In the 1930s, the USSR’s hegemony wasn’t being threatened by Finland or the Baltics - the USSR had no hegemony outside its borders.
The USSR’s reason for its aggressive foreign policy was different - it was acquiring allies, strategic depth, and buffer states in defense against Nazi and capitalist aggression, of which there was a long pattern.
I don't really understand what you mean by "hegemony" then. I would think that the examples you give of acquiring allies, strategic depth, and buffer states, are all examples of hegemony outside one's borders.
Look, if you wanna say, "The USSR's aggressive FP was justified because they were fighting Nazis/it was necessary to survive/whatever" then cool. But that doesn't seem to be what OP is saying, which seems to be more along the lines of "The USSR expanded peacefully through education and trading, not through military force and coups," which just isn't accurate, at least not entirely.
OP is talking about "exporting ideology", which is a subset of FP, and I infer the context to be the Third World in the Cold War. It's comparing US vs. USSR toward Africa, Asia, Latin America. So Finland is outside that scope.
My answer to you strayed from that scope, because I subconsciously used the IR definition of "hegemony" (sorry for not specifying explicitly) and that one tends to refer to the US:
In international relations, hegemony refers to the ability of an actor with overwhelming capability to shape the international system through both coercive and non-coercive means. Usually this actor is understood to be a single state, such as Great Britain in the 19th century or the United States in the 20th and 21st century. ... Hegemony is distinct from Empire because a hegemonic power rules by influencing other states rather than by controlling them or their territory. ... The literature on hegemony tries to explain the United States’ role in the international system as a function of its privileged position within the system. Source
...But thinking on it, you could definitely argue that the existence of pro-communist factions in Finland/Baltics/Weimar Germany/Spain and the USSR's involvement in their politics was indeed an exercise in hegemonic power. So I think OP's argument is strongest for outside Europe, where the USSR supported movements that were for self-determination, economic progress, and socialist principles, while the West sought to continue colonialism, neocolonialism, and other exploitative schemes.
I don't really understand what you mean by "hegemony" then. I would think that the examples you give of acquiring allies, strategic depth, and buffer states, are all examples of hegemony outside one's borders.
Look, if you wanna say, "The USSR's aggressive FP was justified because they were fighting Nazis/it was necessary to survive/whatever" then cool. But that doesn't seem to be what OP is saying, which seems to be more along the lines of "The USSR expanded peacefully through education and trading, not through military force and coups," which just isn't accurate, at least not entirely.
OP is talking about "exporting ideology", which is a subset of FP, and I infer the context to be the Third World in the Cold War. It's comparing US vs. USSR toward Africa, Asia, Latin America. So Finland is outside that scope.
My answer to you strayed from that scope, because I subconsciously used the IR definition of "hegemony" (sorry for not specifying explicitly) and that one tends to refer to the US:
...But thinking on it, you could definitely argue that the existence of pro-communist factions in Finland/Baltics/Weimar Germany/Spain and the USSR's involvement in their politics was indeed an exercise in hegemonic power. So I think OP's argument is strongest for outside Europe, where the USSR supported movements that were for self-determination, economic progress, and socialist principles, while the West sought to continue colonialism, neocolonialism, and other exploitative schemes.