I have been doing some research into this (also where I got the figures above from), and it seems that the institutional investors generally don’t actively engage in the decision making process (i.e. leaving it to the board of directors), but what they found is that the board of directors could already have adjusted their behavior, on their own, to track with the investors’ goals.
Through an analysis of proxy vote records we find that the Big Three do utilize coordinated voting strategies and hence follow a centralized corporate governance strategy. However, they generally vote with management, except at director (re-)elections. Moreover, the Big Three may exert “hidden power” through two channels: First, via private engagements with management of invested companies; and second, because company executives could be prone to internalizing the objectives of the Big Three.
I have been doing some research into this (also where I got the figures above from), and it seems that the institutional investors generally don’t actively engage in the decision making process (i.e. leaving it to the board of directors), but what they found is that the board of directors could already have adjusted their behavior, on their own, to track with the investors’ goals.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/business-and-politics/article/hidden-power-of-the-big-three-passive-index-funds-reconcentration-of-corporate-ownership-and-new-financial-risk/30AD689509AAD62F5B677E916C28C4B6