From where I'm sitting, it looks like death should not be the end in that case.
You can't perceive the passage of time when you are dead, so you're just going to experience dying and then immediate rebirth after the countless eons pass for that rare moment where entropy spontaneously reverses to form your mind again.
We tend to define physical objects in a way that have spatial and temporal boundaries. That means if I point to a particular physical object, you can usually draw a rough border around it, as well as talk about when it came into existence and when it goes away. The boundaries are never really solid and there's usually some ambiguity to them, but it's hard to even know what is being talked about without these fuzzy boundaries.
For example, if I point to a cat and say "that's a cat," you generally understand the rough shape of a cat and thus have a rough outline, and this helps you look for where it's located. If there is a water bowl next to the cat, you immediately know the bowl is not the cat and is not what I'm talking about because it's not within those borders. These borders are, again, a bit fuzzy, if you zoom up on a microscopic scale it becomes less clear where the cat begins and where it ends, but these fuzzy borders are still important because without them, if I said "look at that cat over there" you could never figure out what I'm talking about because you would have no concept of the border of the cat at all, which is necessary to locate it.
It is also necessary to our understanding that these boundaries evolve continuously. If a building was demolished, and then a century later someone inspired by it builds another with the same plans, even if it's in the same location, we would typically not think of it as literally the same building, because they did not exist at the same times, i.e. their temporal boundaries do not overlap as there is a discontinuous gap between them. If a cat is located at one position and then later at another, its boundaries have moved, but this movement is continuous, it's not as if the cat teleportation from one point to the next.
But this is precisely why people find the teletransportation paradox difficult to grapple with. What if the cat did teleport from one location to the next such that the original cat is destroyed and its information is used to reconstruct it elsewhere? Is it still the same cat? How we define objects is ultimately arbitrary so you can say either yes or no, but personally I think it's more consistent to say no.
Consider if the teleporter succeeded in reconstructing the cat, but due to a malfunction, it failed to destroy the original cat. Now you have two. It seems rather obvious to me that, if this were to occur, what you have is a clone and not the original cat. They are obviously different beings with different perspectives of the world as they would each see out of their own eyes separately. If I cloned myself, I would not see out of my clone's eyes, so it is clearly not the same object as myself.
If the teleporter clearly is merely cloning the cat when the destructive process malfunctions, then I do not see a good reason for this to change when the destructive process is functioning correctly. Let's say the destructive process malfunctions only a little bit so there is a second delay in the destruction, that means two cats exist for a second before one is destroyed. Would the cat that is reconstructed therefore be a clone for one second, then suddenly turn into the original cat after a second has passed? That just seems very bizarre to me.
It makes more sense to me to say that all a teleporter really does is clone. That means the original object is always destroyed, and the new object created is always a new object. It is not the same object as the original.
Why do I bring all this up? Because I would be inclined to thus say the person who exists "countless eons" after you died would at best be considered a clone of yourself and not actually yourself. Your temporal boundaries do not overlap, there is no continuous transition from the "you" of the past and the "you" eons later, so they are not the same objects. They are different people.
Sure, if we assume the universe can exist eternally (a big assumption, but let's go with it), then if enough time passes, a perfect clone of yourself would be certain to exist. Yet, if we're assuming the universe can exist for that long, why not also assume the universe is spatially infinite as well? We have no reason to suspect that if you kept traveling in one direction long enough, that you would somehow stop discovering new galaxies. As far as we know, they go on forever.
Hence, if you kept traveling in one direction far enough, you would also eventually find a perfect clone of yourself, which would actually exist at the same time as you right now. If we were to accept that the clone of yourself in the far future is the same object as you, wouldn't you not also have to conclude that the clone at a far distance from you is the same object as you? I find this to be rather strange because, again, you do not see out of your clone's eyes, it's clearly a different person. I would thus be inclined to say neither are "you." One does not spatially overlap you (exists in the same time but a different location) and the other does not temporally overlap you (could possibly even exist in the same location, but definitely not at the same time).
It thus seems more consistent to me to say both are merely clones and thus not the same object. It would be a different person who just so happens to look like you but is not you.
Simultaneity is actually not something that exists for objects separated by vast distances in spacetime according to general relativity. That's why I wasn't considering a spatial infinity, our observable reality is situated inside a very much spatially finite event horizon.
We know so little about how consciousness actually works that I'm personally content to say a mere clone of me existing somewhere with my memories is actually me. Shit, even if it doesn't have my memories! As long as it is close enough to being my mind. Who says the fundamental of subjective experience can't exist in superpositions just like everything else can.
I know consciousness can be interrupted without being permanently extinguished because I've been under general anaesthesia before.
So you’re most people. Welcome to Aldous Huxley thought. You might like monism tbh.
Simultaneity does exist in general relativity, it's just relative. If your clone doesn't exist because they lie beyond the observable horizon, well, you can't observe things in the future either, so what's the point? My point was that there's not an obvious reason to say a clone existing at the same time as you is indeed a clone but a clone existing at a different time is actually "you." To me, it makes more sense to say in both cases they are clones. But you seem to be saying that they are actually both "you"? Even if they exist at the same time? What about in similar locations as well, such as standing next to each other?
Also, I do not believe in "subjective experience" nor do I believe in "consciousness." It's not true that "we know so little about consciousness" because there is nothing to know about "consciousness" as it's largely a mystical buzzword. There are plenty of things we don't understand about the human brain, like intelligence, but we are gradually making progress in these fields. "Consciousness" is largely meaningless, though, and so it cannot be studied as there is nothing to even know about it, as it doesn't refer to anything real.
I have no idea why you are bringing superposition into this despite it having no relevance here.
Simultaneity does exist in general relativity, I didn't say it didn't. I said it doesn't exist for things separated by vast distances in spacetime, and that's true. There is no simultaneity for two entities separated by an event horizon.
I don't know what consciousness, as in qualia and subjective experience are, but they seems pretty real and not a buzzword to me, it's basically all I can know for sure exists.
I brought up superposition to explain why I don't consider two mes to not both be me. Both are experiencing the universe through the processes that go on in my brain, so both are me. My consciousness is the program running in their head (yeah, I get our brains are not similar to computers, I'm just coming up with a metaphor here), why can't it be in a superposition of two locations if two conscious instances of my brain exist in the same area?
Event horizon has to do with black holes which are not relevant here, I am assume you are talking about the cosmological horizon, which nothing in GR prevents you from defining simultaneous events from a particular frame of reference for other events beyond the cosmological horizon. If you do define such events, well, of course you could not perceive something beyond the cosmological horizon, so you might argue it's "metaphysical" so to speak. But, again, this is also true for something that exists in the future, it also not observable.
Qualia is just a category of objects. Redness, loudness, etc. All objects are socially constructed norms used to judge reality to be something. There's nothing special about one set of objects over another, as if objects of qualia require a special explanation that physical objects like trees and cats do not, or mathematical objects like circles and triangles.
Experience is not subjective.
Particles have a wavelength associated with them that depends upon their mass caled the de Broglie wavelength and this represents the statistical spread of the position of particles. A superposition of states is really just a list of probability amplitudes presenting the likelihoods of where the particle may show up. If the statistical spread (determined by the de Broglie wavelength) is too narrow then it would be basically impossible to get the object to be noticeably in a superposition of two different locations, while if the statistical spread is very large then it would be very easy.
The de Broglie wavelength depends upon mass, and gets narrower the more massive an object is. That means for any macroscopic object the statistical spread is just too small to place its position into a superposition of states. Massive objects like a human brain simply cannot be in a superposition of positions with another brain. The closest you could get is to a kind of Schrodinger's cat type scenario whereby the brain is entangled with another event that determines its trajectory, but I see no physical mechanism that would establish something like this between these two copies of "you."
I disagree, experience is very subjective. You can not convey what it feels like to exist with quantifiable data. No amount of information is sufficient to impart the sensation of seeing the color red on another observer without them actually experiencing it.
I'm saying maybe the consciousness itself briefly exists in a superposition, not the entire mass of the brain. If for some weird happenstance two copies of your mind existed at once, then your consciousness would briefly be in a superposition of two locations. Then this superposition would inevitably and immediately decay as the two minds begin receiving different sensory data.
You seem to fundamentally disagree that subjective experience even exists, so I'm not sure if you're still following, but my thinking is that the qualia is in essence literally just the physical system that makes up my brain functioning correctly. So if my brain exists in the universe, a mind similar enough to my own that it experiences the same qualia I'm experiencing now, then I exist and am conscious, regardless if there's any continuity to the physical body and location I currently inhabit.
None of this establishes it is subjective in the slightest. The reality we experience just is. Of course it is not equivalent to quantifiable data. If I go see the Shanghai Tower in person, and if I look at a picture or a written description of the Shanghai Tower, of course the real thing is categorically different than the thing in reality. How does that demonstrate the real thing is "subjective"?
The real thing is not subjective, but it is perspective-dependent. The physical sciences allow us to describe all possible perspectives, as both general relativity and relational quantum mechanics are perspective-dependent theories. But there is a categorical distinction between a description of a perspective and the reality of a perspective.
No matter how detailed a description of fire becomes, the paper it is written on will not suddenly burst into flames, as if it becomes a real fire. The reality of a thing, and the description of a thing, are always distinctly different. The physical sciences are descriptive, we can describe all possible perspectives, but there is still a categorical distinction between the reality of actually occupying such a perspective.
It makes no sense to ask how to quantify the reality we experience. It is false to qualify it as well. Reality just is what it is. When we assign quantities and qualities to it, we are moving beyond reality and into interpretation of reality. Reality does have the property that it is capable of being quantified and qualified, but the specific quantities and qualities we choose depends quite a bit on contextual factors and only makes sense in relation to social institutions as all object-labels are socially constructed norms.
This is, again, true for all objects. There is no reason to separate "the experience of seeing color" from any other experiential realities, such as "the experience of seeing a cat" or "the experience of seeing a triangle." Perspectives are defined in terms of physical systems, and so by definition two different physical systems occupy different slices of reality from two different perspectives. The only way to make them share the same perspective would be to make them the same object, which then they would no longer share the same perspective because the original two objects would no longer even exist, definitionally.
It is just fallacious to jump from reality being perspective-dependent to it being subject-dependent. You have not actually established some fundamental role for subjects here. Again, the physical sciences allow us to describe reality from all possible perspectives of all physical objects, so there is no physical reason to state that reality only exists from human perspectives. If you want to point out the fact that you only occupy the reality of your own perspective and thus cannot actually verify the reality of other perspectives described by the physical sciences, sure, but this is also true of other people. You cannot occupy, as a matter of definition, the perspective of other human beings, so you would be forced to conclude that the slices of reality corresponding to other human perspectives don't exist, either, i.e. devolving into solipsism.
Are you a solipsist? I guess I never actually asked.
If consciousness is a quantifiable object (which is necessary to be in a superposition of states which is a mathematical statement) then you should be able to give me a definition of consciousness I can quantify. You have yet to do so.
You have no mechanism for this to actually occur. You are just devolving into complete quantum mysticism, believing if you abuse terminology from quantum theory then suddenly it gives it legitimacy. It does not.
Stating that if two identical objects exist simultaneously they would be in a superposition of states is making a very specific quantifiable physical claim which you have not even attempted to explain the possible physical mechanism.
No, qualia is just a category of objects. Things like "redness" or "loudness," these are socially constructed norms we use to identify aspects of reality in a way that allow us to communicate them to other people. There is nothing special about "qualia" over any other category of objects, such as mathematical objects or physical objects. Experience itself is not a category of objects, it is not "qualia," nor is it "subjective." What we experience is just reality as it exists from our own perspective.
I'm not a solipsist, I'm not an anything -ist, I've never seriously studied philosophy, I'm just a person trying to make sense of why I as a collection of atoms just like everything else in this universe have an experience at all. Why is there a feeling to it? "It" is all I can for sure verify, you seem similar to me so I grant you have "it" as well as animals with brains and such. I generalize this further to everything else around us, that surely they too also have an innate feeling of existence, maybe perhaps just one far simpler than the sensations dreamed up by living organisms.
Again, my point is that (1) we can describe reality from the perspective of any physical object in the natural sciences, independently of whether or not it is a mammal with a brain, (2) I can experience the reality of the perspective in which I occupy directly for myself, and (3) it seems rather intuitive to then conclude that all possible descriptions of reality from all possible perspectives also correspond to an actual reality from that perspective (i.e. each possibly description of reality from any possible perspective also has a corresponding "what it is like to be" in that perspective).
Rejecting #3 seems to fall into solipsism since you would only be left with the reality from your own perspective, and descriptions of other perspectives would not have a corresponding reality to those descriptions. Accepting #3 would assign reality to all possible perspectives, and thus there would no reason to treat mammals with brains as anything special requiring a special explanation with some special "consciousness" property, since the physical sciences allows us to describe reality even from the perspective of inanimate objects like rocks.
It is clear you need an additional fourth premise to insist that mammalian brains do something special that requires a special explanation, and I do not see what that fourth premise could possibly be.
As I said, experience is just the reality of a particular frame of reference. To ask why there is a reality to it, you are just asking why there is a reality rather than no reality, i.e. not much different than a "why is there something rather than nothing" question. It cannot be meaningfully answered. You can explain why something in reality exists, but then whatever explanation you give will still deal with aspects of reality, which you can then just ask why those aspects exist, and repeat this as an infinite regress, constantly asking "why" to every question. At some point, you just have to respond, it is what it is. Reality as a whole cannot have an explanation. It just is. You just have to accept reality is as a start point or you will never get anywhere.
Experience is not something created by brains. Experience is, again, just reality as it exists from a particular perspective. Brains play a role in what we experience, but so does everything else as well. Every object we posit to exist, including our brains, play some predictive role in allowing us to explain and forecast experiential reality. But none of these objects create reality, as if reality is something that is "given rise to." Reality just is. We can identify objects within reality and use those objects to explain and forecast reality, but none of them can possibly play any sort of creative role in giving rise to reality itself. Logically, it makes no sense, as it is reality which grants objects the quality of being by definition.
I am not a fan of the interchanging of "experience" with "feeling" as you are using, kind of like when you also interchange it with "consciousness," because these words like "feeling" and "consciousness" clearly have human-centric implications to them. This is obvious if we apply these different words to inanimate objects. It clearly has rather mystical implications to say things like a rock can "feel" or it has "consciousness." However, to say the rock can have an experience is part of everyday language, i.e. "the rock is experiencing erosion in the rain," or "the rock is experiencing fluctuations in temperature." The word "experience" just means to undergo a real event, so this kind of language is rather natural, while assigning "feeling" or "consciousness" to a rock seems to anthropomorphize it too much.