Image is from this article in the New York Times.


A magnitude 6.8 earthquake struck Morocco on September 8th, with the epicenter 73 kilometers away from Marrakesh.

At least 2500 people have died as of September 11th, most outside Marrakesh, with more people being pulled out of the rubble every day, making it the deadliest earthquake in Morocco since 1960, and the second-deadliest earthquake this year (first being, of course, the one in Turkiye-Syria in February, which killed nearly 60,000 people). While the deaths are the most horrific part, damage to historic sites has also been very significant - including buildings dating back to the 1000s.

Morocco is situated close to the Eurasian-African plate boundary, where the two plates are colliding. The rock comprising the Atlas Mountains, situated along the northwestern coast of Africa separating the Sahara from the Mediterranean Sea, are being pushed together at a rate of 1 millimeter per year, and thus the mountains are slowly growing. As they collide, energy is stored up over time and then released, and faults develop. The earthquake this month originated on one such fault, as did the earthquake in 1960. The earthquake hypocenter was 20-25 kilometers underground, with 1.7 meters (or 5 and a half feet) of rock suddenly shifting along a fault ~30 kilometers (19 miles) long.

Earthquake prediction is still deeply imprecise at best, and obtaining decent knowledge and forewarning of earthquakes is highly dependent on dense seismometer arrays that constantly monitor seismic activity, such as in Japan, and detailed understanding of the local and regional tectonic environment. The best way to prevent damage is to build earthquake-resistant infrastructure and establish routines for escaping buildings and reaching safety. All of these, of course, are underdeveloped to nonexistent in developing countries, particularly in poorer communities inside those countries.


The Country of the Week, in honour of Allende's death 50 years ago (the only bad geopolitical event that has occurred on September 11th, of course), is Chile. Feel free to chime in with books, essays, longform articles, even stories and anecdotes or rants. More detail here.


Here is the map of the Ukraine conflict, courtesy of Wikipedia.

The weekly update is here!

Links and Stuff

The bulletins site is down.

Examples of Ukrainian Nazis and fascists

Examples of racism/euro-centrism during the Russia-Ukraine conflict

Add to the above list if you can.


Resources For Understanding The War


Defense Politics Asia's youtube channel and their map. Their youtube channel has substantially diminished in quality but the map is still useful.

Moon of Alabama, which tends to have interesting analysis. Avoid the comment section.

Understanding War and the Saker: reactionary sources that have occasional insights on the war.

Alexander Mercouris, who does daily videos on the conflict. While he is a reactionary and surrounds himself with likeminded people, his daily update videos are relatively brainworm-free and good if you don't want to follow Russian telegram channels to get news. He also co-hosts The Duran, which is more explicitly conservative, racist, sexist, transphobic, anti-communist, etc when guests are invited on, but is just about tolerable when it's just the two of them if you want a little more analysis.

On the ground: Patrick Lancaster, an independent and very good journalist reporting in the warzone on the separatists' side.

Unedited videos of Russian/Ukrainian press conferences and speeches.


Telegram Channels

Again, CW for anti-LGBT and racist, sexist, etc speech, as well as combat footage.

Pro-Russian

https://t.me/aleksandr_skif ~ DPR's former Defense Minister and Colonel in the DPR's forces. Russian language.

https://t.me/Slavyangrad ~ A few different pro-Russian people gather frequent content for this channel (~100 posts per day), some socialist, but all socially reactionary. If you can only tolerate using one Russian telegram channel, I would recommend this one.

https://t.me/s/levigodman ~ Does daily update posts.

https://t.me/patricklancasternewstoday ~ Patrick Lancaster's telegram channel.

https://t.me/gonzowarr ~ A big Russian commentator.

https://t.me/rybar ~ One of, if not the, biggest Russian telegram channels focussing on the war out there. Actually quite balanced, maybe even pessimistic about Russia. Produces interesting and useful maps.

https://t.me/epoddubny ~ Russian language.

https://t.me/boris_rozhin ~ Russian language.

https://t.me/mod_russia_en ~ Russian Ministry of Defense. Does daily, if rather bland updates on the number of Ukrainians killed, etc. The figures appear to be approximately accurate; if you want, reduce all numbers by 25% as a 'propaganda tax', if you don't believe them. Does not cover everything, for obvious reasons, and virtually never details Russian losses.

https://t.me/UkraineHumanRightsAbuses ~ Pro-Russian, documents abuses that Ukraine commits.

Pro-Ukraine

Almost every Western media outlet.

https://discord.gg/projectowl ~ Pro-Ukrainian OSINT Discord.

https://t.me/ice_inii ~ Alleged Ukrainian account with a rather cynical take on the entire thing.


Last week's discussion post.


  • companero [he/him]
    ·
    10 个月前

    The lib consensus seems to be that Putin is hoping Trump wins the 2024 election and pulls the rug, forcing Ukraine to accept defeat. I can't help but wonder if Putin is planning almost the opposite. Steamroll Ukraine in 2024, before the US election, shocking the West. Trump can then use that complete failure as ammunition to secure victory. Frankly, I think a second Trump presidency is already pretty likely, and that little nudge might push it into "sure thing" territory.

    • thethirdgracchi [he/him, they/them]
      ·
      10 个月前

      I think the problem with this line of thinking is that Putin can just "plan" to steamroll Ukraine in 2024, and that the only thing preventing Russia from already doing so is Putin's "plan." If Russia could steamroll Ukraine they would've done so already; geopolitics does not revolve around US election cycles. The war in Ukraine may end in 2024, maybe Ukraine's military will collapse thanks to all the pressure on it and their dwindling supplies, but it won't go according to anybody's "plan," as it's not up to Putin to decide when the war ends in a Russian victory outside of committing far more troops than they already have, which I don't see on the horizon given their current strategy seems to be working, albeit very slowly.

      I agree that Trump's victory seems likely though, and if the situation in Ukraine wraps up in 2024 it's almost a sure thing.

      • companero [he/him]
        ·
        10 个月前

        I don't mean like a single "grand plan" or anything. Just observing things as they happen and preparing actions accordingly.

        If Russia's intelligence says Ukraine's military is weak, and the US election is known to happen on a specific date, that allows Putin to formulate a plan to take advantage of that.

        • thethirdgracchi [he/him, they/them]
          ·
          10 个月前

          But like, what's Russia going to do with that information that they wouldn't already do? There's no magic they can do here to make Ukraine fold faster.

          • companero [he/him]
            ·
            10 个月前

            The timing of the inevitable Russian offensive. To minimize losses, it might be best for Russia to defend until 2025 or 2026. However, Putin might accept greater losses to attack in 2024 if it also has potential to influence the US election.

            • MultigrainCerealista [he/him, comrade/them]
              ·
              edit-2
              10 个月前

              I think as a broadly applicable rule, the slower this conflict burns the better it is for Russia.

              That’s not the same as saying the longer it burns since I think Russia has more interest in a permanent settlement than a continued war, but the slower it burns means cheaper for Russia in terms of western support fading away and Russian advantages in manufacturing of munitions being maximized.

              I don’t see any reason for Putin to engage in a risky big arrow push at any stage of this war. He tried it at the beginning and got burned, since then it’s been favorable attrition warfare. Why would this strategy change?

              • zephyreks [none/use name]
                ·
                10 个月前

                I wouldn't say a big arrow push so much as a redistribution of resources. Massing resources for a slow Northern offensive while letting the Southern front essentially fend for itself, that kind of thing. Given the relative lack of Ukrainian defenses, I think Russia can maintain local superiority for long enough to make progress.

      • Parsani [love/loves, comrade/them]
        ·
        10 个月前

        “In essence, there cannot be and never have been any changes in Washington’s foreign policy. Therefore, I would not pin any hopes on the elections in America,” he said.

        Putin said almost this exact thing in his interviews with Oliver Stone years ago

      • companero [he/him]
        ·
        edit-2
        10 个月前

        I certainly don't expect Trump to be "good" for Russia. It's just that he's more of a wildcard versus Biden who will always go out of his way to hurt Russia. There is also a good chance Trump will further weaken US hegemony whether or not that is his intention.

      • zephyreks [none/use name]
        ·
        10 个月前

        Russia doesn't need a huge offensive to make progress tbh. They have a strong position near Kupyansk that, if they can take the town, would allow them to solidify their positions in Luhansk and Donetsk. A constant battery of bad news is sufficient for election purposes.

    • zephyreks [none/use name]
      ·
      edit-2
      10 个月前

      He doesn't have a lot of time to do it tbh. If it happens too close to the election it's a pro for Biden because war rallies voters.