Well you've created a physically distinct human being that shares the exact same subjective experience - up to the divergent point, encoded in memory - as the original. I still fail to see how this proves anything about consciousness or its dependency on physical continuity. You might also have to be a bit clearer what you're arguing: if you mean that the post-split original (person 1) is the pre-split original (person 0) in a way that the post-split copy (person 2) is not, in what sense? What kind of identity does person 1 share with person 0 that person 2 does not? How does that identity relate to subjective conscious experience?
Or another route: try playing with the knobs on your thought experiment a bit. Instead of leaving one original, split them and rebuild each half into a full person. What kind of identity do either of these people share with person 0?
Well you've created a physically distinct human being that shares the exact same subjective experience - up to the divergent point, encoded in memory - as the original. I still fail to see how this proves anything about consciousness or its dependency on physical continuity. You might also have to be a bit clearer what you're arguing: if you mean that the post-split original (person 1) is the pre-split original (person 0) in a way that the post-split copy (person 2) is not, in what sense? What kind of identity does person 1 share with person 0 that person 2 does not? How does that identity relate to subjective conscious experience?
Or another route: try playing with the knobs on your thought experiment a bit. Instead of leaving one original, split them and rebuild each half into a full person. What kind of identity do either of these people share with person 0?