This chapter pairs well with David Harvey's examination of neoconservatism in A Brief History of Neoliberalism:
If the neoliberal state is inherently unstable, then what might replace it? In the US there are signs of a distinctively neoconservative answer to this question.
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US neoconservatives favor corporate power, private enterprise, and the restoration of class power. Neoconservatism is therefore entirely consistent with the neoliberal agenda of elite governance, mistrust of democracy, and the maintenance of market freedoms. But it veers away from the principles of pure neoliberalism and has reshaped neoliberal practices in two fundamental ways: first, in its concern for order as an answer to the chaos of individual interests, and second, in its concern for an overweening morality as the necessary social glue to keep the body politic secure in the face of external and internal dangers.
In its concern for order, neoconservatism appears as a mere stripping away of the veil of authoritarianism in which neoliberalism sought to envelop itself. But it also proposes distinctive answers to one of the central contradictions of neoliberalism. If "there is no such thing as a society but only individuals" as Thatcher initially put it, then the chaos of individual interests can easily end up prevailing over order. The anarchy of the market, of competition, and of unbridled individualism (individual hopes, desires, anxieties, and fears; choices of lifestyle and of sexual habits and orientation; modes of self-expression and behaviors towards others) generates a situation that becomes increasingly ungovernable. It may even lead to a breakdown of all bonds of solidarity and a condition verging on social anarchy and nihilism.
In the face of this, some degree of coercion appears necessary to restore order. The neoconservatives therefore emphasize militarization as an antidote to the chaos of individual interests. For this reason, they are far more likely to highlight threats, both at home and abroad, to the integrity and stability of the nation. In the US this entails triggering what Hofstadter refers to as "the paranoid style of American politics" in which the nation is depicted as besieged and threatened by enemies from within and without.
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Neoconservatism has long hovered in the wings as a movement against the moral permissiveness that individualism typically promotes. It therefore seeks to restore a sense of moral purpose, some higher-order values that will form the stable center of the body politic. This possibility is in a way presaged within the framework of neoliberal theories which, "by questioning the very political foundation of interventionist models of economic management...have brought issues of morality, justice, and power - although in their own peculiar ways - back into economics." What the neoconservatives do is change the "peculiar ways" in which such questions enter into debate. Their aim is to counteract the dissolving effect of the chaos of individual interests that neoliberalism produces. They in no way depart from the neoliberal agenda of a construction or restoration of a dominant class power. But they seek a legitimacy for that power, as well as social control through construction of a climate of consent around a coherent set of moral values.
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But the moral values that have now become central to the neoconservatives can best be understood as products of the particular coalition that was built in the 1970s, between the elite class and business interests intent on restoring their class power, on the one hand, and an electoral base among the "moral majority" of the disaffected white working class on the other. The moral values centered on cultural nationalism, moral righteousness, Christianity (of a certain evangelical sort), family values, and right-to-life issues, and on antagonism to the new social movements such as feminism, gay rights, affirmative action, and environmentalism. While this alliance was mainly tactical under Reagan, the domestic disorder of the Clinton years forced the moral values argument to the top of the agenda in the Republicanism of Bush the younger. It now forms the core of the moral agenda of the neoconservative movement.
so neoconservatism is literally just diet fascism, the description is strikingly similar, while neolibs would just be socdems who weren’t afraid of the poors, partying away and profiting without a care in the world for the rest of humanity, seems almost apt though i think this understates the neolib version of the empire very much (mostly just the Clintons really tbf)
Not exactly, the OG neocon was Henry Scoop Jackson aka the Senator from Boeing. He was the Democratic Senator from Washington, who's domestic policies could hardly be called fascist. Neocon refers to a particular foreign policy position, where as neoliberism is a economic policy, not that I need to tell you but one that seeks to deregulate, institute austerity, union bust, and not enforce anti-trust laws, i.e. the fascists economic policy, of Italy, Germany, Portugal, and Spain when they were run by fascist dictators. There is nothing "socdem" about a neolib, however a neocon can be a socdem, ex Scoop Jackson.
depends how extensive you consider neocon ideology to be, if you take Bushs it definitely include a social conservatism component and neoliberalism as a matter of course, while neolibs of the same era are socdems in the sense that they enable neocons and are inwardly centered, taking from the description made above of neolibs and neocons as political affiliation rather than the narrow ideology referred by the same names, where you’re definitely right, although i would say a foreign policy based on empire is a requirement for fascism which is what neoconservatism is
This chapter pairs well with David Harvey's examination of neoconservatism in A Brief History of Neoliberalism:
so neoconservatism is literally just diet fascism, the description is strikingly similar, while neolibs would just be socdems who weren’t afraid of the poors, partying away and profiting without a care in the world for the rest of humanity, seems almost apt though i think this understates the neolib version of the empire very much (mostly just the Clintons really tbf)
Not exactly, the OG neocon was Henry Scoop Jackson aka the Senator from Boeing. He was the Democratic Senator from Washington, who's domestic policies could hardly be called fascist. Neocon refers to a particular foreign policy position, where as neoliberism is a economic policy, not that I need to tell you but one that seeks to deregulate, institute austerity, union bust, and not enforce anti-trust laws, i.e. the fascists economic policy, of Italy, Germany, Portugal, and Spain when they were run by fascist dictators. There is nothing "socdem" about a neolib, however a neocon can be a socdem, ex Scoop Jackson.
depends how extensive you consider neocon ideology to be, if you take Bushs it definitely include a social conservatism component and neoliberalism as a matter of course, while neolibs of the same era are socdems in the sense that they enable neocons and are inwardly centered, taking from the description made above of neolibs and neocons as political affiliation rather than the narrow ideology referred by the same names, where you’re definitely right, although i would say a foreign policy based on empire is a requirement for fascism which is what neoconservatism is