Its continuity of consciousness. Like, I don't know how to explain it to you, but if they make an exact copy, that isnt you. Its a copy. A different session. A new set of instructions on RAM. It doesn't matter how accurate the simulation is, it doesn't transfer your life and consciousness. I'm pretty done explaining this, its just wrong on a biological level to think otherwise. You have to be in both spots at the same time, essentially, for the 'teleporter' to not kill you. Which is how its explain in Star Trek, for the record.
I'm not actually sure what position you're trying to defend here. I take a very functionalist view of consciousness and I have yet to be persuaded of the relevance of some kind of physical continuity (not sure how you even measure that).
Unless that's the consensus you were talking about, in which case I'll just note I was trying to gently pry the door open rather than come down hard on my side of it, as I'm a layperson and also not convinced the user I was replying to would have been receptive to that.
Well you've created a physically distinct human being that shares the exact same subjective experience - up to the divergent point, encoded in memory - as the original. I still fail to see how this proves anything about consciousness or its dependency on physical continuity. You might also have to be a bit clearer what you're arguing: if you mean that the post-split original (person 1) is the pre-split original (person 0) in a way that the post-split copy (person 2) is not, in what sense? What kind of identity does person 1 share with person 0 that person 2 does not? How does that identity relate to subjective conscious experience?
Or another route: try playing with the knobs on your thought experiment a bit. Instead of leaving one original, split them and rebuild each half into a full person. What kind of identity do either of these people share with person 0?
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Its continuity of consciousness. Like, I don't know how to explain it to you, but if they make an exact copy, that isnt you. Its a copy. A different session. A new set of instructions on RAM. It doesn't matter how accurate the simulation is, it doesn't transfer your life and consciousness. I'm pretty done explaining this, its just wrong on a biological level to think otherwise. You have to be in both spots at the same time, essentially, for the 'teleporter' to not kill you. Which is how its explain in Star Trek, for the record.
It's not "just wrong on a biological level" - it really depends on your understanding of consciousness and there isn't exactly a consensus.
hexbear understand object permanence challenge (impossible)
Hey, no need to be patronizing. It's just a philosophy discussion and we can be cool about it.
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I'm not actually sure what position you're trying to defend here. I take a very functionalist view of consciousness and I have yet to be persuaded of the relevance of some kind of physical continuity (not sure how you even measure that).
Unless that's the consensus you were talking about, in which case I'll just note I was trying to gently pry the door open rather than come down hard on my side of it, as I'm a layperson and also not convinced the user I was replying to would have been receptive to that.
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Well you've created a physically distinct human being that shares the exact same subjective experience - up to the divergent point, encoded in memory - as the original. I still fail to see how this proves anything about consciousness or its dependency on physical continuity. You might also have to be a bit clearer what you're arguing: if you mean that the post-split original (person 1) is the pre-split original (person 0) in a way that the post-split copy (person 2) is not, in what sense? What kind of identity does person 1 share with person 0 that person 2 does not? How does that identity relate to subjective conscious experience?
Or another route: try playing with the knobs on your thought experiment a bit. Instead of leaving one original, split them and rebuild each half into a full person. What kind of identity do either of these people share with person 0?