Sure. So in regards to te CIA unprising - it should be noted that the CIA approached the Dalai Lama in 1950, offering to give him supplies to fight the PLA. He refused, for one because he saw what was happening in Korea and didn't believe that Tibet would win any outright war, but also because he genuinely believed the CCP would be a force for good. The CIA then took to other elements, mostly the regressive elites as well as certain dissents in Kham, trained a few and then airlifted them to try and mount a guerrilla war. That was only in Kham and Amdo, however. The real issue that changed things, and caused the Dalai Lama to flee etc was 1959, when those sporadic rebellions spread to Lhasa as well. Fascinatingly enough, historian Chen Jian notes (I can get you a PDF if you want) that the PLA was actually pretty eager to put these down - mostly as a show of force, but also it would be good martial practice. Take that for what you will.

However, to argue that the CCP had been only respectful up until this point is not entirely fair, I think. VIncent Goossaert and David A. Palmer discuss this in regards to religious institutions, from 1956 onwards (noting again that widespread rebellion had not yet really started outside a few rural areas in Kham), the CCP basically to disregard the 17 point agreement through a bit of a loop hole by arguing that Tibetans in Kham and Amdo, some of which were in Sichuan and not formally 'Tibet', would be subjected to land collectivization, including confiscation from monasteries, temples, and traditional land grants. Many landlords and tyrants very thankfully lost their holdings, but a very sizable percentage of the male population were invested in the monastery system. This caused a lot of resentment. Again, even if you can agree that ultimately religious institutions had to be liquidated, this was seen as a breach of trust as from the 1930s onwards when the CCP relied on minorities to keep them safe from the GMD during the Long March, the CCP had promised that the revolutionary measures it would pursue in the mainland and for Han people would not be applied entirely to minority people out of respect for autonomy. That ceased to be the case.

In Tibet itself, as historian Tsering Shakya notes that there was a lot of resentment in places like Lhasa because of the impression that China was 'taking' over the country. Shakya even argues that actually the CCP did a lot of good. Pre-revolution Tibet wasn't all sunshine and roses, and even the Dalai Lama again pretty much agrees that a lot of the early reforms against feudalism etc was necessarsy. But things were a little shakier than the Chinese narrative of thigns also. You had a desire amongst Tibetans to have their own standing army, to be able to conduct its own foreign policy, and also to cap the limit of Chinese settlers and cadres allowed to stay in the territory. A lot of progressive forces wanted the CCP to actually take a harsher stance and to empower them to do the reforms that woudl be necessary. But, Mao was also very cautious about how to go about changing structures in Tibet and other minority areas at this point - he didn't want to rock the boat, somewhat sensibly. To try and get rid of anti-Chinese sentiments in Lhasa and the Tibetan government, though, the Chinese authorities did want to force the coutnry's dual Prime Ministers to be dismissed, and so they were. That sort of unilateral action unfortunately also pissed off the people who were hoping that the CCP would empower progressive elements - there was a simmering feeling that ultimately Chinese cadres were on one hand unwilling to take action but also that when they did so they did without the input of Tibetan officials or activists.

What changed the picture was that when China signed a trade agreement with India in 1953, the Tibetan elites were suddenly a lot more in favor of the Chinese government. Dalai Lama himself was wowed by Zhou Enlai's diplomacy. infrastructure development and roads etc vastly improved. People were given good jobs, Tibet's international standing grew etc. The ruling elite were very happy; ordinary people were somewhat more mixed, due to again growing resentment at the fact that they had very little input before the revolution and continued to have very little after. In 1955, they moved to create the Preparatory Committee for the establishment of the Autonomous Region of Tibet (PCART). This was seen as somewhat of a compromise - Mao had wanted to actually place the region under Beijing's direct administration, buit thought the PCART would be a good way to start transitioning Tibet to a socialistic system of governance. Here is where things get a loittle tricky - the PCART would divde Tibet into three separate groups, and one of these (Chamdo) would begin moving to socialism quicker, under the supervision of the PLA. The Dalai Lama accepted this, but there was a lot of frustration here - PCART was designed essentaily to keep two separate Tibetan actors against each other (the Tibetan Government and the Panchen Lama) and to have another section (Chamdo) effectively operate under Chinese control with nominal Tibetan input. China thought this would all be a great success, but this basically just created a lot of disunity in Tibeta and a lot of anxiety about what China really wanted. Trust broke down, and then the uprising in Kham and Amdo start (again noting those regions were legally under Chinese jurisdiction, not 'Tibet'). Lhasa denounced them entirely, did not want to support the Khampas whatsoever, but all the fighting also craeted a refugee crisis. The root of the fighting, again, was the belief of Tibetans in those areas that Buddhism itself was under attack, and that now a large body of men (monks, many of whom lived quite poorly, particularly the lower level ones) suddenly had no income. This created anxiety in Tibet that the same situation was inevitable there as well.

For what it is worth, Mao himself was not partiularly worried by these anxieties or even the initial rebellions, believing that basically it was a consequence of economic hardship and that Tibetans would cease to resent the Chinese presence eventually. Also aggravating the situation was that PCART was bringing in many more Han cadres, who were alleged of being significantly more callous towards local customs and religion. Chinese officials had to backpedal on some of their initial reforms, tried to placate people, and also outlined that Han Chauvinism was causing resentment throughout Tibet and other autonomous regions. In 1957, after the hundred Flowers speech, Tibetans started voicing a lot more of these anxieties out in the open, and in the context of growing discontent in Kham, Chinese officials were growign a lot more cautious. The whole situation was deteriorating, and local Chinese offiicials in Tibet proper were growing a lot more dismissive of Tibetan complains, basically saying that they believed Tibet belonged in the 'bosom of the motherland'. And so, Han Chauvinism stopped being the enemy - local nationalism became the greater problem. The Khampa rebellion grew larger, affecting eastern Tibet too, and then with the CIA getting involved, the whole situation basically got set on fire.

The lessons here are sort of mixed. Tibetan elites, including many feudal ones, liked the CCP's early policies because essentially it helped them grow their own capital and 'develop' the region. But a lot of regular peasants were more resentful of what they saw as a sort of cultural elitism amongst the TIbetan elites (including the Dalai Lama) as well as the Chinese cadres. Chinese cadres often barely spoke the language, were not particularly sensitive to local needs, and the shifts in Sichuan in Kham and Amdo made people even more afraid. Couple this with PCART's disastrous policies and shifting elite sentiments, and stuff went out of control. Again, imo, the solution to this would have just been to set up a Tibetan Communist Party, supply them with funds and training, and have let Tibet develop its own unique course to revolution. It really is ultimately a sad thing that shit went the way it did. To say nothing, obviously, of the famine and some of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution that followed.