No, its only you if you are conscious in both worlds and there is a link. If someone completely killed my consciousness, no living cells, and then brought 'me' back years later after rotting in a grave, I'd still be dead. It needs to be a ship of theseus situation. A continual process.
Its not spirit, its electrical impulses in your head. They have never, ever, once stopped while you have existed. Even after you experience body death, you can have electrical impulses firing in your head for a while. Its possible to mechanically make you live after experiencing brain death, but you're gone and dead even if some nerves are firing. If this god-computer could transfer electrical impulses from your current head to the hell dimension and they are able to communicate while that is happening, then yes, they would both be you. But that is absurd and you would be experiencing hell right now.
Its continuity of consciousness. Like, I don't know how to explain it to you, but if they make an exact copy, that isnt you. Its a copy. A different session. A new set of instructions on RAM. It doesn't matter how accurate the simulation is, it doesn't transfer your life and consciousness. I'm pretty done explaining this, its just wrong on a biological level to think otherwise. You have to be in both spots at the same time, essentially, for the 'teleporter' to not kill you. Which is how its explain in Star Trek, for the record.
I'm not actually sure what position you're trying to defend here. I take a very functionalist view of consciousness and I have yet to be persuaded of the relevance of some kind of physical continuity (not sure how you even measure that).
Unless that's the consensus you were talking about, in which case I'll just note I was trying to gently pry the door open rather than come down hard on my side of it, as I'm a layperson and also not convinced the user I was replying to would have been receptive to that.
Well you've created a physically distinct human being that shares the exact same subjective experience - up to the divergent point, encoded in memory - as the original. I still fail to see how this proves anything about consciousness or its dependency on physical continuity. You might also have to be a bit clearer what you're arguing: if you mean that the post-split original (person 1) is the pre-split original (person 0) in a way that the post-split copy (person 2) is not, in what sense? What kind of identity does person 1 share with person 0 that person 2 does not? How does that identity relate to subjective conscious experience?
Or another route: try playing with the knobs on your thought experiment a bit. Instead of leaving one original, split them and rebuild each half into a full person. What kind of identity do either of these people share with person 0?
the copy is not you. If it didn't vaporise the original then there wouldn't be two yous. there would be one you with continuity of experience and one copy. This isn't a ship of theseus argument as I can lose an arm and still be me I am not arguing that my cells contain my personage but that my personage also isn't contained in their exact formulation
As for the dungeon vs vaporisation argument it seems to not understand dying as a potential consequence of a situation as being vaporised is just a fancy word here for killed, the version of you which walked in to the room would be killed and that would be the end of them
continuity of experience is not the relevant factor here clearly there is some animating factor of a person that is unreproducible or we would be able to construct a person/bring a corpse to life. This factor would be snuffed out in the person who walks in the room and I personally think it would be impossible to create a living copy out of cells. A human being is not fungible for another human in the way 7 is for 7
creating a copy does not affect the original just as destroying the original does not destroy the copy this implies that they are separate beings and therefore there is no continuity of conciousness despite continuity of perceived experience.
a person existing with an exact copy made of them would not continue to have that persons experiences from then on which indicates they are different.
when you destroy a physical body the person in it dies as they need that body to sustain their life
If I crush a pen and simultaneously make a new pen I have not moved the pen
Yeah. Bizarre. Sorry, I dont care if my clone is punished a billion times over.
that's like threatening a voodoo doll but with no belief the doll's suffering does anything but look like an effigy of the person suffering
or threatening someone that you will draw a picture of them in hell
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No, its only you if you are conscious in both worlds and there is a link. If someone completely killed my consciousness, no living cells, and then brought 'me' back years later after rotting in a grave, I'd still be dead. It needs to be a ship of theseus situation. A continual process.
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Its not spirit, its electrical impulses in your head. They have never, ever, once stopped while you have existed. Even after you experience body death, you can have electrical impulses firing in your head for a while. Its possible to mechanically make you live after experiencing brain death, but you're gone and dead even if some nerves are firing. If this god-computer could transfer electrical impulses from your current head to the hell dimension and they are able to communicate while that is happening, then yes, they would both be you. But that is absurd and you would be experiencing hell right now.
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Its continuity of consciousness. Like, I don't know how to explain it to you, but if they make an exact copy, that isnt you. Its a copy. A different session. A new set of instructions on RAM. It doesn't matter how accurate the simulation is, it doesn't transfer your life and consciousness. I'm pretty done explaining this, its just wrong on a biological level to think otherwise. You have to be in both spots at the same time, essentially, for the 'teleporter' to not kill you. Which is how its explain in Star Trek, for the record.
It's not "just wrong on a biological level" - it really depends on your understanding of consciousness and there isn't exactly a consensus.
hexbear understand object permanence challenge (impossible)
Hey, no need to be patronizing. It's just a philosophy discussion and we can be cool about it.
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I'm not actually sure what position you're trying to defend here. I take a very functionalist view of consciousness and I have yet to be persuaded of the relevance of some kind of physical continuity (not sure how you even measure that).
Unless that's the consensus you were talking about, in which case I'll just note I was trying to gently pry the door open rather than come down hard on my side of it, as I'm a layperson and also not convinced the user I was replying to would have been receptive to that.
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Well you've created a physically distinct human being that shares the exact same subjective experience - up to the divergent point, encoded in memory - as the original. I still fail to see how this proves anything about consciousness or its dependency on physical continuity. You might also have to be a bit clearer what you're arguing: if you mean that the post-split original (person 1) is the pre-split original (person 0) in a way that the post-split copy (person 2) is not, in what sense? What kind of identity does person 1 share with person 0 that person 2 does not? How does that identity relate to subjective conscious experience?
Or another route: try playing with the knobs on your thought experiment a bit. Instead of leaving one original, split them and rebuild each half into a full person. What kind of identity do either of these people share with person 0?
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the copy is not you. If it didn't vaporise the original then there wouldn't be two yous. there would be one you with continuity of experience and one copy. This isn't a ship of theseus argument as I can lose an arm and still be me I am not arguing that my cells contain my personage but that my personage also isn't contained in their exact formulation
As for the dungeon vs vaporisation argument it seems to not understand dying as a potential consequence of a situation as being vaporised is just a fancy word here for killed, the version of you which walked in to the room would be killed and that would be the end of them
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continuity of experience is not the relevant factor here clearly there is some animating factor of a person that is unreproducible or we would be able to construct a person/bring a corpse to life. This factor would be snuffed out in the person who walks in the room and I personally think it would be impossible to create a living copy out of cells. A human being is not fungible for another human in the way 7 is for 7
creating a copy does not affect the original just as destroying the original does not destroy the copy this implies that they are separate beings and therefore there is no continuity of conciousness despite continuity of perceived experience. a person existing with an exact copy made of them would not continue to have that persons experiences from then on which indicates they are different.
when you destroy a physical body the person in it dies as they need that body to sustain their life
If I crush a pen and simultaneously make a new pen I have not moved the pen
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Continuity of consciousness has entered the chat.
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