MLRL_Commie [comrade/them, he/him]

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Joined 4 months ago
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Cake day: November 10th, 2024

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  • How many betrayals does it take? Was Chechnya not obvious enough for him? Was the pillaging of Russia in the 90's not enough? Was the sanctions and antagonism despite participating in Iraq not enough? Georgia how many times before the current conflict?

    Ansarallah and Hezbollah are parties designed with this fight in mind, with support specifically because of this position. Putin came to power for national interests and is in power for his defense of those national interests. If the US offers a tempting (and seeming concrete) concession and support in line with those national interests which are greater than this path offers, Putin will shift alliances or lose his support structure. You assume that this shift is impossible: that (your words, I say Ruling Class interests) "self interests" are "self destructive" without any sense that this can change



  • I named 2 material interests and left the economic one, too obvious to need naming, of profitable (for the ruling class) trade unnamed but clearly implied. I then shifted to speaking, generally, about the phenomenon without reference to any specific interests, because the analysis can work in any case replacing the interests with any other set that still fits the dynamics (what if Russia cared about the land question instead of national security? Same analysis, new basic material interest). I'm not proving something will happen here, I'm arguing that no discontinuity is needed to understand what happened. I'm limiting the conversation to only 'interests' to make a specific point. I don't think you understand this difference.

    I also have the same prediction as you, with the stated caveat that the US absolutely has the possibility to change it (likely won't because of its own ineptitude despite it likely being a good scenario for US interests). You clearly cannot see past your hero-worship of Putin to see the current shift of alliances as malleable at all. It's naive idealism, with the result that you won't see the blindsiding of a betrayal coming, even if that one isn't happening now



  • I absolutely do, though I don't think he "started the war against the west" in those terms. I resent being accused of such for a claim I'm not convinced you even understand.

    Putin and Russia have interests in security on their borders and national security in general, because that stability is in the ruling class interests. For a long while, the assumed greater stability in these interests was to be found in going along with the west instead of confronting them. Due to the west's continued antagonism, due to Ukraine's position geographically, politically, and economically relative to Russia, and due to a growing possibility to find stability outside of the unipolar Western Empire (e.g. with China), the greater stability was clearly to be found in negotiating a more advantageous position for Russia through war against the party being used against those interests. The fact that the interests eventually pointed in direct opposition to the Western Empire is not due to any discontinuity in these material interests, but in a slow shift in the effects and future effects of the policies of the west on those material interests.

    This is clearly no fundamental shift, and it doesn't make him some ideological hero (or hero in any real sense), just the representative of a set of interests which became aligned against the west. The US could today guarantee, with material backing (I can't imagine how at the moment, but I need no example for something that has happened so often in the past) that the interests of the ruling class will be brought in line by a policy shift of the west. And with that guarantee, I'm entirely unconvinced that Putin and the Russian ruling class will maintain your "war against the west".

    I'm no pessimist about this, I think that the US is unlikely to do this and that the interests of the two ruling classes are too fundamentally, in the bases, opposed. The West would have to do some Cold-War level concession-giving, which is too forward thinking than the West is used to at the moment. But that is very different than thinking Putin himself had some fundamental shift.