It normalized its relations with Burma, and established diplomatic relations with non-communist countries: Malaysia (1974), the Philippines (June 1975), and Thailand (July 1975), all of which had been regarded as “lackeys of American imperialism” in the past.[28] In the context of confronting the Soviet Union and rapprochement with the United States, China adjusted its attitude towards these Third World countries. Meanwhile, China pursued a “dual-track” policy: it still provided a certain degree of support to anti-government left-wing parties.[29] Geng Biao used Sino-Burmese relations as an example: “We have diplomatic relations with Burma. [Prime Minister] Ne Win comes, and we have to welcome him. But the Burmese Communist Party conducts armed struggle, and we strongly support it. However, we can’t sever diplomatic relations with the Burmese government just because we support the Burmese Communist Party.”
Although the CCP claimed it strongly supported the armed rebel groups, this support inevitably grew weaker because it needed to maintain relations with their governments. In May 1974, China and Malaysia formally established diplomatic relations. The Prime Minister of Malaysia, Abdul Razak Hussein, in his meeting with Mao Zedong, repeatedly asked the latter to promise that the CCP would not have any relations with militant communists in Malaysia. Mao refused to sever the CCP’s relations with the Malaysian communists, but he compromised that “it is your internal affairs; we can’t intervene.” When Abdul Razak claimed he would “use troops and police to kill them,” Mao still said “it is your policy”; “we don’t intervene in your internal affairs.”[30] Later in July 1975, Mao told the Prime Minister of Thailand Kukrit Pramoj: “Someone asked me not to have relations with the communists in their country (Mao meant the rightest governments). I said no. How can communists not support other communists?... As for how you deal with the communists (in your country), we don’t intervene. Nothing more than condemning, fighting and killing. We don’t and are unable to manage it. (We) can’t intervene in other countries’ internal affairs. ”[31] By reiterating “we don’t intervene,” Mao implied his declining endorsement to the communist rebellions in Southeast Asia, although he didn’t completely abandon them.
Geng’s speech also illustrated the subtle change of Mao’s foreign policy. “We should not intervene in their internal affairs,” said Geng Biao. “Each countries’ Marxist-Leninist parties’ guidelines, policies, and strategies can only be made by themselves and through the integration of Marxist-Leninist principles and their practical situations. No matter how correct you are, if you don’t understand their situations, it will be very dangerous to command them. In the past, the Soviet revisionists always wanted to command us, but we didn’t listen to them.” Geng’s talk justified China’s declining support to the fraternal communists in Southeast Asia by referencing Mao’s philosophy, “integrating the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the particular situations.” The CCP wanted neither to participate in other communist parties’ conferences nor to invite other parties’ members to join CCP events. “The meetings we hold are to solve our own problems. What happens if they disagree with us when we are giving a report? If they invite us to attend a conference, we cannot keep silent about what is wrong. The moment we speak, we will disagree with them and quarrel with them. They are the hosts, and we are the guests. It’s not good to quarrel with them on their own turf.” China was also reluctant to train military personnel for its communist brothers. “We should tell them that fighting is not a big issue; they can learn when they fight. Some always ask to send military cadres to come here to study. We should tell them there is no need to do so,” said Geng Biao.
The CCP emphasized the role of “political support” - “political support is primary; economic support is secondary,” according to Geng. But in fact, this political support was also decreasing. Propaganda support was one of Beijing’s traditional means of political endorsement for the fraternal parties. The left-wing parties’ armed struggles were often the focal point in the Chinese media. In the middle of the 1970s, when China had improved its relations with Burma, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, Chinese media gradually reduced its reporting on the revolutionary insurgencies in these countries. It also avoided criticizing the Southeast Asian leaders by name. Additionally, in the past, the Chinese media had underscored the importance of Mao’s approach of armed struggles in the countryside when reporting the insurgencies in Southeast Asia, while in the middle of the 1970s, the reporting had to admit the complexity in Southeast Asia and encourage political movements in cities.[32] Three China-based clandestine radio stations—the Voice of the People of Thailand, the Voice of the Malayan Revolution, and the Voice of the People of Burma—were still able to pursue different lines from Beijing’s media. They continued carrying anti-government propaganda. But, Chinese media references to these clandestine stations became less frequent as the 1970s progressed.[33] The above demonstrated a dimming in Chinese zeal to spread revolution.
Mao Zedong himself was reluctant to give up revolutionary ideals, as well as the endorsement to fraternal parties, but he had no better option. He realized other communist parties did not live up to his expectations because they achieved little and were unable to overthrow their governments. He had to compromise and placate those foreign government leaders.[34] Revolutionary ideology declined in Chinese foreign policy in the 1970s.
Yes and unfortunately the overall revolutionary foreign policy that China displayed in the 50s and 60s largely ended during the late Mao era of the 70s and eventually led to what Chinese foreign policy is now: