None of what you said changes the fact that Khrushchev defaulted on USSR’s quasi-compulsory state bonds (i.e. domestic public debt), which was critical for financing public projects during Stalin’s era at unprecedented scale:

The Ministry of Finance also began to warn that payments on the bonds for interest and prizes could not continue at current levels due to the burden on state finances and the inflationary risks associated with introducing billions of rubles into circulation in the form of interest, prizes, and redemption payments, money that could not be matched by consumer supply. In 1956, Minister of Finance Arseny Zverev predicted that, by 1960, state payments would reach 37.7 billion rubles, up from 30.2 rubles in 1955, or a rise of 25 percent. The government, by then, owed 228 billion on the bonds. By the end of the sixth Five-Year Plan, that would rise to an estimated 350 billion and, by 1960, the Soviet government would have to make 21.5 billion rubles in payments, he emphasized. Bondholders were poised to “recapture a real nest egg, possibly worth two or three times what [they] had paid for it,” in the words of long-time critic of the bonds, Franklyn D. Holzman.

In March 1957, the presidium of the Party Central Committee decided to abolish the bonds, leaving them “in the hands of the bondholders (as a symbol of their investment in the common project of building socialism).” That April, in meetings with workers and peasants in Gorkii, Khrushchev came clean about the size of the state’s debt—by then, around 260 billion rubles. Though they had played a crucial role in financing socialist development, Khrushchev explained, the mass bonds had become a drain on state finances. The government was stuck in a “vicious cycle” because payments rose with each passing year: he estimated that in 1957, around 16–17 billion rubles would be spent on prizes and redemption payments, while in 1958, the government would pay 18 billion rubles and, by 1967, 25 billion rubles—almost the entire sum that would be obtained from planned proceeds of the bonds in 1957. As a result, the government planned to halt all future issues as of 1 January, 1958 and freeze payments on existing bonds for 20 years. A “light bond” of 12 billion rubles was issued in 1957 instead of the planned bond of 26 billion. Despite the massive unpopularity of the move and accusations that the Soviet government had stolen “our only savings,” a recurring line in letters of complaint, the last mass subscription bond was significantly oversubscribed.

Forestier-Peyrat and Ironside, The Communist World of Public Debt (1917–1991): The Failure of a Countermodel?, 2020

The authors perspective is neoclassical in nature, but the numbers cited are correct. By refusing to expand the public debt, this crushes the ability of its citizens to spend, and therefore straining the productive capacity of its economy.

It is no surprise that economic growth began to slow and plateau starting from 1960, after experiencing almost 30 years of unprecedented growth (in all of world’s history) since Stalin’s first Five-Year Plan in 1929.

This is not to say that this was the only mistake that the Soviet government made under Khrushchev. There were many others when it comes to reversing Stalin’s policies, this was merely one of the major ones.