There's links to the source materials within the link provided, but beware: "LessWrong" is itself a cognitohazard a bit like Scientology is, with its own distorted vocabulary, belief that the entire rest of the world is ignorant of their enlightened truth, and all that other standard cult stuff.
A cult that is seriously based on a fucking Harry Potter fanfic, and is paid millions of dollars by billionaires because they like the cult's message. :so-true: :solidarity: :porky-happy:
It's not "just wrong on a biological level" - it really depends on your understanding of consciousness and there isn't exactly a consensus.
hexbear understand object permanence challenge (impossible)
Hey, no need to be patronizing. It's just a philosophy discussion and we can be cool about it.
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I'm not actually sure what position you're trying to defend here. I take a very functionalist view of consciousness and I have yet to be persuaded of the relevance of some kind of physical continuity (not sure how you even measure that).
Unless that's the consensus you were talking about, in which case I'll just note I was trying to gently pry the door open rather than come down hard on my side of it, as I'm a layperson and also not convinced the user I was replying to would have been receptive to that.
Here's an easy way: allow, in the thought experiment since that's all it is, for the perfect copy to be made while the original it is copied from is still alive and isn't destroyed in the process. It seems pretty relevant to the "behold! Literally the same person with the exact same subjective experience!" claim if the original is still there, watching, breathing, and observing people making that claim about the copy.
Well you've created a physically distinct human being that shares the exact same subjective experience - up to the divergent point, encoded in memory - as the original. I still fail to see how this proves anything about consciousness or its dependency on physical continuity. You might also have to be a bit clearer what you're arguing: if you mean that the post-split original (person 1) is the pre-split original (person 0) in a way that the post-split copy (person 2) is not, in what sense? What kind of identity does person 1 share with person 0 that person 2 does not? How does that identity relate to subjective conscious experience?
Or another route: try playing with the knobs on your thought experiment a bit. Instead of leaving one original, split them and rebuild each half into a full person. What kind of identity do either of these people share with person 0?