Social democracies aren't anti-fascists, at least not in the sense that they are reliably, ideologically opposed to fascism. Their foreign policy is probably best described (certainly prior to the Cold War) as conventional geopolitics. But (1) they were resistant to allying with fascists, (2) they eventually fought an incredibly bloody war against fascists, and (3) they did so while allying with communists. All of this suggests they weren't fascists themselves, and wound up seeing fascism as a bigger threat than communism.
Regarding that first point, consider that fascists attacking social democracies didn't occur in isolation; it occurred after a decade or so of trying and failing to reach some rapport. In Europe, Britain had a fascist party (and fascist sympathies among more powerful parties), but it never cooperated with Germany to the extent Italy (for example) did, so it became an enemy. The United States had a full-on Nazi party (with a significant German immigrant population, and with Nazi sympathies among major U.S. industrialists), but you had the same lack of cooperation, so it too became an enemy. You can make similar arguments to varying extents about other European countries. In Asia, there was actually a fair amount of pre-war U.S. economic antagonism towards Japan that led Japan to conclude war was inevitable. If the Allies were just moderate fascists, why did they have such a hard time getting along with other fascists, and why did they form an alliance with the big scary communist USSR?
I think the France and UK were more Keynesian capitalists than proper social democracies sustained by mass movements.
In the same document where we get "social democracy is objectively the moderate wing of fascism," Stalin identifies France and the UK as social democracies. But if they were in fact to the right of social democracy, that makes Stalin's comments look worse, not better.
Social democracies aren't anti-fascists, at least not in the sense that they are reliably, ideologically opposed to fascism. Their foreign policy is probably best described (certainly prior to the Cold War) as conventional geopolitics. But (1) they were resistant to allying with fascists, (2) they eventually fought an incredibly bloody war against fascists, and (3) they did so while allying with communists. All of this suggests they weren't fascists themselves, and wound up seeing fascism as a bigger threat than communism.
Regarding that first point, consider that fascists attacking social democracies didn't occur in isolation; it occurred after a decade or so of trying and failing to reach some rapport. In Europe, Britain had a fascist party (and fascist sympathies among more powerful parties), but it never cooperated with Germany to the extent Italy (for example) did, so it became an enemy. The United States had a full-on Nazi party (with a significant German immigrant population, and with Nazi sympathies among major U.S. industrialists), but you had the same lack of cooperation, so it too became an enemy. You can make similar arguments to varying extents about other European countries. In Asia, there was actually a fair amount of pre-war U.S. economic antagonism towards Japan that led Japan to conclude war was inevitable. If the Allies were just moderate fascists, why did they have such a hard time getting along with other fascists, and why did they form an alliance with the big scary communist USSR?
In the same document where we get "social democracy is objectively the moderate wing of fascism," Stalin identifies France and the UK as social democracies. But if they were in fact to the right of social democracy, that makes Stalin's comments look worse, not better.