My newly acquired understanding of the democratic transition in Spain, along with what I already knew about those in the former Soviet bloc, led me to fundamentally reject the Marxist ideology in which I once had unshakable faith. I came to realize that the theories Marx advanced in the nineteenth century were limited by his own intellect and the historical circumstances of his time. Moreover, I saw that the highly centralized, oppressive version of Marxism promoted by the CCP owed more to Stalin than to Marx himself. I increasingly recognized it as an ideology formed to serve a self-interested dictatorship. Marxism, I began to hint in publications and lectures, should not be worshiped as an absolute truth, and China had to start the journey to democracy. In 2010, when some liberal scholars published an edited volume called Toward Constitutionalism, I contributed an article that discussed the Spanish experience.

My vision—shared with other liberal scholars—was that China would start by implementing democracy within the party, which, over the long run, would lead to a constitutional democracy. China would have a parliament, even a real opposition party. In my heart, I worried that the CCP might violently resist such a transition, but I kept that thought to myself. Instead, when speaking with colleagues and students, I argued that such a transition would be good for China and even for the party itself, which could consolidate its legitimacy by making itself more accountable to the people. Many of the officials I taught acknowledged that the party faced problems, but they could not say so themselves. Instead, they cautiously urged me to persuade their superiors.

Yet Xi was launching the biggest ideological campaign since Mao’s death to revive Maoist rule.

So basically this professor lost faith in Marxism, chronicled how the party itself was becoming a stale machine that should be swept away for bourgeois democracy, and then was disappointed that Xi went the other way and reinvigorated the party with its Marxist ideals. The CPC (notice that this professor is calling it the CCP, not the CPC) has a lot of corrupt elements, as all ruling parties do, and has and will continue to fuck things up from time to time, like the Lei Yang debacle or initially suppressing Li Wenliang's report about covid-19. But this author's main contention seems to be that the party is expelling otherwise "good" party members who happen to be "dissident real estate tycoons" or, like herself, former communists that have since renounced Marxism and want China to "open up to democracy" and the West.

China, and the CPC, are not perfect. And you should never "trust" a state, especially one with billionaires and an immense surveillance state. But make no mistake, Xi Jinping is pulling the CPC back to the left and building socialism in China, and people like the author of this article (by her own admission!) want to turn China into a neoliberal hellhole like the United States. I know where I stand between the two.

EDIT: Also love the title. What, exactly, did the CPC fail at? Keeping this capitalist roadster in the party? Fail to make the West look good with their handling of the pandemic? Also, satisfaction with the government within China has skyrocked since the days of Jiang Zemin. While the ideas of the author may line up with Jiang Zemin more than Xi Jinping, it seems the vast majority of Chinese people like the leadership of Xi Jinping far better.