.P. Postyshev, B.P. Sheboldaev, I.M. Vareikis, K. Ya. Bauman, Ya.B. Gamarnik, A.I. Egorov, G.N. Kaminsky, P.P. Lyubchenko, V.I. Mezhlauk, B.P. Posern, J.E. Rudzutak, M.L. Rukhimovich, M.M. Khataevich, V. Ya. Chubar, I.E. Yakir and others demanded large-scale repressions against the secret Trotskyists and their accomplices.
Blatantly distorting historical facts in his report at a closed session of the XX Congress of the CPSU, N.S. Khrushchev assured that "Stalin's report at the February-March plenum of the Central Committee in 1937" On the shortcomings of party work and methods for eliminating Trotskyist and other double-dealers " escalate. " Khrushchev kept silent that this thesis was put forward by Stalin not in 1937, but in 1928. In addition, he distorted the meaning and content of Stalin's speeches at the plenum.
Beginning on March 3, 1937, his report at this plenum with a condemnation of "political carelessness", Stalin seemed to support the prevailing sentiments among the members of the Central Committee. He cited historical facts about espionage and sabotage activities during the Napoleonic Wars, which were unknown to many party members. The secretary general condemned the party members for not understanding the evolution of Trotskyism over the "last 7-8 years", pointing out that modern Trotskyism "is not a political trend in the working class, but an unprincipled and unprincipled gang of saboteurs, saboteurs, intelligence officers and spies, murderers, a gang of sworn enemies of the working class employed by the intelligence agencies of foreign states. "
However, in his closing remarks on March 5, Stalin called for restraint in using the label "Trotskyist" in the ideological and political struggle. He drew attention to the need to take into account changes in the views of certain former Trotskyists. Stalin said: “In the speeches of some comrades, the thought slipped ... let's now beat right and left anyone who has ever walked along the same street with a Trotskyist or has ever dined in the same public canteen somewhere in the neighborhood of a Trotskyist ... It won't work, it won't do. Among the former Trotskyists we have wonderful people, you know this, good workers who accidentally fell into the hands of the Trotskyists, then broke with them and work like real Bolsheviks, whom you can envy. One of these was Comrade Dzerzhinsky. (Voice from the seat: "Who?") Comrade Dzerzhinsky, you knew him. That's why,
Stalin also reminded that the discussion of 1927 had already shown the numerical weakness of the Trotskyists. Stalin suggested that at that time "about 12 thousand party members" supported Trotskyism in one way or another. “Here is the whole strength of Messrs. Trotskyists. Add to this the fact that many of this number became disillusioned with Trotskyism and abandoned it, and you will get an idea of the insignificance of Trotskyism. "
In addition, Stalin accused the party leaders who were not named by him for the fact that the Trotskyists still had reserves in the party. Recalling the party purge carried out in 1935-1936, he said: “The fact that we have excluded tens, hundreds of thousands of people during this time, that we have shown a lot of inhumanity, bureaucratic heartlessness in relation to the fate of individual party members, over the past two years, there was a purge and then the exchange of party cards - 300 thousand were expelled. So since 1922 we have had one and a half million expelled. The fact that at some factories, for example, if you take the Kolomna plant ... How many thousands of workers are there? (Voice from the floor: "Thirty thousand.") There are now 1,400 party members, and there are 2,000 former members and those who left this factory and expelled from one factory. As you can see, such a balance of forces: 1,400 party members - and 2,000 former members at the plant. All these outrages that you have allowed - all this is water for the mill of our enemies ... All this creates an environment for the enemies - both for the Rights, and for the Trotskyists, and for the Zinovievites, and for anyone else. This soulless policy, comrades, must be done away with. " (It should be noted that the party organization of the Kolomna plant was under the leadership of the MK VKP (b), headed by NS Khrushchev, and this "soulless policy" was carried out with the knowledge of the future fighter against the "personality cult" and repressions of the 1930s.) comrades, we must end it. " (It should be noted that the party organization of the Kolomna plant was under the leadership of the MK VKP (b), headed by NS Khrushchev, and this "soulless policy" was carried out with the knowledge of the future fighter against the "personality cult" and repressions of the 1930s.) comrades, we must end it. " (It should be noted that the party organization of the Kolomna plant was under the leadership of the MK VKP (b), headed by NS Khrushchev, and this "soulless policy" was carried out with the knowledge of the future fighter against the "personality cult" and repressions of the 1930s.)
In his speeches at the plenum, Stalin dwelled on the "shadow sides of economic success", pointing out "the mood of carelessness and complacency ... the atmosphere of ceremonial celebrations and mutual greetings, killing the sense of proportion and dulling the political instinct." Stalin drew attention to the fact that "successes" should not become a reason for complacency. He remarked: “It has been proven that all our economic plans are understated, because they do not take into account the enormous reserves and opportunities lurking in the depths of our national economy ... plans for some very important sectors of the national economy ”.
In his closing remarks, Stalin expanded the list of vices of the "party comrades" to which he pointed out, in addition to conceit, political blindness, carelessness and complacency. He stated that the principles of loyalty to the party and the suitability of a person for the performance of work are often ignored in the selection of personnel. Instead, Stalin said, "people are sometimes selected not according to political and business principles, but from the point of view of personal acquaintance, personal devotion, friendly relations, in general according to the characteristics of a philistine character, according to characteristics that have no place in our practice."
Stalin demanded: “It is necessary to restore party assets and non-party assets under the people's commissariats, at enterprises - what was previously called a production conference ... And another means is the restoration of democratic centralism in our internal party life. This is also a test, comrades. Restoring the election of party bodies on the basis of the charter. Secret elections, the right to reject candidates without exception and the right to criticize. Here's the second checker from the bottom. " Stalin stressed that the establishment of secret elections in the party is in the spirit of the new Constitution of the USSR. He said: "The elections to the supreme bodies of power we are organizing will be a big test for many of our workers."
Stalin stressed: “Lenin taught us not only to teach the masses, but also to learn from the masses. He called for "to listen sensitively to the voice of the masses, to the voice of rank-and-file party members, to the voice of the so-called little people, to the voice of the people."
Stalin warned: "As soon as the Bolsheviks break away from the masses and lose contact with them, it is necessary for them to cover themselves with bureaucratic rust, so that they lose all strength and become an empty shell." The fact that the "party comrades" did not listen to the "voice of the masses" led Stalin to worrying thoughts. This was evidenced by his appeal to the ancient Greek myth of Antaeus. Stalin recalled that this hero "still had his weak point - the danger of being torn off the ground in any way." Since in the myth of the exploits of Hercules, the latter defeated Antaeus, Stalin's comparison sounded like an ominous prophecy. Stalin ended his retelling of the myth as follows: “I think that the Bolsheviks remind us of the hero of Greek mythology, Antaeus. They, just like Antaeus, are strong in that they keep in touch with their mother, with the masses who have given birth, nursed and raised them. And as long as they keep in touch with their mother, they have every chance of remaining invincible. This is the key to the invincibility of the Bolshevik leadership. "
In his report on March 3, Stalin put forward a program of general political retraining at many months of courses for all party leaders from top to bottom - from secretaries of primary organizations to members of the Politburo and secretaries of the Central Committee.
Explaining "how our cadres must be trained and retrained in the spirit of Leninism," Stalin declared that "first of all, comrades, we must be able to strain ourselves and prepare two deputies for each of us." These deputies had to pass the approval of higher authorities. It was assumed that the appointment of deputies was necessary in order for them to fulfill the duties of the current leaders during their studies, and then they should also be sent to the same training courses. Stalin did not hide the fact that he saw in these swings a possible change of the current leaders. He declared the need to infuse into the command cadres “fresh forces awaiting their promotion, and thus expand the composition of the leading cadres ... We have tens of thousands of capable people, talented people. You just need to know them and put them forward in time, so that they do not stop in their old place and do not start to rot.
Declaring the possibility of promoting new people to managerial positions, opposing the wisdom of the "little people" to the arrogant bosses, Stalin made it clear about his extreme dissatisfaction with the staff at all levels of management. In fact, Stalin declared all leading positions in the party vacant and announced a wide competition for these positions, nominating up to three candidates for at least each vacancy. All participants in this competition had to go through an extensive political study program, and the winners of the competition had to meet the requirements that would be presented to them by both the top leadership and the party masses.
It can be assumed that the heads of departments, law enforcement and economic at different levels had to withstand a similar competition. Stalin recalled that the verification of the leaders by the masses was in the spirit of the newly adopted Constitution, and stated that "the people are checking the leaders of the country during elections to the bodies of power of the Soviet Union by universal, equal, direct and secret ballot."
It is quite obvious that, in spite of the desire of a number of party leaders to unleash repressions in order to disrupt the holding of elections according to the new order and preserve his high posts, Stalin put forward a program of broad democratization within the party in the spirit of the newly adopted Constitution, which reflected the deepening of the socialist revolution in the country.
At the same time, Stalin believed that the mechanical replacement of some leaders with others, even more educated ones, was insufficient. Stalin emphasized the paramount importance of the ideological and theoretical training of party leaders. Recognizing the difficulty of assimilating the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, Stalin said: "You cannot demand from every member of the party that he assimilated Marxism." However, he further remarked: “I do not know how many members of the Central Committee have adopted Marxism. How many secretaries of regional and regional committees have adopted Marxism? " (These words remained only in an uncorrected verbatim version of Stalin's concluding speech, but were excluded from the published text in Pravda.) Surely, as before, he was extremely worried about the superficial acquaintance of party leaders with Marxism.
Stalin hoped that a general retraining of party cadres would help equip them ideologically and theoretically. He emphasized: “If we were able to prepare our party cadres from top to bottom ideologically, to temper them politically in such a way that they could freely orientate themselves in the domestic and international situation, if we could make them quite mature Leninists, Marxists, capable of solving issues without serious mistakes leadership of the country, then we would have solved nine-tenths of all our tasks. "
Such a program of general retraining of the country's ruling cadres had no precedents in world history. The program showed that a socialist society could develop successfully only on the basis of constant improvement. One of the manifestations of this was the constant increase in the educational level of all Soviet people, especially party leaders. This program corresponded to the principles of the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the dialectical development and scientific organization of socialist society.
Written by Yu. Emelyanov,
16 August 2012