Right now, I don't have any sources ready, and I know for certain that the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on idealism explicitly excludes non-recent branches of idealist schools of thought.
There are at least two definitions of ontological idealism (and two corresponding ones for ontological materialism) that I have seen. One of which characterises idealist schools of thought as positing that (some) non-material things have some sort of primacy over material things (note that non-material things are not limited to thoughts). Another definition is broader and simply requires idealist schools of thought to posit that non-material things exist (while the corresponding definition for materialism requires those schools to posit that only material things exist).
Contrary to popular perception, idealism does not require you to believe in magic, including that we can psychically change matter. Simply, for example, subscribing to the idea that math does not depend on matter is idealist.
Also, while religious idealism (most prominently Christian idealism) does require you to believe in magic, it also doesn't require one to believe that it is thoughts that have any sort of primacy over matter.
I am also pretty sure that I'm not alone in considering relevant disagreements to be at least mostly linguistic in nature. I have heard that Wittgenstein said something to the same effect, but have not checked.
My position, based on Engels. You gotta add Dialectics: material things can combine in such ways that are not singularly traceable to the material basic components, but instead rely on emergent components when they interact. Consciousness as we understand it IS material but is not understood through vulgar materialism which says that it can be broken down into electric signals/chemicals to be understood entirely. This is the way. Dialectics of Nature.
Nothing "idealist" exists, but things not understood in their complete totality do, and emergence is real. But emergence is material, not Magic. Trying to make a definition of "materialism" which says human consciousness is simple cells, chemicals, and electric is a straw man of good materialist analyses. These definitions are all based in a non-dialectical framework and that's why they run into the same issues that Plekhanov ran into.
Are you insinuating that Wittgenstein's position of linguistic disagreements is applicable to differences of idealism and materialism?
i personally thought the most common form of idealism was summed up as this: "humans cannot perceive reality perfectly, they perceive things to their human limit and see appearances of things"
or, alternatively: "humans have experiences that trascend humanity itself and can't be fully understood by humans"
For Marx in particular, he saw any theory divorced from practical experience as a slipperly slope towards idealism - I'm still working through this argument myself, though, and I believe I misunderstood his point. I'm not very strong on my Young Hegelian critiques, truthfully
Lenin admits that it’s true though lol. He just says practically it very strong appears and works that the real substance that is subjectively experienced can be interacted with very functionally with materialistic assumptions. From practice (scientific and political) we know that diamat is the most functional system if not necessarily perfect.
i personally thought the most common form of idealism was summed up as this: "humans cannot perceive reality perfectly, they perceive things to their human limit and see appearances of things" or, alternatively: "humans have experiences that trascend humanity itself and can't be fully understood by humans"
It is definitely not that. The points about imperfection of perception are not relevant to either of idealism and materialism themselves.
For Marx in particular, he saw any theory divorced from practical experience as a slipperly slope towards idealism
I have not encountered Marx saying so, but that would be silly, as idealism isn't some sort of a detachment from practice, and I would argue that there are no serious incompatibilities between idealism and Marxism (at the very least, nobody has managed to bring any of such to my attention, so far).
You want to pin down absolute definitions of idealism vs materialism, capitalism vs socialism, but the precise meanings of these words are not agreed by all thinkers if they are consciously defined at all. Many thinkers who are called idealist did not self-identify as such, same for capitalist economists.
These terms ought to be considered as post-hoc groupings of an eclectic set of philosophies, even contradictory ones. So what definition of idealism are you applying?
there are no serious incompatibilities between idealism and Marxism
How can this be? Marx wrote a bunch of polemics against idealism. The German Ideology notably, but also the Gotha Critique, Theses on Feuerbach, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts (1844). Are you defining Marxism as the school that emerged after Marx, or Marx himself?
Empirical idealists are certainly not divorced from practice for example. Not that strict empiricism makes sense, but we do use practice is a criterion of truth.
Do you have any resources or examples that might clearly demonstrate what idealism is and isn't?
Right now, I don't have any sources ready, and I know for certain that the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on idealism explicitly excludes non-recent branches of idealist schools of thought.
There are at least two definitions of ontological idealism (and two corresponding ones for ontological materialism) that I have seen. One of which characterises idealist schools of thought as positing that (some) non-material things have some sort of primacy over material things (note that non-material things are not limited to thoughts). Another definition is broader and simply requires idealist schools of thought to posit that non-material things exist (while the corresponding definition for materialism requires those schools to posit that only material things exist).
Contrary to popular perception, idealism does not require you to believe in magic, including that we can psychically change matter. Simply, for example, subscribing to the idea that math does not depend on matter is idealist.
Also, while religious idealism (most prominently Christian idealism) does require you to believe in magic, it also doesn't require one to believe that it is thoughts that have any sort of primacy over matter.
I am also pretty sure that I'm not alone in considering relevant disagreements to be at least mostly linguistic in nature. I have heard that Wittgenstein said something to the same effect, but have not checked.
My position, based on Engels. You gotta add Dialectics: material things can combine in such ways that are not singularly traceable to the material basic components, but instead rely on emergent components when they interact. Consciousness as we understand it IS material but is not understood through vulgar materialism which says that it can be broken down into electric signals/chemicals to be understood entirely. This is the way. Dialectics of Nature.
Nothing "idealist" exists, but things not understood in their complete totality do, and emergence is real. But emergence is material, not Magic. Trying to make a definition of "materialism" which says human consciousness is simple cells, chemicals, and electric is a straw man of good materialist analyses. These definitions are all based in a non-dialectical framework and that's why they run into the same issues that Plekhanov ran into.
Are you insinuating that Wittgenstein's position of linguistic disagreements is applicable to differences of idealism and materialism?
i personally thought the most common form of idealism was summed up as this: "humans cannot perceive reality perfectly, they perceive things to their human limit and see appearances of things"
or, alternatively: "humans have experiences that trascend humanity itself and can't be fully understood by humans"
For Marx in particular, he saw any theory divorced from practical experience as a slipperly slope towards idealism - I'm still working through this argument myself, though, and I believe I misunderstood his point. I'm not very strong on my Young Hegelian critiques, truthfully
Lenin admits that it’s true though lol. He just says practically it very strong appears and works that the real substance that is subjectively experienced can be interacted with very functionally with materialistic assumptions. From practice (scientific and political) we know that diamat is the most functional system if not necessarily perfect.
It is definitely not that. The points about imperfection of perception are not relevant to either of idealism and materialism themselves.
I have not encountered Marx saying so, but that would be silly, as idealism isn't some sort of a detachment from practice, and I would argue that there are no serious incompatibilities between idealism and Marxism (at the very least, nobody has managed to bring any of such to my attention, so far).
You want to pin down absolute definitions of idealism vs materialism, capitalism vs socialism, but the precise meanings of these words are not agreed by all thinkers if they are consciously defined at all. Many thinkers who are called idealist did not self-identify as such, same for capitalist economists.
These terms ought to be considered as post-hoc groupings of an eclectic set of philosophies, even contradictory ones. So what definition of idealism are you applying?
How can this be? Marx wrote a bunch of polemics against idealism. The German Ideology notably, but also the Gotha Critique, Theses on Feuerbach, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts (1844). Are you defining Marxism as the school that emerged after Marx, or Marx himself?
Empirical idealists are certainly not divorced from practice for example. Not that strict empiricism makes sense, but we do use practice is a criterion of truth.