There's links to the source materials within the link provided, but beware: "LessWrong" is itself a cognitohazard a bit like Scientology is, with its own distorted vocabulary, belief that the entire rest of the world is ignorant of their enlightened truth, and all that other standard cult stuff.
A cult that is seriously based on a fucking Harry Potter fanfic, and is paid millions of dollars by billionaires because they like the cult's message. :so-true: :solidarity: :porky-happy:
the copy is not you. If it didn't vaporise the original then there wouldn't be two yous. there would be one you with continuity of experience and one copy. This isn't a ship of theseus argument as I can lose an arm and still be me I am not arguing that my cells contain my personage but that my personage also isn't contained in their exact formulation
As for the dungeon vs vaporisation argument it seems to not understand dying as a potential consequence of a situation as being vaporised is just a fancy word here for killed, the version of you which walked in to the room would be killed and that would be the end of them
deleted by creator
Maybe so, to outside observation.
If the original wasn't destroyed in the process, there's still the fact that they're still there and a copy was made somewhere else. Unless there was some parlor trick done on purpose where outside observers were deliberately not allowed to know which one was the original, it's a shakey magical thinking premise to claim that the original, while still alive, somehow lost any ownership, even by way of external observation, of being what it already was.
continuity of experience is not the relevant factor here clearly there is some animating factor of a person that is unreproducible or we would be able to construct a person/bring a corpse to life. This factor would be snuffed out in the person who walks in the room and I personally think it would be impossible to create a living copy out of cells. A human being is not fungible for another human in the way 7 is for 7
creating a copy does not affect the original just as destroying the original does not destroy the copy this implies that they are separate beings and therefore there is no continuity of conciousness despite continuity of perceived experience. a person existing with an exact copy made of them would not continue to have that persons experiences from then on which indicates they are different.
when you destroy a physical body the person in it dies as they need that body to sustain their life
If I crush a pen and simultaneously make a new pen I have not moved the pen
The moment the "perfect copy of you is actually you" theory has to allow for the additional thought experiment possibility of "what if the original didn't die in the first place when the copy was made" the entire premise falls apart.
Does death "materialistically" in a totally not magical way make that copy actually "you" because a death occured?