There were a number of articles by bourgeois media outlets back in 2018 and 2019 that were bemoaning this ongoing process of the CPC co-opting China's private sector via party cells.

According to a South China Morning Post article in 2018:

China’s large privately owned firms are becoming more like state-owned enterprises, as many in recent years have implanted in their businesses cells of the Communist Party, the Communism Youth League and even discipline inspection committees. The party’s organisation department found that 68 per cent of China’s non-state enterprises had set up party cells by the end of 2016, and that 70 per cent of foreign-funded firms in China had also done so. The ratio is even higher now given the party promotion that has taken place over the past two years.

And according to a The Diplomat article in 2018:

The impact of adding a Party cell goes far beyond an increase in the cost of doing business. It also impacts the corporate structure and management decisions as they grow more opaque with the blurring of lines between the state’s role and private ownership. In so doing, this policy threatens to reverse China’s four decades old reform agenda of opening up to private enterprise as an engine of growth. In fact, entrepreneurs feel very insecure about their ownership and control over their businesses and companies. For instance, Alibaba’s Jack Ma once said that if the government wants to take over Alipay (value at $150 billion), he will gift it to the state without complaint. Tech startups are increasingly encouraged to sell shares to government bodies so that government-designated representatives can sit on the board to participate in management and operating decisions.

Another The Diplomat article in 2019:

Chinese experts who advocate for the Party Committee system argue that it benefits production, long-term planning, and the fight against corruption inside Chinese companies. But the Party Committee has an explicit role even within foreign companies, where its nature has raised debates especially among the community of investors involved in joint ventures (JVs) with state-owned enterprises. Even if Chinese Company Law regulates the establishment of Party units in foreign invested enterprises (both JVs and fully owned) without requiring governance roles for their members, recent trends in officials’ attitude — which are oriented toward the demand for more power — indicate accelerating interference. That suggests that these positions are not merely symbolic, but rather an eventual source of political pressure around the boardroom.