A perfect replica of something is the something, any perceived distinctions between one and the other are academic. Twins have different conciousnesses because they have different experiences and are thus not perfect replicas of each other.
If you were to somehow copy paste someone from the past into the future, at the moment the copy-paste takes place the person in the future is indistinguishable from their past self. You would have no way of proving that they weren't their past self at the moment of copying, except by creating an arbitrary distinction between "original" and "copy" that is itself unfalsifiable.
Also, since non-existent things can't experience their own non-existence, neither version would functionally experience the time passed in the eons between the past-version's copying and the future-version's pasting. Think of the last time you got black-out drunk or fainted or got put under anesthesia. Did you experience the time you were blacked out? Or were you just one place, and then suddenly you were somewhere else?
The future-version would go on and have different experiences and become a different person from the past-version, sure, but that's no different than you becoming a different person than you were as a child.
"my higher level reasoning and sensorimotor functions may have been disabled, but core processes remained intact and uninterrupted"
This seems arbitrary. There are people who have clinically died or have had clinical death induced for medical procedures that report their time "dead" as being not much different than any other blackout. If you don't experience something, you don't experience it.
As for the point of view argument, that again seems like an unfalsifiable argument. You cannot experience a gap in your experience. If you die and then 1000 years later a being wakes up with your identity and all your memories up to the point of death, there's no way an outside ibserver can prove that it doesn't have your point of view without creating an essentialized, non-quantifiable "self" that stands outside of time.
And if a perfect copy of you was created while you were still alive, it's not that "you" would experience both versions simultaneously, it's that both versions would think of themselves as "you" and be right to do so. The second these versions looked at each other and realized they weren't one and the same, their experiences would diverge and they'd become functionally different beings. But both would still be correct in calling themselves the "original" you.
Well that's kind of the point, you really couldn't, outside the copy's insistence that they were the original. But that means that insisting externally that they're not "really" who they say they are is just as unprovable.
There's futurists who take the maximalist position that eventually we'll either have predictive technology capable of re-tracing the history of every extant particle in the observable universe and thus recreating the past in perfect detail, or that we'll make some breakthrough in physics and cosmology that makes direct observation of the past possible.
I don't really know if I buy either of those propositions, but either way telling a recreation of a past individual that they're not really that individual despite their insistence is trying to disprove a negative. I've heard people bring up the Chinese Room in regards to this sometimes, but that also applies to literally every living being capable of communicating with you.
A perfect replica of something is the something, any perceived distinctions between one and the other are academic. Twins have different conciousnesses because they have different experiences and are thus not perfect replicas of each other.
If you were to somehow copy paste someone from the past into the future, at the moment the copy-paste takes place the person in the future is indistinguishable from their past self. You would have no way of proving that they weren't their past self at the moment of copying, except by creating an arbitrary distinction between "original" and "copy" that is itself unfalsifiable.
Also, since non-existent things can't experience their own non-existence, neither version would functionally experience the time passed in the eons between the past-version's copying and the future-version's pasting. Think of the last time you got black-out drunk or fainted or got put under anesthesia. Did you experience the time you were blacked out? Or were you just one place, and then suddenly you were somewhere else?
The future-version would go on and have different experiences and become a different person from the past-version, sure, but that's no different than you becoming a different person than you were as a child.
deleted by creator
"my higher level reasoning and sensorimotor functions may have been disabled, but core processes remained intact and uninterrupted"
This seems arbitrary. There are people who have clinically died or have had clinical death induced for medical procedures that report their time "dead" as being not much different than any other blackout. If you don't experience something, you don't experience it.
As for the point of view argument, that again seems like an unfalsifiable argument. You cannot experience a gap in your experience. If you die and then 1000 years later a being wakes up with your identity and all your memories up to the point of death, there's no way an outside ibserver can prove that it doesn't have your point of view without creating an essentialized, non-quantifiable "self" that stands outside of time.
And if a perfect copy of you was created while you were still alive, it's not that "you" would experience both versions simultaneously, it's that both versions would think of themselves as "you" and be right to do so. The second these versions looked at each other and realized they weren't one and the same, their experiences would diverge and they'd become functionally different beings. But both would still be correct in calling themselves the "original" you.
(Sorry, can't get quotes to work on mobile)
deleted by creator
How could you prove that the simulacrum is an identical copy if you've been dead for 200 years?
Well that's kind of the point, you really couldn't, outside the copy's insistence that they were the original. But that means that insisting externally that they're not "really" who they say they are is just as unprovable.
There's futurists who take the maximalist position that eventually we'll either have predictive technology capable of re-tracing the history of every extant particle in the observable universe and thus recreating the past in perfect detail, or that we'll make some breakthrough in physics and cosmology that makes direct observation of the past possible.
I don't really know if I buy either of those propositions, but either way telling a recreation of a past individual that they're not really that individual despite their insistence is trying to disprove a negative. I've heard people bring up the Chinese Room in regards to this sometimes, but that also applies to literally every living being capable of communicating with you.