This is untrue; Hezbollah alone still has the capability to end Israel's ability to function as a state, let alone Iran. Israel could, at any point in the last year, had a few thousand missiles fired at them every day for a couple months; orders of magnitude beyond their ability to intercept. Their decision (particularly Hezbollah's) not to escalate to that level will be discussed here and elsewhere for years to come, and we'll likely get dripfed information on that over time

In a real all out war, the enemy, in the US and Israel, is not going to tolerate hundreds of missiles being fired at them a day without a response. And the problem with Iranian long range missiles was their accuracy under warfare conditions, evident in post hoc analysis on the strike on Nevatim Airbase. 30 to 40 direct hits on the base, but only one F-35 hangar hit out of 20 total, and one to two large aircraft hangars hit. The accuracy for counterforce targeting is just not there, the missiles have little effect on military bases, which are quite hard targets. So then the missiles can only be used on large soft targets effectively, but these are at levels of escalation Iran was uncomfortable with hitting. This is what I suspect after reading independent analysis, western analysts, and some dripfed information. An alleged leaked voice recording of IRGC General Behrouz Esbati, in regards to this topic said:

• Washington is capable of striking our positions and those of the Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq.
• Our conventional missiles have little impact on American military bases.
• If we attack their military bases, the U.S. will retaliate by targeting dozens of our sites.
• The Islamic Republic has avenged the killing of Hassan Nasrallah.
• Escalating the war in the region does not benefit the Axis of Resistance.

So that is the general idea, Iranian missiles have little impact on military bases, and any resulting retaliation would not be worth it, and a regional war is not in Iran's interest.

Analysis regarding accuracy from the satellite imagery stated similar, if you're looking at the probably of a single specific Iranian missile hitting a single specific hardened aircraft shelter (single shot probability of kill), even under the best case scenario, it's a 0.03% probability. Again, this is the chance one single missile will score a hit against a single specific hardened aircraft shelter. We see better performance at Nevatim, but that’s because Nevatim has many hardened aircraft shelters distributed over a wide area. Once you account for the chance that at least one/any of the missiles fired will strike at least one/any target, your hit chances for hitting at least one target get much better. But the conclusion is simple, you cannot get results from the imagery available that suggest Iranian long range missiles are capable of economic counterforce targeting. IRGC generals would've come to this conclusion upon viewing their own satellite imagery and data. Short range missiles with electro optical sensors that were used against a US military base in 2020 could have counterforce potential, but that means only baes within a 300-500km radius from Iranian launch sites are vulnerable, and the kill chain becomes more complex. And Iran don't have tens of thousands of these missiles. The backbone of Iranian deterrence are longer range liquid fueled missiles, not short range tactical missiles.

What I'm most afraid of is that it was a "deal" like that Iran made with Israel to delay the response to Haniyeh's assassination, as it would indicate that Hezbollah's leadership, including Nasrallah, were still under the illusion -somehow - that Israel was deal-capable; just like Iran's civilian leadership is/was.

I read an interesting piece on strategic front about deception, and how Hamas and Sinwar were able to deceive Israel prior to October 7, and how Hezbollah were deceived by Israel in the lead up to the ceasefire negotiations, not using their full capabilities, a paralysis of the leadership. I'll post it soon, along with the rest of the sources I've read.