The sino-soviet split leading to China taking opposite positions in foreign policy to the USSR ,espcially around them

In a more serious note from a geopolitical perspective (it wasnt just ideological) China even tho it went to far in the other side had legitame missgeavings and fears of the Soviet Union leading into shitty ass foreign policy positions in the 70s. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the proclamation of the Brezhnev Doctrine sent alarm bells ringing in China. In the eyes of the Chinese the Soviet Union was now claiming they had the right to intervene in any communist country not following its brand of Marxism-Leninism. To China’s leaders, this was a clear threat directed against them.Especially after since relations were already sour after the late 50s and Kruschev’s de-stalinization that was openly opposed both domesticaly and in the communist world stage by Mao. Party under Kruschev already looked down on the chinese communists and held a elitist view of their leading and deciding role on the world stage. Even under Stalin stuff were complicated tho easily better. A further complication was the Cultural Revolution in China. With its (correct) critique of Soviet ‘revisionism’, the mass movement had flamed anti-Soviet system sentiments among the Chinese leadership and populace.

For a specific example ,in consideration of the above factors, Mao and other Chinese leaders ordered the People’s Liberation Army to double down on their presence on the disputed Zhenbao Island and in the general borders, with small india-china rn style cross border clashes started happening. The Soviets struck back by launching an ambush against a Chinese border patrol in Xinjiang. Chinese intent was to serve as a warning to the Soviet Union that they cant and shouldnt try to have direct influence over the PRC. That they werent to be what countries of the eastern bloc were in relation to the USSR, and not to provoke a general war. The chinese revolution was largely one of anti colonial national liberation after all and the scars and fears of foreign influence run deep. Thus, Chinese leaders were shocked when news reached them of Soviet military, and more ominously, nuclear build-up…It seems that there was genuine discussion among revisionist Soviet military and political leadership of a nuclear strike to china .As Soviet archives on events in 1969 remain closed, historians can only rely on testimonies from Soviet officials. The Soviet diplomat Arkady Shevchenko claimed:

The Politburo was terrified that the Chinese might make a large-scale intrusion into Soviet territory which China claimed…From others I heard that the Soviet leadership had come close to using nuclear arms on China. A [Foreign] Ministry colleague who had been present at the Politburo discussion told me that Marshal Andrei Grechko, the Defense Minister, advocated a plan to “once and for all get rid of the Chinese threat.” He called for unrestricted use of multi-megaton bombs…Fortunately, not many military men shared Grechko’s mad, bellicose stance…I talked with one of Grechko’s colleagues, [General] Nikolai Ogarkov…[who] took a more realist view of the prospect of war with China…[He proposed] the alternative…to use a limited number of nuclear weapons in a kind of “surgical operation” to intimidate the Chinese and destroy their nuclear facilities…Disagreements about bombing China stalemated the Politburo…for several months.

Senior Counselor to the USSR United Nations Delegation, Valentin Karymov, stated that every kind of contingency plan was considered, including preventive strikes. Lev Deluisin, a China specialist in the Foreign Ministry, had this to say:

Discussions occurred about whether to carry out a preventive strike against all of China’s nuclear complexes so as to resolve the problem…fortunately, the government rejected these options, but these opinions were expressed.

Mao and the Chinese leaders were horrified. In August, the war scare in China reached its fever pitch. On 27 August, the CPC Central Committee issued an urgent order for the large-scale evacuation of Chinese population and main industries from big cities, while calling upon workers and residents in big cities to begin digging air-raid shelters and stockpiling everyday materials to prepare for a nuclear strike. On 28 August, an urgent mobilisation order was issued to China’s border provinces and regions. Party committees, government agencies, military commands, and ordinary citizens in provinces adjacent to the USSR were urged to be prepared for a large-scale Soviet surprise attack, while PLA forces along the Sino-Soviet border entered an emergency status of combat readiness.

Both sides recognised that drastic action was needed to stop escalation. This was achieved in a meeting at Beijing airport between Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai and Soviet Foreign Minister Kosygin on 11 September. This meeting effectively ended the phase of military build-up between the USSR and China, although the rattled Chinese leadership continued to issue emergency orders until mid-October 1969. It was in this atmosphere of fear that Mao started to see the USSR as China’s “main enemy”, and the seeds of a Sino-American rapprochement were planted.

This is major an example of the context behind china wanting to do away with soviet influence anywhere near them and basicaly deciding to be nega-USSR in their foreign policy and lliances. Tho there are other similarly important factors