• RamrodBaguette [comrade/them, he/him]
    ·
    2 years ago

    Funny how the Soviets actually wanted the Afghan communists to get their shit together before even considering intervention, initially. They knew it was a trap but weren't left with any recourse (or so they saw it as).

    • Shoegazer [he/him]
      ·
      edit-2
      2 years ago

      I've been reading this essay and I'm almost done, but I'm left with a question. The USSR didn't want to invade, and the US knew that but also knew funding the Mujahaideen would draw the Soviets in, but why? Is it because if the jihadists won, a pro-soviet/moderate buffer state would seize to exist? This would make sense as the Muslim countries around the region were pro US because they framed themselves as pro-Islam

      edit:

      “what the Soviets want in Kabul is a government which would not threaten it, not necessarily a Marxist one. The Soviets did not want to keep their troops in Afghanistan since this would inevitably mean that in a few years the US would also build up forces in the area.

      From one of the foreign ministers

      • chickentendrils [any, comrade/them]
        ·
        edit-2
        2 years ago

        Yep, as you found.

        And the US' support of UA will be harder for the mass media to memory-hole, as compared to the US relationship with the Mujahideen. It's more than a few film dedications, Columbia launches, or State of the Union mentions at this point.

        I don't put it past them to try rerunning the exact same strategy, especially if Trump gets in and poses enough of a threat to blow the whole thing because he's not on the same page and has brain rot.

        I'd imagine that embroiling the Soviet-Afghan conflict didn't have as much riding on it though, going in, probably most of the subsequent security crises and ultimate invasion and occupation were somewhat organic opportunities for TPTB. But it's a playbook that Wall St. & CIA have run multiple times since, so I'd imagine the intention with Ukraine is similar.