The difference is causal efficacy. If you say consciousness is a property of matter you're not allowing qualia in of themselves any causal efficacy because (presumably) you don't conceive of qualia manipulating matter in any way because there's no such thing in our current understanding of physics. On the other hand when you say it's a property of the universe you open up to the possibility of consciousness existing independently of matter and possibly exerting some kind of influence on the material world, probably through some quantum effects.
If they have no causal efficacy why have we evolved them in the exact way we did? Why does my body do the things I tell it to do? Why do orgasms feel really good instead of really bad? It doesn't make any sense for qualia to correspond to the body and the brain in any way if the body and the brain doesn't need them to exist at all. For qualia to be included in the natural selection process (and it seems that they indeed were inluded in the process) they need to have causal efficacy.
The only way for it to make sense from a physicalist perspective is to assume it's just a huge coincidence or that there are infinite other universes where billions of consciousnesses scream internally in terror while their bodies do whatever they want. Or assume some sort of intelligent design, but that by default doesn't sit well with science.
I think I see what you're getting at now. I wasn't sure how something non quantitative could have a causal effect on the natural world, but then you questioned why shooting fat ropes feels great.
I started with the assumption that every system of particles has its own qualia. There is then a qualia for each possible configuration of matter in the universe.
If humans evolved without the causal efficacy of qualia, then why is the sensation of cumming a good one? Why would that exact configuration of matter in the exact moment you happen to bust be the one to produce a qualia you would describe as a pleasant sensation?
This would be a rather large coincidence that evolution, completely randomly, stumbled upon a configuration of matter with qualia that matches the result the selection pressures tended towards.
Is this why you say there must be causal efficacy, and why you say qualia seem to be included in the process of natural selection?
This would be a rather large coincidence that evolution, completely randomly, stumbled upon a configuration of matter with qualia that matches the result the selection pressures tended towards.
Is this why you say there must be causal efficacy, and why you say qualia seem to be included in the process of natural selection?
Exactly this yeah. It seems like the most parsimonious explanation to me, all other explanations require quite a bit of weird assumptions and logical leaps that you don't usually do when doing science.
Now I'm not sure I buy into all the conjectures of Kastrup's idealism (life after death, all of existence being solely mental states etc..) but it's more and more clear to me that consciousness cannot be tied to matter alone but is a thing with a life of its own. Personally some sort of neutral monism makes the most sense to me, but I'm still reading up on all of this stuff.
The difference is causal efficacy. If you say consciousness is a property of matter you're not allowing qualia in of themselves any causal efficacy because (presumably) you don't conceive of qualia manipulating matter in any way because there's no such thing in our current understanding of physics. On the other hand when you say it's a property of the universe you open up to the possibility of consciousness existing independently of matter and possibly exerting some kind of influence on the material world, probably through some quantum effects.
What is the problem with qualia having no causal efficacy?
If they have no causal efficacy why have we evolved them in the exact way we did? Why does my body do the things I tell it to do? Why do orgasms feel really good instead of really bad? It doesn't make any sense for qualia to correspond to the body and the brain in any way if the body and the brain doesn't need them to exist at all. For qualia to be included in the natural selection process (and it seems that they indeed were inluded in the process) they need to have causal efficacy.
The only way for it to make sense from a physicalist perspective is to assume it's just a huge coincidence or that there are infinite other universes where billions of consciousnesses scream internally in terror while their bodies do whatever they want. Or assume some sort of intelligent design, but that by default doesn't sit well with science.
I think I see what you're getting at now. I wasn't sure how something non quantitative could have a causal effect on the natural world, but then you questioned why shooting fat ropes feels great.
I started with the assumption that every system of particles has its own qualia. There is then a qualia for each possible configuration of matter in the universe.
If humans evolved without the causal efficacy of qualia, then why is the sensation of cumming a good one? Why would that exact configuration of matter in the exact moment you happen to bust be the one to produce a qualia you would describe as a pleasant sensation?
This would be a rather large coincidence that evolution, completely randomly, stumbled upon a configuration of matter with qualia that matches the result the selection pressures tended towards.
Is this why you say there must be causal efficacy, and why you say qualia seem to be included in the process of natural selection?
Exactly this yeah. It seems like the most parsimonious explanation to me, all other explanations require quite a bit of weird assumptions and logical leaps that you don't usually do when doing science.
Now I'm not sure I buy into all the conjectures of Kastrup's idealism (life after death, all of existence being solely mental states etc..) but it's more and more clear to me that consciousness cannot be tied to matter alone but is a thing with a life of its own. Personally some sort of neutral monism makes the most sense to me, but I'm still reading up on all of this stuff.
Alright great! Thanks for the help in understanding that concept.
It seems that, after all, consciousness is not stored in the balls.
Kastrup's work looks pretty interesting, and I think I'll be reading more into it.