I think it was a calculated risk, but it was “very high risk, very high reward”, ie it was almost certainly going to fail but if it did succeed then they would have won the war in week 2 instead of year 5 therefore, despite the high probability of failure, the risk-reward calculus still made it worthwhile.
And then given the high probability of failure, the campaign doubled as a feint to draw forces away from the main thrust in the south.
The idea it must be either a failed offensive or a feint is a bit false. It could also be a high risk gambit that in the expected event of failure became a planned feint.
I think it was a calculated risk, but it was “very high risk, very high reward”, ie it was almost certainly going to fail but if it did succeed then they would have won the war in week 2 instead of year 5 therefore, despite the high probability of failure, the risk-reward calculus still made it worthwhile.
And then given the high probability of failure, the campaign doubled as a feint to draw forces away from the main thrust in the south.
The idea it must be either a failed offensive or a feint is a bit false. It could also be a high risk gambit that in the expected event of failure became a planned feint.