I'm not sure I agree with the assessment on France. I might be mistaken, but I was under the impression they had a reasonable strategy for regrouping after the Nazis decided to give up on going through the Maginot line. The issue was that they misjudged the pace at which the Nazis would make it through the Ardennes. And if I'm not mistaken, the reason for that misjudgement was they didn't expect that amphetamine fueled soldiers would be able to work the hours they did.
I think the battle of France kind of came down to luck on the timing more than either tactics or the "unstoppable German War machine".
I also recall hearing that there were fascist collaborators among the French bougeoise that helped call for the capitulation of the French state instead of trying to reorganize the military to fight the fascist invaders. But I need to research that more so concider it hearsay and not fact.
the improvement to allied affairs would be pretty limited after a capture of Paris, Brits were out and the remainder of the army were gonna get smashed. a steadfastly allied French fleet woudda helped but clearly wasn't actually necessary for victory. maybe non-Vichy algeria would've put the screws to the italians but imo its equally likely they'd pathetically fold :shrug-outta-hecks:
the French staff literally thought a substantial armored force couldn't go through the Ardennes. they ignored intelligence giving them advanced warning because it was not a possibility and the scouts mustve been mistaken. they could've moved more troops to counter, attacked them aerially/conventionally in the forest, but their rigid understanding of the combat theater blinded them until it was too late.
i wouldn't necessarily call it an 'outdated command structure' but poor leadership & strategic inflexibility in spades
I'm not sure I agree with the assessment on France. I might be mistaken, but I was under the impression they had a reasonable strategy for regrouping after the Nazis decided to give up on going through the Maginot line. The issue was that they misjudged the pace at which the Nazis would make it through the Ardennes. And if I'm not mistaken, the reason for that misjudgement was they didn't expect that amphetamine fueled soldiers would be able to work the hours they did.
I think the battle of France kind of came down to luck on the timing more than either tactics or the "unstoppable German War machine".
I also recall hearing that there were fascist collaborators among the French bougeoise that helped call for the capitulation of the French state instead of trying to reorganize the military to fight the fascist invaders. But I need to research that more so concider it hearsay and not fact.
the improvement to allied affairs would be pretty limited after a capture of Paris, Brits were out and the remainder of the army were gonna get smashed. a steadfastly allied French fleet woudda helped but clearly wasn't actually necessary for victory. maybe non-Vichy algeria would've put the screws to the italians but imo its equally likely they'd pathetically fold :shrug-outta-hecks:
the French staff literally thought a substantial armored force couldn't go through the Ardennes. they ignored intelligence giving them advanced warning because it was not a possibility and the scouts mustve been mistaken. they could've moved more troops to counter, attacked them aerially/conventionally in the forest, but their rigid understanding of the combat theater blinded them until it was too late.
i wouldn't necessarily call it an 'outdated command structure' but poor leadership & strategic inflexibility in spades