• star_wraith [he/him]
    ·
    edit-2
    9 months ago

    I have a prior career in equity research and M&A. It was always shocking to me how little direct involvement there was with institutional investors. They typically just try and find competent people to sit in their place on the board, but these board members are so disconnected from the businesses themselves. Most board members sit on the boards for multiple companies and are involved with any one company for a day or two each quarter, and that’s about it.

    I am also very curious to see how the growth of passive investing, index funds, managing investments by sector/asset class, really any sort of investing other than single business-level among institutional investors impacts the future of capitalism. Vanguard invests almost entirely this way. 40 years ago this type of investing was much more rare, now it’s the dominant form. They aren’t interested in the performance of a single company, only the performance as a sector / asset class / economy.

    • Kaplya
      ·
      9 months ago

      I have been doing some research into this (also where I got the figures above from), and it seems that the institutional investors generally don’t actively engage in the decision making process (i.e. leaving it to the board of directors), but what they found is that the board of directors could already have adjusted their behavior, on their own, to track with the investors’ goals.

      https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/business-and-politics/article/hidden-power-of-the-big-three-passive-index-funds-reconcentration-of-corporate-ownership-and-new-financial-risk/30AD689509AAD62F5B677E916C28C4B6

      Through an analysis of proxy vote records we find that the Big Three do utilize coordinated voting strategies and hence follow a centralized corporate governance strategy. However, they generally vote with management, except at director (re-)elections. Moreover, the Big Three may exert “hidden power” through two channels: First, via private engagements with management of invested companies; and second, because company executives could be prone to internalizing the objectives of the Big Three.