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Examples of racism/euro-centrism during the Russia-Ukraine conflict

Add to the above list if you can, thank you.


Resources For Understanding The War Beyond The Bulletins


Defense Politics Asia's youtube channel and their map, who is an independent youtuber with a mostly neutral viewpoint.

Moon of Alabama, which tends to have good analysis (though also a couple bad takes here and there)

Understanding War and the Saker: neo-conservative sources but their reporting of the war (so far) seems to line up with reality better than most liberal sources.

Alexander Mercouris, who does daily videos on the conflict and, unlike most western analysts, has some degree of understanding on how war works. He is a reactionary, however.

On the ground: Patrick Lancaster, an independent journalist reporting in the Ukrainian warzones.

Unedited videos of Russian/Ukrainian press conferences and speeches.


Yesterday's discussion post.


  • Donut
    ·
    edit-2
    1 year ago

    deleted by creator

    • LeninWeave [none/use name]
      ·
      edit-2
      3 years ago

      Westerners when they try to push the Nazis into the Soviet Union and Molotov-Ribbentrop is signed as a last resort: "Stalin is literally worse than the Nazis."

      Westerners when they do a coup to put neo-Nazi militias and their allies in power: "Sorry sweaty, necessary evil." :maybe-later-kiddo:

        • Alaskaball [comrade/them]MA
          ·
          3 years ago

          STALIN FELT FULLY JUSTIFIED IN SIGNING THE PACT

          It was a dramatic moment when in the conference room of the Kremlin, Stalin and Molotov, the leaders of world revolution, stood side-by-side with Ribbentrop the spokesman of Hitler, the leader of world counter-revolution. But Stalin was unperturbed. His evaluation of the course of events and of the forces engaged was not that of the frantic critics in the West. Rightly or wrongly, he was convinced that he had averted, at least for a time, a war with Nazi Germany in which the Chamberlain and Daladier Governments of Britain and France would have become first Hitler’s arms merchants and finally his co-belligerents. He felt that his conscience had nothing with which to reproach him. He laughed to scorn those who regarded the pact as a wedding of Bolshevism and Nazism, and regarded their attacks as the chatter of fools. Why should he be regarded as a criminal for signing such an agreement when the statesmen of the critics’ own governments had been in constant political and personal association with the leaders of Nazism and Fascism, and had made pacts with them without consulting the Soviet Union or even the League of Nations, of which they were members and with which they were pledged to prior consultation?

          Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 215-16

          As for Stalin’s decision to sign the Treaty, that was also a political maneuver. He thought he was deceiving Hitler, turning him against the West. I don’t think either Stalin or Hitler took the Treaty seriously. Each was pursuing his own goals. Hitler’s were those that we knew from Mein Kampf. Stalin understood correctly what Hitler was up to, but he thought he could deflect the blow of the German army away from the USSR and direct it at the West, and in that way buy time. Of course, the West, meanwhile, did everything it could to turn Hitler against the East. Schecter, Jerrold. Trans & Ed. Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes. Boston: Little, Brown, c1990, p. 50

          These events served to feed the suspicion and arouse the dissatisfaction of the realistic Soviet leaders, including Stalin. Apparently they got “fed up” with attempting to stop the aggressors by participation in European affairs, and characteristically boldly reversed their attitude and decided to secure their own position by making a pact of nonaggression with Germany, which would assure peace for Russia, at least for a time, regardless of any possibility of war in Europe. Davies, Joseph E. Mission to Moscow. New York, N. Y.: Simon and Schuster, c1941, p. 456

          At the same time, however, it was obvious that a rapprochement between the Soviet Union and France, marked by the signing of a mutual assistance treaty, was proceeding at an even more intense pace. The Soviet Union had also joined the League of Nations and was conducting intensive diplomatic and political activities aimed at curbing the aggressive aims and actions of the ruling circles in Germany, Italy, and Japan. The policy of the Soviet Union found very little support among the ruling parties of England and France. They, like Hitler, were pursuing a double game at that time, playing now an anti-Soviet card, now an antifascist one. Under the circumstances, Soviet diplomats also had to play a double game….

          Medvedev, Roy. Let History Judge. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989, p. 725

          …As Stalin learned, his negotiating partners were, moreover, simultaneously continuing their secret efforts to reach an acceptable understanding with Hitler. It was clear that Britain and France were simply playing for time while seeking the most favorable outcome from their own point of view and without regard for Soviet interests. In effect, the Western powers offered no concrete ideas for joint action against Germany. Their intention was plainly to let the USSR play the chief part in resisting possible German aggression without giving guarantees that they would share a proportion of the burden. …By the end of the summer of 1939 in had become plain to the Soviet leadership that, with Nazi Germany to the West and militaristic Japan to the East, in had no one on whom to rely. The argument Stalin had put forward at the 18th Congress seemed justified: anti-communism and a lack of a desire by Britain and France to pursue a policy of collective security had opened the sluice gates for aggression by the anti-Comintern pact. London and Paris were blinded to the real danger by their self-interest and hatred of socialism. Short-sighted politicians were saying, let Hitler make his anti-Communist crusade in the east. He seemed to them the lesser evil. The Soviet Union faced an extremely limited choice, but Stalin realized that it must be made, however negative the reaction in other countries. As a pragmatist, he cast ideological principles aside and, once he was sure the Anglo-French-Soviet talks would not produce results, he resorted to the German option which was being offered so assiduously by Berlin. He thought there was now no other choice. The alternative was to place the USSR in confrontation with the broad anti-Soviet front, which would be far worse. He had no time to think of what successive generations would say. The war was at hand and he had to postpone its outbreak at any cost.

          Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 351

          Looking back, the Non-Aggression Pact appears extremely tarnished, and morally an alliance with the Western democracies would have been immeasurably preferable. But neither Britain nor France was ready for such an alliance. From the point of view of state interest the Soviet Union had no other acceptable choice. A refusal to take any step would hardly have stopped Germany. The Wehrmacht and the nation were tuned to such a degree of readiness that the invasion of Poland was a foregone conclusion. Assistance to Poland was hampered not only by Warsaw’s attitude, but also by the Soviet Union’s unpreparedness. Rejection of the pact would could have led to the formation of a broad anti-Soviet alliance and threatened the very existence of socialism. In any case, Britain and France had both signed similar pacts with Germany in 1938 and were conducting secret talks with Hitler in the summer of 1939 with the aim of creating an anti-Soviet bloc. It is commonly suggested that the pact triggered the start of the Second World War, while it is commonly forgotten that by then the Western powers had already sacrificed Austria, Czechoslovakia and Memel to Hitler, and that Britain and France had done nothing to save the Spanish republic.

          Volkogonov, Dmitri. Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy. New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1991, p. 356

          After the war, the French Communist leader Bonte stated that the Kemsley visit, along with knowledge of the clandestine meeting between Goering and the British businessman, had been the chief factors in influencing the Soviets to seek an agreement with Germany. While this is certainly an exaggeration, there can be no doubt that the undercover dealings did have a strong influence on Stalin, as well as on Hitler, who was convinced by them that Britain would not fight. How could the Soviet leader trust a government which continued to indulge in such underhand activities while supposedly negotiating seriously with him? Admittedly, he was himself talking to the Germans, but he could always justify this as insurance, in case the Allied talks failed. In keeping his options open until the very last moment, Stalin does seem to have been prepared to give the allies every opportunity to succeed.

          Read, Anthony and David Fisher. The Deadly Embrace. New York: Norton, 1988, p. 230

          To the people of the USSR and foreign Communists, this Soviet-German Pact was a blow. True Communists were dismayed that Socialist Russia should make a treaty with the arch-enemy Hitler. They regarded Fascism as “the most aggressive form of Capitalism and Imperialism.” But Stalin had his answer. He called the unpopular pact a “Marriage of Reason” and slowly the Soviet nation swallowed the pill, accepted their leader’s explanation, and even began to agree that Stalin had made “one of the wisest moves in history.”

          Fishman and Hutton. The Private Life of Josif Stalin. London: W. H. Allen, 1962, p. 131

          At half-past-six on the afternoon of July 3, 1941, the day after his return to Moscow, Stalin spoke to his people: “What did we gain by concluding a Pact of Non-Aggression with Germany? We assured our country peace during 18 months, as well as an opportunity of preparing our forces for the event of Germany’s attacking our country. This was a gain for us, and a loss for Fascist Germany.”

          Fishman and Hutton. The Private Life of Josif Stalin. London: W. H. Allen, 1962, p. 142

          • Alaskaball [comrade/them]MA
            ·
            3 years ago

            STALIN MOVED INTO POLISH TERRITORY WHEN JUSTIFIED

            Accordingly, in the hour when the Polish government and general staff abandoned their country to its fate, with a promptitude that once more surprised the world Stalin set the Red Army on the march towards the “Curzon line.” This line, which had been universally recognized as the Russo-Polish boundary until the Poles tore a great area of white Russia and the Ukraine from the Soviets during the intervention wars, meant an advance through territory containing 12 million inhabitants. The banner of Revolution was raised, and to the rescue of these 12 million former Soviet subjects the Red Army hastened. However the argument may go, the fact is that Stalin did not send the Red Army into the onetime Polish territory until there was no government left in Poland and the country was wide-open for the Nazis to acquire land as far beyond the “Curzon Line” as they chose.

            Murphy, John Thomas. Stalin, London, John Lane, 1945, p. 215

            Their [the Russians] immediate purpose was to occupy as quickly as possible the Polish area whose possession they had wrung from Germany as part of the price for their pact of friendship and their supplies of oil, grain, manganese, and cotton. That they did this with no regard for Polish or Anglo-American public opinion is neither to their detriment nor their credit; it simply showed that Stalin, fully alive to the danger of Nazi invasion, was determined to put as much space as possible between his prepared defense zone and the coming blitzkrieg.

            Duranty, Walter. Story of Soviet Russia. Philadelphia, N. Y.: JB Lippincott Co. 1944, p. 251

      • SoyViking [he/him]
        ·
        3 years ago

        Maybe they say the "Stalin was worse than Hitler!" thing because they think Hitler was kind of okay?

    • Dirt_Owl [comrade/them, they/them]
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      edit-2
      3 years ago

      How many times is the west going to fund far-right orgs only have it to bite their asses later on? You can't write this shit. This is Isis all over again.

    • Frank [he/him, he/him]
      ·
      3 years ago

      I think it says a lot about the legitimacy of the Poroshenko government that the only guys he could find willing to fight "For Ukraine" were a bunch of Nazis and associated filth. I almost feel bad for Zelensky. He inherited the Nazis after they'd already started to metastasize.