Apologies for posting.
I should say by way of introductory remarks, that while this is an effort post, it is an effort post on a shitposting website, and thus ab initio a shitpost and therefore be taken in the correct spirit of levity in which it is intended. Don't get my thread locked.
Recent discussion on here has touched on the moral status of the execution of the Romanov family by Bolsheviks ahead of the advancing White Army1. While not exactly of practical significance given how few of us have Royal Families locked up in our basement, it did reveal several significant, (sometimes severe) differences in the philosophical underpinnings of the posters on this website.
A Moral Communism
Moral status as such actually has very little to deal with communism/leftist (in the Marxian vein) in terms of it's internal mechanism. Marx, Engels, Lenin, and the rest of that intellectual lineage2. famously thought very little of moral philosophy. A communist is thus entirely at liberty to dismiss this entire discussion as idealism, and observe that within a Marxist framework, there are no 'good' and 'bad', merely a historically deterministic sequence of class antagonisms that will eventually resolve in favor of the proletariat and thus choosing to be a communist is merely choosing to throw one's hat in with the predetermined victors. This strand of amoral communism thus is not terribly interested in this discussion, and anyone here that adheres to that framework is excused from the discussion as having won the argument.
Given the rest of us do have moral considerations that prefigure our political beliefs, it's necessary for us to sketch out at least a scaffolding for what moral commonalities leftists share before going further, lest we fall into a morass of fundamentally incompatible frameworks stemming from different axiomatic premises. Speaking from my own personal position, I ascribe to leftist political positions as they offer me the greatest promise of granting a comfortable and dignified existence to the largest number of people possible. That in of itself does not make a moral axiom though, as achieving a large amount of something is valueless if the individual components don't themselves have value, and therefore, and a fundamental value informing my politics is the axiomatic value/sanctity of human life. So I am taking on as an assumption that generally speaking, want everyone to have dignified and comfortable lives3. If that position doesn't more or less describe you, you are also excused as having won the argument.
Justifying Shooting a Tsesarevich in my Pajamas
Which brings us to the Romanovs. In keeping with 3. above, and considering the minor children of royals not culpable for the systematic injustices perpetrated under the dictatorship of their parents, we'll limit our discussion here to the minors (Anastasia, and especially Alexei), though I think the general outline of the argument can be applied to pretty much all of the Tsar's issue. The entirety of the family, along with their retinue, were bulleted and bayoneted in Yekaterinburg about 10 days before white occupied the city. In attempting to defend the legacy of one of the most politically successful socialist projects in history4., this action has largely been justified on the left. Examining the commonly proposed justifications in light of our moral principles finds them universally lacking.
- It was necessary in order to safeguard the immediate success of the revolution against an individual with claim to the throne.
This argument goes that while we do value human life and dignity, our efforts to maximize these will sometimes require that certain human lives be forfeit, essentially turning this into a trolley problem5.. This argument differs in an important aspect from the trolley problem in that the trolley problem consists of single moment in time with clearly articulable and certain outcomes given at the outset. Leaving Alexei alive was in no way certain to doom the revolution to failure of significant struggle, as he could have been maintained in custody, and ascribing such outsized influence on the course of political affairs to the life of a sickly 13 year old is a profoundly anti-materialist approach to history. History is replete with challenges to establish socialist authority6., none of which stemmed from claimants to the Imperial thrown. Further, liquidating the Tsar, his children, and his brother did not exhaust the Romanov line, his cousin could and did proclaim himself Emperor-in-exile, and despite being old enough to actually head a restorationist intervention, none materialized. So the notion that killing Alexei was necessary fails to stand up to scrutiny 7.. It is also worth noting as an aside that the Romanovs were deeply unpopular, and to wit, were not the government the Bolshevik revolution occurred under, and supporters of the provisional government (domestic and international alike) formed the overwhelming contingent of the White forces, and the notion that a 14 year old tsarist claimant to the thrown would have had a meaningful impact on that colossal clusterfuck strains credulity.
- It prevented a longterm challenge to Boshevik control in a manner similar to Jacobite uprisings or the Bourbon Restoration.
Taking a more longterm view of the problem, it might be acknowledged that the Alexei presented no immediate threat justifying his liquidation, but, drawing from the history of pre-CIA regime changes, he presented a longterm likely/probable/plausible/possible threat in the form of an eventual challenge, and that acting in light of that possibility was justified if not strictly necessary. If we wish to examine this in light of our moral principles, we need to develop some notion of probability calculus; at what point is taking in innocent life now justified in order to avoid certain possible harms that have a certain probability of occurring. You can formalize this to ridiculous extents8., or you can take the legal systems more qualitative approach, of establish some standard of proof (you are, after all, justifying killing someone), where the execution is deemed justified if seems more likely than not/clearly and convincingly/beyond a reasonable doubt that it will prevent further, greater harm in the future. This lets you weaken the requirement that it is necessary to kill him to merely it is prudent to kill him. What is lacking though is any evidence that anyone has meaningfully carried out this process for any standard beyond plausible. The greatest extent to which this is established is that historically, there have been several restorationist insurrections, but no systematized historical study has been undertaken to quantify the risk of insurrection/coup in the presence or absence of an legitimate claimant.9.
Well perhaps we leave it there; a plausible narrative that places Alexei as the cause of some harm is sufficient in our eyes to justify his liquidation. The problem with this is that it is such a liberal standard that it can be applied to nearly everyone. There are scores of documented peasant rebellions throughout history, so by the same standard it is plausible that any given peasant may be at risk for launching a peasant rebellion down the line and thus, by that same standard, we are justified in liquidating them. Universalizing from this generic peasant^.10. to all peasants. And thus our system named aimed an providing dignity and comfort is able to justify pretty much any atrocity.
- The moral culpability of for the executions lies at the feet of the Tsar who created the system and not the executioners themselves.
This argument goes that it was actually the Tsar that placed him in position to be killed by standing at the top of a monarchical system that has ruined and ended untold numbers of lives. Had the Tsar dismantled that system before it came to blows, Alexei would have lived a happily inbred life as a continental European curiosity.
This argument plays fast an lose with the notion of fault to an extent that borders on the absurd. Within getting into the morass that encompasses the legal notion of fault, I'll observe that the executioners where in total control of the situation, given the Romanovs were in the zone of immediate material influence, while the Bolshevik leaderships were at a more distant proximity, and Tsar Nicholas II at the head of the Imperial State was a fleeting memory, having greatly influenced the events that now overtook them, but having no control over them. The Bolshevik's in Ipatiev House or those in leadership in Moscow alone decided who in that house lived and died, they knew that, and they exercised that choice.
- Unpleasant things happen during a revolution and we accept that as soon as they begin.
This is true, but once again, it comes down to the notions of control and proximity. As a leftist, I acknowledge that the struggle for political power may involve the world becoming a worse place (as judged according to my moral principles outline above) due to my actions to make it a better one. This is an abstract acknowledgement. It may also result in me taking actions that I find unpleasant or repugnant11. If it is the moral principles that describe motivate my political struggle though, it is fundamentally self-defeating to exercise my control over my immediate surroundings to knowingly act in a manner that results in an immediate degradation of the world around me (once again, as judged by my moral standards). My actions in the here and now, must be justified according to my principles in the here and now and my actions in the here and now. If 10 minutes ago I was standing in Yekaterinburg and the Whites are closing in, and now I'm still standing in Yekaterinburg and the Whites are still closing in, but now there is a brand new pile of child corpses of my making, then I have made the world a worse place.
No tears for dead peasants
It is reasonable to ask why go to such great lengths to challenge the justifications for the murder of Alexei (which is so emotionally remote to me as to essentially be fictitious). To which I offer the following justifications.
- It's ridiculous and therefore funny.
- Because eventually some of us may be in positions to make decisions that make the world a substantially better or worse place for others, and I want it be very clear what stands before us when making those decisions. No, none of us are going to decide whether or not an heir lives or dies, but we are going to decide how to treat with those around us, and want everyone to pause before they exercise what little control they have in the world around them before making it a worse place, justifying it with a glib aphorism or some half-baked argument.
1. The fitness for humor here is not considered, as something can be both morally bad and the legitimate target of well-done comedy. Like 9/11.
2. I was promised ice cream if I didn't say 'ilk' here.
3. To wit, one of the main justifications for political violence on the left is that it is directed at those preventing others from enjoying dignity, comfort, or well, life.
4. Such as it is.
5. which we may dub the Yekaterinburg Streetcar Defense
6. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Rebellions_in_the_Soviet_Union
7. One could alternatively take the logical form of necessity as a conditional, ~P -> ~Q with P being "the legitimate claimant to the imperial thrown is killed" and "Q" being "the revolution is successful". Given the contra-factual nature of ~P, the truth value of this statement can't be evaluated directly, but given the analogous situation in China with PuYi, we can strongly infer that this conditional is in fact false and thus logical necessity is not present.
8. define xi to be each enumerated possible future in space X, p(xi) to be the probability of that future occurring, and h(xi) to be the number of lives ruined by Alexei in that future xi. Shoot kid if
9. To reach a preponderance of evidence standard you would need to establish P(Insurrection|Legitimate Claimant) > P(Insurrection), which the strictly materialist interpretation would hold P(Insurrection|Legitimate Claimant) = P(Insurrection).
10 Regular viewers will recognize this as universal generalization.
11 Orwell's description of the conditions of fighting in the Spanish civil war come to mind.
That's ridiculous.
"Maybe we shouldn't kill the kids, they weren't responsible."
"Yeah, but if we don't, the monarchists might use them to strengthen their claims."
End of discussion, versus "Ok let's go do a historical survey to verify that possibility and also break out the philosophy textbooks." Your point is incredibly bad faith. It didn't take a bunch of sitting around theorizing to come up with a justification, it was immediately apparent and easy to express in a single sentence.
This is one of those cases where I literally could not agree with your point even if I wanted to. You're essentially trying to argue that everyone but the groups you named should forfeit their agency as a moral actor. "Should I ask this person on a date? Better go find a statistician!" Extreme level of field arrogance.
Great, so the standard of evidence required is literally "can anyone say anything in favor of doing this terrible thing" in order for it to be justified, and as soon as that justification is offered, any follow-up questions could be dismissed as "we don't have time".
Absolutely not, they are welcome to use whatever systematized thought process they like or none. But if they're going to engage in fraught moral decision making that have grave consequences for other people, they should absolutely engage in a degree of epistemic humility instead of coming up with some pat 30 second justification for their decision and then insisting to everyone else that they have in fact done their homework.
In that context, yes, as long as it seems reasonable at first glance. The decision wasn't very important, and they did genuinely did not have time. I've already explained how thay context differs from you or me making the same decision.
I really think you have an extremely romanticized view of war and are giving royal lives disproportionate worth.
It was to certain people.
I don't want to come off as glib, but I think the mistake I am making in some people's eyes here (not necessarily yours) is that I am giving them any worth.
So was the life of every single individual soldier who died in WWI.
You invoked your field so I'm going to invoke mine. I studied physics and astronomy in uni, and one of the things that helped me with is a better understanding of scale. I'm used to differentiating between very large and very small numbers. For instance, we have a unit called a "barn," an extremely small area used at the particle scale, because hitting an area of that size is like "hitting the broad side of a barn." 10^20 and 10^21 are basically identical to most people, even though one is much, much larger than the other. Part of the reason I became a leftist is because after practicing working with numbers like that, I was able to comprehend some inkling of the scale of devastation caused by (for instance) the War on Terror.
I'm sorry but these things need to be considered in the context of scale. If you put as much empathy towards each Russian soldier as you are to the Romanov children, your mind would literally not be able to handle it (nor would mine). Scale and proportionality matter, and in the context of major events like WWI, the evaluation that the lives of 5 children have zero value is probably closer than the value you're ascribing to them. The difference between say 1/10^7 and zero is too small for the human mind to really comprehend.
No they don't, not when discussing individual moral actions we can take as individual moral agents, which is once again what I'm doing. If an individual had it within their power to save thousands of Russians on the battlefield, they absolutely had an obligation to do that, and yes if that meant letting the Romanov's die because you were too busy with your finger in the metaphorical body dyke, then yes that could would be justified. The people who shot the Romanov's were not so preoccupied with saving untold numbers of others that they had to liquadate the Romanovs. They were sitting around for several months, shot the Romanov's, and then went on to other things.
This goes back to my whole point that has nothing to do with the Romanov's. We are individuals operating within a specific zone of material influence, and we can make decisions to make that world better or worse, and the fact that other people elsewhere that I can do nothing about are using their agency to make the world a significantly worse place does not justify me taking such actions, even if they are comparably minor.
You keep coming back to "but you've got to see the big picture!", to which I am responding, no, you cannot actually see the actual big picture; no one can. You can, as an individual, see a very tiny picture, and be skeptical of anyone who comes in and paints a specific big picture for in order to justify making the actual, small picture, the only one you know reliably, substantially worse.
They literally were.
They were cheka functionaries, not higher-ups who had to take a break from manning the levers of state power. Lenin didn't hop on a train to squeeze some machine-gunning monarch time in between his emergency war committee meetings. If the decision was so inconsequential as to warrant no consideration by the higher-ups as you are saying, let the functionaries make a considered decision.
Ok, they considered it and decided to do it.
Sorry, I think I lost the plot a bit here.
No worries, I'm getting a bit muddled with all the parallel chains myself.
If they considered it and decided to do it, then they should show their work. Clearly that's not asking too much when literally murdering children is on the line, and if you're going to introduce political violence against children into your political toolkit you'll want clear safeguards on it beyond 'preventing a vaguely articulable possible future threat'.
So to be clear about what you want here, low ranking soldiers in the Red Army, roughly half of whom were illiterate and most of whom had little formal education, should, in the middle of the war, track down history and philosophy books somewhere (not like they had internet), read through them, debate, and conduct a formal study using objective, statistical modelling before making the decision on whether to kill to royal family?
Come on, you have to recognize how unreasonable you're being here.
They're welcome to use whatever methodology they like and were disposed to; I've merely offered suggestions drawing from my own background on how I might approach a studied approach to arriving at the most correct conclusion I could.
But they should absolutely enunciate that methodology and it's conclusions, or whoever delegated that authority to them should do so. Assign it to some clerk, I don't care. But I'm not particularly sympathetic to the argument that I'm making it too difficult to justify shooting children by requiring some thought beyond "ehh, we just sorta felt like it might save us some trouble down the line".
The standard you're using, which I'll (perhaps inaccurately) characterize as "it was judged as prudent toward safeguarding the revolution on an ad hoc basis" has absolutely no safeguards, and can go a long way to explaining the excesses of the Soviet revolution, which in the end was still a justified revolution. Surely you agree there's some better middle-ground between 'paralyzed with inaction overanalyzing every decision' and the path they ended up taking.
Sure, I agree that there's a line and I can agree that the Soviets crossed it at other points. But I don't agree that that's a reason to throw out ad-hoc reasoning altogether as it is often necessary. Personally, I think that even with all the time in the world, I would arrive at the same conclusion that killing them was justified, but also that it was perfectly reasonable to rely on ad-hoc reasoning in this case.
I don't really agree with this framing that, if only they had had a different moral framework, none of the excesses would've happened. I think a revolutionary context is likely to be bloody and contain excesses and people who get used to making decisions that make sense in that context will often make decisions as if they were still in that context, even though the material conditions have changed.
I don't believe you can find any moral framework or approach to decision-making that is both practically applicable during war-time and impossible or impractical for bad actors to exploit to justify doing bad shit.
Nor do I, it is often necessary. But in cases with grave implications for the lives of others and in the absence of a imminent need to make a decision, it falls short in providing justification for that.
So would you put any safeguards on when it unacceptable to deploy ad-hoc reasoning, or is that an additional, ad hoc consideration?
I suggest as an improvement to the system they used, that they do everything exactly the same but include an axiom about not intentionally shooting unarmed children. I don't see that as any less practical.
So, not in this case then since there was an imminent need to make a decision.
Ad-hoc reasoning is generally applicable and pretty much the default approach. If something seems important enough and you have time to consider it in more depth, you should. There are also good general guidelines and trends that are useful in making decision, like for example, "Don't kill people." You should also do self-crit and self-reflection to better understand your feelings and biases so you can identify when you're falling into a trap of making a bad decision. Meditation is a good tool to accomplish those things and to stay level-headed.
But there's no hard-and-fast rules, no. Even if I said there were, a bad actor could just ignore them, find some convoluted loophole, or just adopt a different framework entirely. The way to stop such things is not through following a strict code of rules, it's by having the self-awareness to recognize that you're being a bad actor and the self-control to stop yourself.
I mean if that's your standard, can you point to the decisionmakers actually doing this in this case?
No, they were in custody for a year prior to their execution, and even after deciding to execute them they dithered for over two weeks, and in the end there were 10 days between carrying it out and the occupation of the city by whites. They had something of an eternity, not trying to land a damaged airplane before running out of fuel.
Still not nearly enough time to meet the level of rigor you're asking for.
I'd be much happier if they did what you're asking for in terms of self-crit, bias reflection, and some meditation. But I don't see any evidence they did much of any of that.
You're right, they didn't. But that hasn't really been your criticism.
During the boiling point of tensions of a revolution, it's hard for people to keep a cool head. Even we on this website often get heated about politics and sometimes sneer at calls for civility and level-headed news. Perhaps we should do less of that, idk. I sometimes find myself conflicted between the two approaches myself.
I don't really think it's reasonable to expect that given the circumstances, though. Like it's hard to tell a Russian peasant that they need to stop being so angry, given the circumstances. Realistically, you don't get to dictate the exact nature of events, you can typically only push them in the direction of broad trends, like "continuing to suffer calmly" or "rising up in a wave of fury." Ideally though, there is a balance to be found, and especially after the war the balance is more towards cooler heads.
I think you could make a good case that socialist movements should do a better job at separating war-time leaders from civilian government during peacetime. To use another example, while things improved under Mao, there was probably someone more qualified who wouldn't have killed the sparrows.
Of course in the Soviets' case, it might have been risky to lay off the gas. Would a leader softer than Stalin have survived? Maybe it's worth it to accept a war-time leader just to make sure the project survives its initial years (at which point, when do you ask them to give up power?). Of course, in the long run the USSR collapsed but the causes of that are debatable. Definitely a question worth further study, I'd say.
I hate moral calculus, but have just a modicum of perspective here: Consider the whole population of the USSR and the catastrophe it would represent not just for most of them but for socialist movements around the world (particularly China) if a little Romanov went on to galvanize opposition. Even if we concede that it's literally only a 1/1,000,000 chance of happening, that still puts things clearly in favor of killing them because we are talking about many millions of peasants here whose entire lives depend on the Soviets holding out or else being, at best, reduced to basically the status of slavery and deprivation and perhaps all of their descendants for the next century or more as well.
But this number is just pulled out of thin air to give us the appearance of having done moral calculus. It might be only 1/1e⁹ or 1/1e¹². What you really mean is that it's justified because of any chance at all. But the risk of anyone leading a reactionary insurrection that leads to millions of deaths is nonzero, as evidenced by the fact that ahootind him didn't stop rhe civil war.
Except for the fact that such numbers are impossible to generate, for any decision in the context of a revolutionary civil war. That's why no one in history to my knowledge has ever used such statistical analysis to make such decisions. If I'm wrong about this, can you give me a concrete example of a time in history when moral calculus of the type you describe was used to make war time decisions?
I'm not the one who insists on the use of numbers like 1/1,000,000 in my argument for a justification. In my OP I specifically eschew this as unworkable and attempt a more qualitative standard instead. Everyone else is coming in and saying "if it's at least 1/1,000,000 it's still justified", but the they can't provide in actual methodology for reaching that threshold.
They are obviously using numbers derived from suppositions of the argument. They are in no way claiming those numbers are real or meaningful, and are using 1/1000000 as an intentionally absurd estimate to make a point
Also, how do you have this much time lol? I hope you are posting on company time
I'm a professor, so everyone who walks by the office just assumes I'm responding to emails.
LMAO. Incredibly
he means "vanishingly small", he's not using the number literally
But the probability of some joe schmoe leading an insurrection against the soviet are also vanishingly small. It wasn't Monarchists at the head of the White Army.