literally me, but i keep it to myself its funnier when they don't know it's an insult.
I am an idealist, in the same sense as Che's ideas about a revolutionary's love. I want desperately for us as humanity to make kind, informed, rational and appropriate decisions. I want to see the best in people... I also realize that's not realistic a lot of the time. But hey, have to have hope to keep going, no?
Idealism should never undermine the reality of the situation, but it can and should be a guiding force. I am an idealist in the sense that I believe given the tools and direction we can be incredible. Realistically, right now the fight is tough, it sucks, but we can make a better world, or at least, we gotta try.
As for idealism in relation to material condition, decisions cannot and should not be made with 'what if' positions. Plan for the worst but those plans should be made malleable enough to adapt should real material conditions allow.
That's not what idealism means in this context. Idealism means "ideas shape reality" whereas materialism is "reality shapes ideas." Idealism is ignoring material conditions in order preserve an idea, instead of changing the idea to match the material conditions we face.
Pragmatism maybe? I'm not really sure, I tend to find "realist" just means "I'm really good at justifying the actions I was going to do already." though obviously that isn't a definition.
This may be of some relevance:
Cornforth on 'realism'
From 22–24 of Maurice Cornforth’s Materialism and the Dialectical Method:
Some Varieties of Present-day Idealist Philosophy
Another compromise philosophy is known as "realism". In its modern form, this philosophy has arisen in opposition to subjective idealism.
The "realist" philosophers say that the external material world really exists independent of our perceptions and is in some way reflected by our perceptions. In this the "realists" agree with the materialists in opposition to subjective idealism; indeed, you cannot be a materialist unless you are a thoroughgoing realist on the question of the real existence of the material world.
But merely to assert that the external world exists independent of our perceiving it, is not to be a materialist. For example, the great Catholic philosopher of the middle ages, Thomas Aquinas, was in this sense a "realist". And to this day most Catholic theologians regard it as a heresy to be anything but a "realist" in philosophy. But at the same time they assert that the material world, which really exists, was created by God, and is sustained and ruled all the time by the power of God, by a spiritual power. So far from being materialists, they are idealists.
Moreover, the word "realism" is much abused by philosophers. So long as you believe that something or other is "real", you may call yourself a "realist". Some philosophers think that not only is the world of material things real, but that there is also, outside space and time, a real world of "universals", of the abstract essences of things: so these call themselves "realists". Others say that, although nothing exists but the perceptions in our minds, nevertheless these perceptions are real: so these call themselves "realists" too. All of which goes to show that some philosophers are very tricky in their use of words.
I'm not the OP, but I would like to speak on this matter and, perhaps get some relevant input.
That seems to be a roughly correct assessment of what idealism is if we replace the word 'reality' with 'material part of reality' (because non-material part of reality is still a part of reality). However, I see a couple of issues with the assessment of Marxism as supposedly being a materialist and anti-idealist school of thought:
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I'm not sure what the argument is for how the ideas encountered in math depend on material part of reality. There is no such dependency as far as I can see as a person with a background in mathematics.
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I am not aware of any Marxist positions that are in conflict with idealism. If there are such positions, I'm all ears.
1: Math is the literal representation of the the laws of matter. Math would not make sense if it didn't follow the laws of matter that we have developed throughout all our history.
2: "The question of the relation of thinking to being, the relation of spirit to nature is the paramount question of the whole of philosophy.... The answers which the philosophers gave to this question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature ... comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of materialism." (Marx, Selected Works, Vol. I, p. 329.) The entire foundation of Marxism (dialectical materialism) is in conflict with the foundation of idealism.
Math is the literal representation of the the laws of matter
It is not, especially not in the sense of math as what mathematicians study, but, again, math as an academic discipline is also not that. Math as an academic discipline says nothing about matter. Physics and chemistry (as academic disciplines) do.
In an academic work of physics, you would encounter passages like 'a body's movement can be described this way', or 'spectral analysis indicates that this planet's atmosphere has such-and-such gases'.
In an academic work of chemistry, you would encounter passages like 'when mixed, these two substances enter a reaction the result of which are these substances'.
In an academic work of math, you would instead encounter passages like 'the annulus of convergence of this Laurent series has such-and-such radii', or 'this surface has this Euler characteristic', or 'this shape is a wild embedding of a sphere into R^3'.
Unlike bodies of matter, planets and their atmospheres, substances, etc., none of the objects mentioned in the quotes in that last part are material.Math would not make sense if it didn't follow the laws of matter that we have developed throughout all our history
It's the other way around, however. Math as what mathematicians study is not dependent on matter in any way (if you disagree, you can try exploring what properties matter would need to have to, for example, annihilate the idea of the field of rational numbers). Meanwhile, if a material system works in a way that corresponds to some non-self-contradictory system found in math, it is not going to produce any results that would somehow cause a contradiction in the math system, so long as the material system works in accordance with the correspondence to the math system. You are not going to, for example, start out with 2 apples, give one apple to your comrade and be left with 3 apples, so long as giving an apple corresponds to subtracting 1 from a natural number that starts out as the count of how many apples you have and so long as there are no other ways to change how many apples you have.
The entire foundation of Marxism (dialectical materialism) is in conflict with the foundation of idealism
I am yet to encounter any conflicts in this regard. I have been unable to find them on my own, and the people that I have talked to so far, including outside of this thread, have not managed to find any such issues. I hope to resolve this matter at some point, one way or another.
It is not, especially not in the sense of math as what mathematicians study, but, again, math as an academic discipline is also not that. Math as an academic discipline says nothing about matter. Physics and chemistry (as academic disciplines) do.
Maybe a better phrasing would be that math is another paradigm of matter, another way of visualizing matter. Still i stand by what i said, even if mathematician studies are seemingly abstract, it is only because we have developed math to a higher stage of development than other disciplines and thus have lost the forest for the trees.
It’s the other way around, however. Math as what mathematicians study is not dependent on matter in any way.
Math does not exist in a vacuum, this is a big difference between metaphysics and Marxism, things do not exist in a vacuum.. Math studies have to converge to the currently developed laws of math or it is not math but nonsense.
"Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but as a connected and integral whole, in which things, phenomena are organically connected with, dependent on, and determined by, each other." (Dialectical and Historical Materialism)
I apologise for disappearing for a few days. Dealing with stress, in particular due to this discussion, and with more 'professional' stuff. I have not read everything in the thread that got posted since I last replied here yet, and will probably not be able to do so quite right now.
Maybe a better phrasing would be that math is another paradigm of matter
In what sense? If by the word 'paradigm' you just mean 'a collection of ideas' (where an 'idea' is any non-material object), then the expression 'a collection of ideas of matter' doesn't make sense in this context without further clarification.
If you mean that it is some sort of a collection of theories about matter, then there are, again, problems. Math-as-what-mathematicians-study is not a theory, not a collection of thought patterns, research methods or anything like that - it exists independently of our minds. Also, not particularly relevant, but math as the body of knowledge about what mathematicians study tells us nothing about matter without application of the sort that physicists and chemists engage in.another way of visualizing matter
Math-as-what-mathematicians-study is not any sort of way of visualising anything, though. We can use knowledge about that stuff in order to help us visualise things, both material and non-material, like we know how to draw an annulus and we know that a Laurent series generally converges for z within a metric annulus on the complex plane, meaning that we can visualise the region of convergence of such a series with a relevant drawing (or imagine a relevant drawing), or like how we can use our knowledge of the fact that roughly half of uranium-238 decays into uranium-234 within 4.5 billion years or so to make a relevant drawing (or, again, imagine one).
Math does not exist in a vacuum, this is a big difference between metaphysics and Marxism, things do not exist in a vacuum
Not sure what you mean by 'existing in a vacuum'. In the literal sense, it is incorrect, as math is not a material thing, and does not have a location in any reasonable sense in this context.
If by that you mean that it depends on matter, then that seems to be an assumption/axiom that you subscribe to. That assumption does not seem to have a good basis. How would matter have to be different in order to, for example, eliminate the idea of the field of rational numbers? Or do you have another example of a dependency of math-as-what-mathematicians-study in mind?Math studies have to converge to the currently developed laws of math or it is not math but nonsense
What do you mean by 'converge' here, and what relevance does this sentence have to this topic?
What mathematicians study can be said to be 'the laws of math'. The study of math can't be said to 'converge' in any sense that I can think of, other than colloquial and imprecise, in which case I'm not sure what exactly it is that you mean.Furthermore, are there any conclusions that Marxism draws from materialism about society, economics, politics, communist praxis, epistemology or some human activity that I have failed to consider here? Because if not, it seems that we are in the same boat with the exception that I say that some non-material things are non-mental and are not dependent on matter, while matter has dependencies on it, and you say that there are no such things.
What do you mean by 'material'?Nevermind, I saw your comment below.
I think the misstep that you're taking is equating 'material' with 'physical' or relating to '(physical) matter'.
Marxists don't study things, they study relations and processes. So when Marxists talk of 'material', they're speaking of 'material relations'. This includes physical objects, of course, and also social relations and e.g. gravity or magnetic fields. Money or value as social relations are as material as gravity or a flower; such relations have very real, very tangible effects on the world even if you can't see or touch the relations.
You seem to be transposing your own definition of 'material' onto historical and dialectical materialists who hold a very different definition. You're just going to speak past people if you do that.
I could be wrong: are you referring to any particular Marxists as a source for your definition of materialism and it's coincidence with idealism? You say that you're:
yet to encounter any conflicts in … [t]he entire foundation of Marxism (dialectical materialism) [and] the foundation of idealism[.]
Personally, I haven't come across a single Marxist who treats materialism and idealism as compatible. Even those who admit that ideas can shape reality (including Marx himself) do so from a position of rejecting idealism. In that sense, just as material does not equate to (physical) matter, idealism does not equate to ideas simpliciter.
All these debates are rooted in historic philosophical traditions. You can't dismiss the essence of Marxism on the basis of modern, dare I say idealistically universalised, notions of what these terms mean; you have to go back to the beginning and situate the terms in their historical context. That is another aspect of Marxism—insisting that relations are historically contingent, meaning that e.g. definitions can change through the epochs.
I apologise for disappearing for a few days. Dealing with stress, in particular due to this discussion, and with more 'professional' stuff. I have not read everything in the thread that got posted since I last replied here yet, and will probably not be able to do so quite right now.
I think the misstep that you're taking is equating 'material' with 'physical' or relating to '(physical) matter'
But then what you mean by 'material' also encompasses non-material things, which doesn't align with how the word 'material' is used in philosophy. This also supports the thoughts that I have been left with for a while at this point that there is no conflict between Marxism and idealism. Just between Marxism and some forms of idealism that are often presented to encompass all of idealist schools of thought.
Also, can you provide a source for your definition of the word 'material'? Also, as of right now, I do not understand what exactly it is that you mean by it if not that a 'material' object is one that consists of matter (and, perhaps, that a 'material' process is one that involves material objects, etc.).
I could be wrong: are you referring to any particular Marxists as a source for your definition of materialism and it's coincidence with idealism?
I never claimed that materialism 'coincides' with idealism. What I have claimed is that Marxism doesn't conflict with idealism (in particular, with the views that I subscribe to).
Strictly speaking, my claim is incorrect, because at least usually Marxists do seem to take as an axiom that all ideas depend on matter in some way, but- I don't see any significant conclusions that are drawn from that assumption that conflict with idealism.
- Judging by how often Marxists who criticise/reject idealism don't actually mean idealism in general, but just some idealist schools of thought. More specifically, ones that only distinguish mental stuff out of non-material. These would be people like, for example, (some of) idealist mathematical intuitionists seem to believe (as opposed to materialist mathematical intuitionists).
Personally, I haven't come across a single Marxist who treats materialism and idealism as compatible
I do not treat them as compatible, except in the sense that there are types of materialism of different strictness. I don't think that anybody here subscribes to strict materialism that posits that nothing but matter exists, for example.
What I am saying is that Marxism is fundamentally 'agnostic' in this sense. All of the relevant conclusions can be made in various idealist and materialist frameworks, especially if we allow for some basic rewording. Again, at the very least currently I am not aware of any relevant conflicts.Although, I think that all the 'idealism vs materialism' arguments do lack an evaluation of a view that neither matter nor ideas have any sort of 'primacy' in any reasonable sense, considering that idealism and materialism are often defined through specifically the 'primacy' thing (as opposed to through what is labelled as 'existing', which is how the relevant terms are defined in at least some traditions), and, bizarrely, I have not encountered the position that I just outlined yet.
idealism does not equate to ideas simpliciter
Not sure what you are trying to say here.
- If you mean that, literally, that words 'idealism' and 'ideas' are not synonymous, then that is obviously correct.
- If you mean that idealist schools of thought do not generally say that ideas are the only thing that exists, then yes, that is correct. In particular, I do say that matter exists.
- If you mean that idealism does not necessarily claim that ideas have primacy over matter, then there is an issue. While, for example, I claim that there are ideas (such as what mathematicians study) that are independent of matter but not vice versa, and that I also claim that there are ideas (like, for example, our imagination and perception of things, including what is studied by mathematicians as well as how that stone that you just threw skimmed over the water) that either have dependency on matter but not vice versa or, at least, that matter has some sort of 'primacy' over those, I do claim that some ideas do have some sort of 'primacy' over matter. If you do not define 'idealism' and 'materialism' through some sort of 'primacy' or even existence of relevant objects, then how do you define those?
In any case, my main point is that, so far, I do not see any significant conflicts between Marxism and idealism.
Thanks for responding. Don't worry about the delay. At least on my instance, there's no issue with taking your time, especially with tricky issues that require thinking space. I'm preparing a longer response for you because there's a lot to unpack, here. It may take me a day or two to collect my thoughts.
It's late in the day but if I don't reply this evening I'm going to keep forgetting!
I used spoiler tags to make reading easier.
I recommend Maurice Cornforth’s three very short volumes on dialectical materialism, historical materialism, and epistemology.
I’ll begin with what seems to be at the core of the disagreement.
You say:
what you mean by ‘material’ also encompasses non-material things, which doesn’t align with how the word ‘material’ is used in philosophy.
All philosophy is class philosophy. Bourgeois philosophy tends not to acknowledge that fact and its obscurity furthers its class position.
Marxists always treat materialism as dialectical materialism. While materialism relates to matter and treats the material as primary, it is matter as a relation as opposed to matter as 'things'. Engels in Anti-Dühring:
Motion is the mode of existence of matter. … On the earth, for example, a body may be in mechanical equilibrium, may be mechanically at rest; but this in no way prevents it from participating in the motion of the earth and in that of the whole solar system, just as little as it prevents its most minute physical particles from carrying out the vibrations determined by its temperature, or its atoms from passing through a chemical process. Matter without motion is just as inconceivable as motion without matter.
Matter, then, cannot be reduced to the physical object that appears to rest in front of you. The object is the relation of all its constituent atoms and forces, always moving. You say that I must mean that '"material" also encompasses non-material things’. This suggests that something like motion would count as a ‘non-material thing …’. While motion is not tangible, it is ‘matter’ according to dialectical materialism.
Marxists do not see motion as falling within the category of matter. Marxists treat matter and motion as a dialectic. If motion is matter and motion is intangible, then other intangibles could be material. That is, not every intangible is reducible to an idea.
Marx, Capital, Volume I (Preface to the first German edition):
… it is the ultimate aim of this work [Capital], to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society[.] … My standpoint, from which the evolution of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for relations whose creature he socially remains ….
Which is to say that social laws of motion are not inescapable just because society somehow all agrees to be bound in some way (which is an idealist refrain to the power of money that I have heard before), but because these laws (relations) are material. These relations are no less material for being expressed in symbols, linguistic or mathematical. I’m unsure whether you or your sources would consider such relations as material or ‘non-material’ for not being physical – possibly not. Marxists treat these relations of production as material.
I reject the equation of material to ‘physical’ or relating to ‘(physical) matter’ because that definition is neither materialist nor dialectical. The framing suggests a definition of matter from an idealist perspective. This is unsurprising if you consider yourself to be an ontological idealist. It may explain why you thought (in another comment) that ‘“dialectical materialism” … can just as well … work … fine within an idealist framework/alongside subscription to idealist schools of thought’. That view fails to accommodate the motion-matter dialectic and must exclude value, social relations, and laws of motion.
If that’s wrong and you are reading philosophy that accepts the above concepts as material, then we must start again because I have misread you.
Cornforth’s Materialism and the Dialectical Method should clarify things further:
Materialism is not a dogmatic system. It is … a way of interpreting, conceiving of, explaining every question.
… Materialism is opposed to idealism. On every question, there are materialist and idealist ways of interpreting it, … of trying to understand it.
Thus materialism and idealism … consequently … express opposite approaches in practice and lead to very different conclusions in terms of practical activity.
This leaves no room to say that ‘Marxism doesn’t conflict with idealism’:
Idealism is the way of interpreting things which regards the spiritual as prior to the material, whereas materialism regards the material as prior. … [T]his difference manifests itself … in general philosophical conceptions of the world as a whole, and in conceptions of particular things and events.
If your philosophy rejects social relations, etc, as matter, it is bourgeois philosophy. Idealist, bourgeois philosophy does not provide the tools to fully grasp the claims of materialist dialectics.
Example:
Why are there rich and poor? [An] … idealist [explanation] … is because some … are careful and farsighted, and these husband their resources and grow rich, while others are thriftless and stupid, and these remain poor. …
The materialist … seeks the reason in the material, economic conditions of social life[,] … divided into rich and poor … because the production of the material means of life is so ordered that some have possession of the land and other means of production while the rest have to work for them. However hard they may work and … scrape and save, the non-possessors will remain poor, while the possessors grow rich on the fruits of their labour.
Summary (emphasis added):
The basic teachings of materialism stand in opposition to these three assertions of idealism [omitted].
- Materialism teaches that the world is by its very nature material, that everything which exists comes into being on the basis of material causes, arises and develops in accordance with the laws of motion of matter.
- Materialism teaches that matter is objective reality existing outside and independent of the mind; and that far from the mental existing in separation from the material, everything mental or spiritual is a product of material processes.
- Materialism teaches that the world and its laws are knowable, and that while much in the material world may not be known there is no unknowable sphere of reality which lies outside the material world.
… Marxist philosophy is characterised by its absolutely consistent materialism all along the line, by its making no concessions whatever at any point to idealism.
On the broad attempt to philosophise away the differences between materialism and idealism:
[I]dealism serves as a weapon of reaction; and … when socialists embrace idealism they are being influenced by the ideology of the capitalists. … Whatever fine systems of philosophy have been invented, idealism has been used as a means of justifying the rule of an exploiting class and deceiving the exploited.
This is not to say that [materialist] truths have not been expressed in an idealist guise[;] … they have. For idealism has very deep roots in our ways of thinking, and so men often clothe their thoughts and aspirations in idealist dress.
Cornforth, again, to tie this back in with dialectics:
The problem of understanding and explaining development in a materialist way … is answered by dialectical materialism.
Dialectical materialism considers the universe, not as static, not as unchanging, but as in continual process of development. It … seeks for the explanation, the driving force, of this universal movement, not in inventions of idealist fantasy, but within material processes themselves—in the inner contradictions, the opposite conflicting tendencies, which are in operation in every process of nature and society.
Cornforth, quoting Lenin:
“… dialectics is the study of the contradiction within the very essence of things. …”
Where contradiction is at work, there is the force of development.
This materialist understanding of dialectics is the key to understanding the forces of development within the material world itself, without recourse to outside causes.
I realise this was a long comment. I hope it clears some things up. To finish with Cornforth:
[T]he whole history of human thought has been the history of the fight of materialism against idealism, of the overcoming of idealist illusions and fantasies.
I would like to clarify some things. It is not exactly true that Marxism is a materialist philosophy. Marxism is a dialectical materialist philosophy. One of Marx's key innovations in philosophy was to conceive of a feedback relation between ideas and matter. Matter constrains and guides the development of ideas, and ideas influence matter through human action.
Another aspect here is that this feedback relationship is self similar. If you zoom in to smaller parts of reality, you find new iterations of this loop. For example, you could find a feedback relationship between the legal system and the economic mode of production. But if you zoom into the legal system themselves, you will find some relation between the material base of the legal system (the courts, prisons, lawyers) and the ideal part (the laws on the books, the common juridical worldviews).
I think it’s more correct to say dialectical materialism is a subset of materialist philosophy. It’s not a dualist philosophy because the mental realm is not conceived of as a separate thing. Rather information and ideas are embedded in the complex chemistry of the human brain.
I think the true utility of dialectics to Marx was that it allowed him to intuit how change actually occurs in our material world without relying on the science of thermodynamics which didn’t exist yet.
Yup. I should have added that part but forgot.
I think the true utility of dialectics to Marx was that it allowed him to intuit how change actually occurs in our material world without relying on the science of thermodynamics which didn’t exist yet.
It's more than just thermodynamics. I don't think dialects can simply be reduced to science (that is positivism, which marx rejected). It might be better to say that dialects is the philosophy of science.
Plus, marx was well aware of thermodynamics. In fact, the whole idea of labor-power was inspired by horse-power. And value was conceived of as the economic analogue of work.
Science doesn’t not have to be positivist. I think most scientists actually understand that. For example the laws of thermodynamics break down at a quantum level and we’re still trying to come up with and test better models that can incorporate that new information.
What I mean to say about the laws of thermodynamics is they are incredibly useful in describing how and why things change. These were not all worked out when Marx was developing his theories. Yes, Marx and Engels were up to date with the science of their time and they make reference to work and power. However they lacked an understanding of entropy if only because scientists had only begun to experiment with the concept. That’s very clear especially if you read Engels’s Dialectic of Nature. In it he explicitly argues against ideas that would come to be core to the science of thermodynamics.
That’s all to say I suspect if those developments in physics had occurred maybe 40 years earlier, Marx would have formulated a much more precise concept of value. Then maybe he wouldn’t have needed to write so much about linen coats.
I think it’s more correct to say dialectical materialism is a subset of materialist philosophy. It’s not a dualist philosophy because the mental realm is not conceived of as a separate thing
This line of thinking indicates the assumption that the only type of idealism is the sort that posits that only matter and 'mental' non-material stuff exists. There are other types, including ones that do not consider said 'mental' stuff to exist.
I myself, for example, fall under the camp of considering non-material non-mental stuff to exist, in addition to mental stuff. I consider some, but not all, of the former to have no dependencies on material stuff, with material stuff being dependent on such, and that all mental stuff depends on material stuff. I am yet to find any sort of conflicts with Marxism on these grounds (or in general, sans, perhaps, some wording that is used by Marx or other people).
I would like to clarify some things. It is not exactly true that Marxism is a materialist philosophy. Marxism is a dialectical materialist philosophy. One of Marx's key innovations in philosophy was to conceive of a feedback relation between ideas and matter. Matter constrains and guides the development of ideas, and ideas influence matter through human action
However, why call this 'dialectical materialism' if it can just as well be work just fine within an idealist framework/alongside subscription to idealist schools of thought? There doesn't seem to be any conflict in this regard.
Because Marxists think of ideas as themselves being material things. Marxism is not a dualist philosophy. For us, ideas exist as brains, books, TV programs and so on. There is thus even some interesting theories about how the medium itself changes the ideas. Furthermore, in marxist theories, ideas are not given equal weight to the rest of the system. Ideas are only a small part of material reality.
As far as I understand it math is the symbolic representation of formal logic which is itself a reflection of thermodynamic principles.
Mathematics as what mathematicians study is not itself a representation (of, well, itself), so that's obviously false in that sense, and I'm not sure how representation of it is relevant to its own nature. And, of course, math itself isn't dependent on what is studied in thermodynamics.
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Just last week I called some people on my union team idealists to their face.
They're libs so I don't think they got the full impact of what I was saying.
I have to say, it feels like one issue that I have with a lot of socialists is not understanding what idealism is and not understanding when they are talking about non-material things (and there are a lot of important non-material things to talk about, like capitalism, value, social stuff in general, etc.). I am honestly still unsure why so many people assume that idealism is incompatible with major schools of thought associated with socialism.
I am still not super clear on it myself, but while you are correct that idealism isn't incompatible with socialism, it is incompatible with Marxism as idealism is the opposite of materialism and Marxism is rooted in materialism, not idealism.
And I think you are wrong on how you categorize things. Capitalism, value, and social stuff can be analyzed from an idealist perspective, but a Marxist would analyze those things from a materialist perspective. They don't merely exist as ideas, but also as real material institutions that have material affects on people.
thank you, you are completely correct. more marxists need to understand that idealism is the opposite of materialism.
it is incompatible with Marxism as idealism is the opposite of materialism and Marxism is rooted in materialism, not idealism
I have to disagree. Marxism does not seem to be rooted in either materialism or idealism, or, at least, I do not see any contradictions with either. A lot of people seem to hold this view out of gross misunderstanding of what idealism and materialism (as well as the relevant types of those, such as, for example, ontological idealism and materialism) are, and an assumption that idealism is some sort of a belief in magic.
Like, one of the schools of thought that I subscribe to is mathematical Platonism (perhaps with some modifications, as I have not seen any mention of concepts such as what I describe as 'manifestations of ideas' in sources regarding mathematical Platonism), which makes me an idealist in the ontological sense. In what ways are those views of mine incompatible with Marxism? I see no conflicts of any sort of significance whatsoever. I do not think that Marxism has any sort of dependency on ontology, or, at least, I do not see those dependencies.
Capitalism, value, and social stuff can be analyzed from an idealist perspective, but a Marxist would analyze those things from a materialist perspective
If we are talking about strict materialism, then such perspectives would posit that non-material things do not exist, and I am yet to find a Marxist who holds those views.
If we are talking about non-strict materialism, where non-material things can be said to exist, then how do those perspectives differ from idealist ones in this context? I do not see any dependencies of, say, Marx talking about various forms of values of commodities on making non-strict materialist assumptions.They don't merely exist as ideas, but also as real material institutions that have material affects on people
However, that is not in conflict with idealism, and, furthermore, when relevant things are discussed in socialist spaces, including Marxist and Marxist-adjacent ones, people almost always talk about the non-material stuff. Not to the exclusion of material things, of course, like people getting sick, or some goods or materials being moved to somewhere, etc., but people also talk about and in terms of stuff like capitalists and workers' relations to capital, land, and labour, like laws being passed, enforced, and abolished, like policies of various states and organisations, etc.
And, of course, I am yet to encounter any sort of Marxist perspective where materialist assumptions are necessary, unless I am missing something.I have to disagree. Marxism does not seem to be rooted in either materialism or idealism, or, at least, I do not see any contradictions with either.
Marxism is dialectical materialism, that is what it means. When someone says "Marxist analysis", it means it's an analysis through the lens of dialectical materialism. It's method is dialectical, viewing things as a process, while it's theory is materialistic, matter being primary. Marxism is hitherto the most advanced development on materialist theory.
Obligatory "Dialectical and Historical Materialism by Stalin" recommendation, this book explains why Marxism is opposite to idealism and metaphysics: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1938/09.htm
Marxism is dialectical materialism, that is what it means. When someone says "Marxist analysis", it means it's an analysis through the lens of dialectical materialism. It's method is dialectical, viewing things as a process, while it's theory is materialistic, matter being primary. Marxism is hitherto the most advanced development on materialist theory
But what actual contradictions are there between Marxism and idealism?
Again, for example, I am a mathematical Platonist. What beliefs of mine in that regard contradict with Marxism? If it's just the subscription to ontological materialism, but without any notable conclusions drawn from that, then, given that that would mean that I agree with every Marxist position except that one, that would mean that the differences between my positions and Marxist ones are insignificant.Obligatory "Dialectical and Historical Materialism by Stalin" recommendation, this book explains why Marxism is opposite to idealism and metaphysics: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1938/09.htm
I will read it, albeit that will have to wait until at least tomorrow.
Again, for example, I am a mathematical Platonist. What beliefs of mine in that regard contradict with Marxism?
Well for one you see math as something independent, you see math existing in a vacuum.
"Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but as a connected and integral whole, in which things, phenomena are organically connected with, dependent on, and determined by, each other.
The dialectical method therefore holds that no phenomenon in nature can be understood if taken by itself, isolated from surrounding phenomena, inasmuch as any phenomenon in any realm of nature may become meaningless to us if it is not considered in connection with the surrounding conditions, but divorced from them; and that, vice versa, any phenomenon can be understood and explained if considered in its inseparable connection with surrounding phenomena, as one conditioned by surrounding phenomena." (Dialectical and Historical Materialism)
This is my understanding of your views from what you wrote in other replies, i haven't read and don't plan to read about mathematical Platonism, we already have developed much further than whatever Plato worked with.
Marxism does not seem to be rooted in either materialism or idealism
Marx was a young hegelian. Hegel was an idealist. Marxism was created by Marx changing Hegel's ideas. Dialectical materialism took Hegel's dialectic and changed it from idealist to materialist.
Can you, however, point to any Marxist positions that are in contradiction to idealism in general and/or, in my case specifically, to mathematical Platonism? As of right now, I see literally no conflict between Marxism and idealism.
The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. – real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process. If in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-down as in a camera obscura, this phenomenon arises just as much from their historical life-process as the inversion of objects on the retina does from their physical life-process.
In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life. In the first method of approach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living individual; in the second method, which conforms to real life, it is the real living individuals themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness.
This method of approach is not devoid of premises. It starts out from the real premises and does not abandon them for a moment. Its premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation and rigidity, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions. As soon as this active life-process is described, history ceases to be a collection of dead facts as it is with the empiricists (themselves still abstract), or an imagined activity of imagined subjects, as with the idealists.
Karl Marx - The German Ideology
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01a.htmMy understanding of this passage is that in idealist thinking, ideas shape reality but in materialist thinking, material reality shapes ideas.
So, I finished going over the quoted part, and Marx is talking about specifically the type(s) of idealism that I do not subscribe to. He is addressing specifically the types of idealism that posit that only material stuff and mental stuff exist, and that the latter has some sort of 'primacy' over the former. My view on this sort of idealism is echoed by what you quoted, and I find that type of idealism rather silly.
The quoted part does not address the type of idealism that I subscribe to, one which posits that non-material non-mental stuff, like what mathematicians study, exists as well, and that some of it has no dependency on the other stuff, i.e. it has 'primacy' over, in particular, material stuff in this sense.
I will not be able to go through the entire quote right now, so I will do so later. For now, I'd like to address the last part of your reply with my reply to another comment in this thread:
That seems to be a roughly correct assessment of what idealism is if we replace the word 'reality' with 'material part of reality' (because non-material part of reality is still a part of reality). However, I see a couple of issues with the assessment of Marxism as supposedly being a materialist and anti-idealist school of thought:
- I'm not sure what the argument is for how the ideas encountered in math depend on material part of reality. There is no such dependency as far as I can see as a person with a background in mathematics.
- I am not aware of any Marxist positions that are in conflict with idealism. If there are such positions, I'm all ears.
Note that the middle part of this reply is just hastily copied from elsewhere. I did not edit it in case there are some relevant positions covered in the quote.
Idealism is when you have ideas and the more you have the more idealist it is. And if you have really high level important ideas then it’s Platonism
PS it’s bad form to not read someone’s reference and proceed to “reply” with a canned response. If you don’t have the time to respond say so and use that comment as a reminder for when you do have time.
I will actually address your points when I get back from a doc appt
Edit: this looks like something I'll want to make into a separate effort post. Will tag you when it's done.
PS it’s bad form to not read someone’s reference and proceed to “reply” with a canned response
I did not have the time to consider the entirety of the reply, and I felt that there was a part that should have been clarified. Considering that I already had an answer that I could have used for that purpose at the time, and was lacking time to properly write a full response, I judged that option as appropriate.
Will be waiting for the promised post. Do consider that it might take me some time to go over it, as I will both be getting busier starting tomorrow and I am experiencing some stress discussing this, in particular because people might think as if I'm just trying to argue for arguing's sake in this case or that I am trying to be rude.
Look into historical materialism. Marx's materialist method of understanding how human societies evolved hinged on giving primacy to factors like energy, production, population and ecology. It allowed him to construct an understanding of anthropology so advanced for his time that when I was being taught anthropology by my uni professors I legit thought he was a Marxist. Only later did I realise that marx's method is today being rediscovered and being touted as some new revolutionary thinking.
Another point in which materialism is important to Marxism is with economics. Whole today's economic theories on value consider it to be subjective, marx analysed value through constraints on labour in an economy. The method that he used was a kind of primitive linear programming. It then inspired the creation of actual linear programming, which won Nobel prizes and forms the backbone of economic planning even in capitalist firms.
Really, marx's dialectical materialism was one of the first scientific approaches to fields and political movements (economics, history, socialism) dominated by idealism and hodgepodge theories. It is the reason why marx was so influential beyond his years and beyond his contemporaries like proudhon and fruerbach
I am aware of historical materialism. I am not aware of any conflicts between it and idealism.
Marx himself seems to have only thought of idealism as specifically the type of idealism that posits that only material stuff and mental stuff exist. I do not subscribe to any of those schools of idealist thought, and I very much do subscribe to the notion that mental stuff is dependent on material stuff, and, in that sense, the latter has a 'primacy' over the former. And yet, I am still an idealist and I see no conflicts between idealism and Marxism.
I don't remember if you were the guy who mentioned believing in platonic ideals in math or what (platonic ideals come deeply into conflict with dialectics), but it seems as if your philosophical views are highly eclectic. Maybe you should study some authors who explain dialectical materialism.
I mean, mathematical Platonism seems to be the most popular view on ontology among mathematicians, so my views are not exactly special in that regard.
However, I have not shared these thoughts on Hexbear before, at least as far as I can remember. Also, please, don't call me a 'guy'. I am not hard-against that, but would rather not be called that word or described as such.
Ok, sorry about calling you a guy.
Mathematical platonism is rejected in the dialectical world-view. In fact, dialectics is entirely incompatible with platonism. Dialectics by definition sees all objects are having fuzzy boundaries that change over time. In dialectics, the definition of objects is context dependent and negotiable.
Marxism is strictly materialist. Read Materialism and Empiriocriticism or Anti-Dühring.
Marxism is strictly materialist
Does Marxism draw any conclusions from materialism that are relevant to stuff like society, economics, politics, communist praxis, epistemology or some human activity that I have failed to consider here? If not, then I do feel justified in saying that there are no relevant conflicts and calling myself a Marxist.
Read Materialism and Empiriocriticism or Anti-Dühring
Alright. Albeit that will not be done overnight.
However, do understand that if by 'idealism' those works mean specifically the idealist schools of thought that only recognise material and non-material mental stuff, and not idealist schools of thought in general, then the views that I subscribe to are likely not addressed in those works.
Does Marxism draw any [relevant] conclusions from materialism?
Of course. One of the tenets of Marxism is that social being determines social consciousness, not vice versa. This is textbook materialism. Anything else simply leads to liberalism, religion, etc.
the idealist schools of thought that only recognise material and non-material mental stuff
You seem confused. There are two main currents in philosophy - materialism, which posits that nature is primary to spirit, being is primary to thought, and idealism, which posits the opposite. In between the two there are agnostics, who claim this question is impossible to answer. This has nothing to do with whether a philosophy "recognizes non-material stuff".
None of those things you mentioned are non material. They’re just patterns that exist in the material configuration of physical matter. For example, a stack of wood is only different from a wooden chair because of how that wood is arranged. That’s a material change even though the underlying substance is identical. Value is just a way of describing changes in configuration in the material world that are found to be useful to humans. Social relations are also more complicated but still exist in material form as they are embedded in the complex arrangements of neurons and chemicals within the human brain.
The problem then with idealism is that if you don’t understand how concepts like capitalism are embedded in the physical world, you are very unlikely to understand how to change them.
None of those things you mentioned are non material
None of those things consist of any matter. They are not material things. They have connections to material stuff, but they are not themselves such.
Furthermore, when discussing, for example, social relations, people very rarely talk about the material stuff, and, indeed, we usually do not have much of an idea of the configurations of the brains of relevant people, or about other relevant material stuff. That does not impede us from, well, discussing those.The problem then with idealism is that if you don’t understand how concepts like capitalism are embedded in the physical world, you are very unlikely to understand how to change them
Understanding connections between capitalism-as-an-idea and material stuff, including what I would describe as manifestations of capitalism, creates no conflict with idealism, though.
If you don’t think the configuration of material objects in relation to one another is a material phenomenon then I have no idea what is.
As for when people talk about social relations people they are talking about materials things! It’s just when you have highly complex repeating and interrelated patterns in the way in which matter is arranged it’s easier to think only about the relevant information.
To go back to my chair example. Quarks and leptons and other subatomic particles are interacting to create atoms which are structured into highly complex molecules which form the basis of a cells which were assembled into what was once part of a large organism. That organism was split into pieces and reassembled into an object you can sit on. A simple chair is so complex in fact that we can’t even conceive of all the specific information embedded within any given chair. That does not mean the idea of a chair is meaningless. It just means our minds have produced a highly simplified reflection of what a chair is in order to direct the way our material bodies interact with it.
Capitalism is the same way. It is manifest in the material world. It is a consequence of the ways in which matter interacts. The concept of capitalism as it exists in our heads is just a highly simplified material reflection of the material phenomenon itself.
This is such a critical point in Marxism. It’s why dialectical materialism is not a positivist phenomenon. We can never truly know everything about a material object as long as the information embedded within said object is more complex than our brains can mirror. If that’s true then as the world changes our ideas must change with it and indeed they do! That’s the dialectical process in action.
