These are all lucky, unintended consequences. Trump basically played Russian roulette with Iran and quit after pulling the trigger once or twice. Sure, things are arguably better off now, but all of that only happened because there was a major risk of what would have been a genocidal war. It’s like looking at the Cuban Missile Crisis and focusing on whatever improvements came after it instead of seeing it as a near-miss that must be avoided at all costs. A policy that risks slaughtering millions of Iranians is a shit policy, full stop.
We see things differently then comrade and will have to agree to disagree. My 2 pence is I consider Kruschev a coward for blinking not once, not twice but three times during that period and don't particularly think there should've been something for the Soviets to fear with stationing missiles in Cuba. Once the crisis was in full swing Kruschev should've stared the imperialists down to the last.
Kruschev should've stared them down how Stalin would have (and did do during the Korean war by claiming he had nukes when he had none) and gone the full way instead of pissing his pants like he did during that period and cravenly giving into the imperialists. The entire history of the 20th century would've been different - the Vietnam war probably avoided had missiles been stationed in Cuba and Cuba not under a 6 decade long embargo.
Compare Kruschevs cowardly attitude of avoiding confrontation at all costs versus Che Guevaras stance of "we'll fight with what we've got"
the Russians were so thoroughly stood down, and we knew it. They didn’t make any move. They did not increase their alert; they did not increase any flights, or their air defence posture. They didn’t do a thing, they froze in place.”
Khrushchev’s response, broadcast on Radio Moscow on 28 October, was craven in the extreme, stating that “the Soviet government, in addition to previously issued instructions on the cessation of further work at the building sites for the weapons, has issued a new order on the dismantling of the weapons which you describe as ‘offensive’ and their crating and return to the Soviet Union”.
It is possible that part of Khrushchev’s motivation for embarking so light-mindedly on so serious a course of action was to give the lie to Chinese criticisms of revisionist passivity in the face of imperialist aggression – notably the refusal to assist China in developing her nuclear capability. In point of fact, however, the humiliation and dangers to which this zigzagging revisionist leadership exposed the socialist camp only served to confirm the Chinese comrades’ worst fears.
The October Crisis happened at a moment when fraternal relations between China and the Soviet Union were reaching breaking point, and Mao’s Marxist Leninist characterisation of Khrushchev’s handling of the crisis as moving “from adventurism to capitulationism” really hits the nail on the head.The criticism is not that one should never retreat – Lenin’s insistence on signing the very painful Brest-Litovsk Treaty with German imperialism wascorrect, and Trotsky’s preferred position of “neither peace nor war” was a disaster. The criticism is that, once so serious an undertaking as confronting US imperialism with nukes 90 miles from Miami was embarked upon, it needed to be followed through to its necessary consequences. Contrary to the view that Khrushchev’s retreat was a statesmanlike tactic which enabled Kennedy to pull back from the brink, the reality is that the combination of light-mindedness and cowardice, of adventurism and capitulationism, actually emboldened US imperialism, making the world a more, not less dangerous place. We should ask ourselves: if Kennedy had met a sterner rebuff from Moscow over Cuba, would he have been so ready to launch the genocidal war in Indochina which cost so many Vietnamese lives?
We shouldn’t give Trump any credit for manufacturing such an enormous risk out of nothing, and we definitely shouldn’t give him any credit for how other countries have responded – he has no control over those responses, and he certainly didn’t intend them. It was blind luck, the price for it was a near-miss, and the thing about near-misses is they’re not always misses.
There's nothing blind luck about it. Either he was foolish enough to make a decision to go to war with Iran (a mistake Biden would never have made) in which case the Empire collapses almost immediately given the numerous war games that show US getting it's ass handed to it or he strengthened Irans position and inadvertently China and Russias too
Though it took two years to plan and was scheduled to take place over three weeks, it only took ten minutes for it to end. Within those ten minutes, the backbone of the U.S. forces had been broken, and the Iran-like country emerged victorious.
This is an interesting discussion, and you are (as always) very well informed, so I'd like to keep exploring this.
There’s nothing blind luck about it. Either he was foolish enough to make a decision to go to war with Iran
I don't view brinksmanship as a game where one party can unilaterally decide to stop playing at any time. There are all sorts of human mistakes, equipment failures, or accidents that can cause the situation to spiral out of control even when neither side intends to escalate. In a normal situation, it's easier to navigate crises like the 1983 nuclear false alarm incident, or the 1988 shoot down of Iran Air 655, or a submarine sinking. How would those crises have turned out if they had occurred in a situation like our aggression against Iran? Maybe they still turn out alright, but maybe we go to war instead. When you're on the brink of a conflict even a little nudge can push you over, and that nudge can come from anywhere. Notably (as was possibly the case in the Iran Air 655 shoot down), that nudge can come from some overly-aggressive commander on the ground. How many of those has the U.S. military churned out?
The Russian roulette analogy wasn't adequate. A better analogy is lining two armies up across a field from each other, having them load their guns and point them at each other, and then waiting to see who blinks. At that point whoever is in nominal control of each side is not in full control, even of their own side. Maybe someone gets jittery and pulls a trigger. Maybe you get an accidental discharge. Maybe someone who's really spoiling for a fight pulls a trigger intentionally. In any of those situations a battle would break out and there would be a lot of killing before anyone could stop it.
in which case the Empire collapses almost immediately given the numerous war games that show US getting it’s ass handed to it
The U.S. empire didn't collapse after losses in Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Iraq. I don't see why it would collapse with a loss in Iran, much less collapse immediately. War with Iran would really be uncharted territory -- as you point out, it would be the largest, most advanced country we've fought since WWII -- so I don't think we can draw any neat conclusions from it.
Three points on that reading of the Cuban Missile Crisis, although it's not the main topic here:
Characterizing it as capitulation on the part of the Soviets omits the fact that the U.S. agreed to remove first-strike nukes from Turkey in exchange for the USSR removing its missiles from Cuba. That article mentions this but (without support) claims the U.S. planned to retire its Turkey nukes soon anyways; without some evidence of this, one could easily read that claim from the U.S. as ass covering.
Primarily blaming Kennedy for Vietnam runs counter to most assessments of the war. It was Johnson who really escalated the fighting, and there's a credible argument that Kennedy planned to withdraw after the 1964 election. Certainly Kennedy had plenty of responsibility for the war, but the phrasing of that part makes it read more like a narrative constructed in hindsight than a logical progression of events as they unfolded.
I'm also reminded of Parenti's "anything the Soviets did would be construed against them" point. Sure, maybe further brinksmanship in Cuba wouldn't have led to nuclear war, and would have caused the genocidal anti-communists in the U.S. to back down. But it also could have been used by that crowd as evidence of the imminence of the communist threat, and as a sign that even more aggressive opposition was needed.
We see things differently then comrade and will have to agree to disagree. My 2 pence is I consider Kruschev a coward for blinking not once, not twice but three times during that period and don't particularly think there should've been something for the Soviets to fear with stationing missiles in Cuba. Once the crisis was in full swing Kruschev should've stared the imperialists down to the last.
Kruschev should've stared them down how Stalin would have (and did do during the Korean war by claiming he had nukes when he had none) and gone the full way instead of pissing his pants like he did during that period and cravenly giving into the imperialists. The entire history of the 20th century would've been different - the Vietnam war probably avoided had missiles been stationed in Cuba and Cuba not under a 6 decade long embargo.
Compare Kruschevs cowardly attitude of avoiding confrontation at all costs versus Che Guevaras stance of "we'll fight with what we've got"
http://www.lalkar.org/article/165/the-october-crisis-remembered
There's nothing blind luck about it. Either he was foolish enough to make a decision to go to war with Iran (a mistake Biden would never have made) in which case the Empire collapses almost immediately given the numerous war games that show US getting it's ass handed to it or he strengthened Irans position and inadvertently China and Russias too
This is an interesting discussion, and you are (as always) very well informed, so I'd like to keep exploring this.
I don't view brinksmanship as a game where one party can unilaterally decide to stop playing at any time. There are all sorts of human mistakes, equipment failures, or accidents that can cause the situation to spiral out of control even when neither side intends to escalate. In a normal situation, it's easier to navigate crises like the 1983 nuclear false alarm incident, or the 1988 shoot down of Iran Air 655, or a submarine sinking. How would those crises have turned out if they had occurred in a situation like our aggression against Iran? Maybe they still turn out alright, but maybe we go to war instead. When you're on the brink of a conflict even a little nudge can push you over, and that nudge can come from anywhere. Notably (as was possibly the case in the Iran Air 655 shoot down), that nudge can come from some overly-aggressive commander on the ground. How many of those has the U.S. military churned out?
The Russian roulette analogy wasn't adequate. A better analogy is lining two armies up across a field from each other, having them load their guns and point them at each other, and then waiting to see who blinks. At that point whoever is in nominal control of each side is not in full control, even of their own side. Maybe someone gets jittery and pulls a trigger. Maybe you get an accidental discharge. Maybe someone who's really spoiling for a fight pulls a trigger intentionally. In any of those situations a battle would break out and there would be a lot of killing before anyone could stop it.
The U.S. empire didn't collapse after losses in Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Iraq. I don't see why it would collapse with a loss in Iran, much less collapse immediately. War with Iran would really be uncharted territory -- as you point out, it would be the largest, most advanced country we've fought since WWII -- so I don't think we can draw any neat conclusions from it.
Three points on that reading of the Cuban Missile Crisis, although it's not the main topic here: