"my higher level reasoning and sensorimotor functions may have been disabled, but core processes remained intact and uninterrupted"
This seems arbitrary. There are people who have clinically died or have had clinical death induced for medical procedures that report their time "dead" as being not much different than any other blackout. If you don't experience something, you don't experience it.
As for the point of view argument, that again seems like an unfalsifiable argument. You cannot experience a gap in your experience. If you die and then 1000 years later a being wakes up with your identity and all your memories up to the point of death, there's no way an outside ibserver can prove that it doesn't have your point of view without creating an essentialized, non-quantifiable "self" that stands outside of time.
And if a perfect copy of you was created while you were still alive, it's not that "you" would experience both versions simultaneously, it's that both versions would think of themselves as "you" and be right to do so. The second these versions looked at each other and realized they weren't one and the same, their experiences would diverge and they'd become functionally different beings. But both would still be correct in calling themselves the "original" you.
"my higher level reasoning and sensorimotor functions may have been disabled, but core processes remained intact and uninterrupted"
This seems arbitrary. There are people who have clinically died or have had clinical death induced for medical procedures that report their time "dead" as being not much different than any other blackout. If you don't experience something, you don't experience it.
As for the point of view argument, that again seems like an unfalsifiable argument. You cannot experience a gap in your experience. If you die and then 1000 years later a being wakes up with your identity and all your memories up to the point of death, there's no way an outside ibserver can prove that it doesn't have your point of view without creating an essentialized, non-quantifiable "self" that stands outside of time.
And if a perfect copy of you was created while you were still alive, it's not that "you" would experience both versions simultaneously, it's that both versions would think of themselves as "you" and be right to do so. The second these versions looked at each other and realized they weren't one and the same, their experiences would diverge and they'd become functionally different beings. But both would still be correct in calling themselves the "original" you.
(Sorry, can't get quotes to work on mobile)
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