The New York Times, here via Yahoo, has some rather weird piece over alleged lack of intelligence on Ukrainian warplanes:

U.S. Lacks a Clear Picture of Ukraine's War Strategy, Officials Say

"President Volodymyr Zelenskyy of Ukraine has provided near-daily updates of Russia’s invasion on social media; viral video posts have shown the effectiveness of Western weapons in the hands of Ukrainian forces; and the Pentagon has regularly held briefings on developments in the war.

But despite the flow of all this news to the public, U.S. intelligence agencies have less information than they would like about Ukraine’s operations and possess a far better picture of Russia’s military, its planned operations and its successes and failures, according to current and former officials.

Governments often withhold information from the public for operational security. But these information gaps within the U.S. government could make it more difficult for the Biden administration to decide how to target military aid as it sends billions of dollars in weapons to Ukraine.

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Avril D. Haines, the director of national intelligence, testified at a Senate hearing last month that “it was very hard to tell” how much additional aid Ukraine could absorb.

She added: “We have, in fact, more insight, probably, on the Russian side than we do on the Ukrainian side.”

One key question is what measures Zelenskyy intends to call for in Donbas. Ukraine faces a strategic choice there: withdraw its forces or risk having them encircled by Russia.

Andrei Martyanov rants about the piece:

"Well, NYT decided to start steering clear of this whole Russia "lost in Ukraine" BS it promoted together with neocon crazies, and begins this ever familiar tune of the "intel failure". Right.

U.S. Lacks a Clear Picture of Ukraine's War Strategy, Officials Say

Hm, how about I put it bluntly--the U.S. never had clear picture on anything, especially on Russia, or, as a private case, [the Special Military Operation] and completely bought into Ukie propaganda, which shows a complete incompetence of the "intel" in the US.

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The narrative on [the Special Military Operation], in reality, is dead and the failure is not being set, it already happened. It is a fait accompli no matter how one wants to put a lipstick on the pig.

Larry Johnson thinks there is another another motive behind the story:

"Frankly, I find it hard to believe that there are not solid analysts at the Defense Intelligence Agency who know the answers to all these questions. The real problem may not be a lack of intelligence. Nope. It is the fear of telling the politicians hard truths they do not want to hear.

Given the billions of dollars the United States is spending on “intelligence” collection systems, it is time for the Congress and the American public to demand that the intelligence services do their damn job."

I do not believe for one moment that U.S. intelligence services do not know what is going on in Ukraine and in Kiev. They know that the Ukraine has lost the war and will have to sue for peace as soon as possible.

They also have told the White House that this is a case and that the whole idea of setting up the Ukraine to tickle the Russian bear was idiotic from the get go. The question now is who will take the blame for the outcome. Who can the buck be passed to?

There is always the option for politicians, as Andrei assumes is the case, to blame the intelligence and the various agencies which provide it. This was done when the war on Iraq, based on false claims weapons of mass destruction, started to go bad for the U.S.

But what the NYT piece does is passing the buck from the intelligence community to president Zelensky of Ukraine: "He did not inform us about the bad position his country was in."

It is cover your ass time and Zelensky prominence in the 'west' makes it possible to blame him personally for the outcome of the war.

On May 31 the Council of Foreign Relations, with its head Richard Haass, had a public discussion about the state of the war in Ukraine. One of the participants was the former Deputy Commander of the United States European Command Stephen M. Twitty. He knows and makes absolutely clear where the war stands:

TWITTY: I think the war in the Donbas is starting to turn to the Russians’ favor, and when you take a look at—and I’m particularly talking about the eastern part of the Donbas—the Russians have transitioned from trying to pour all their combat power into the Donbas to obliterating every single town. Whether it be Rubizhne, Lyman, they’re working now on Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk as well, they’re obliterating these particular towns, and that’s how they’re making their headway. They’re not putting a bunch of combat power with infantry forces and tanks in there. They’ve taken all their artillery and they’re treating it like Mariupol and that’s how they’re making their headway. So they’re starting to make some headway in the eastern Donbas and so we have to watch that one closely.

HAASS: ... Why don’t we reverse [our policies]? General Twitty, is there something that the president said? Are things we’re not doing that we should be doing? Is there things that you would recommend at this point?

TWITTY: Well, as I take a look at this, you know, Secretary Austin came out that we’re going to weaken Russia. We have not really defined what weaken means, because if you take a look at the Ukrainians right now, I take a strong belief in Colin Powell’s doctrine—you overwhelm a particular enemy with force. And right now, when you take a look at Ukraine and you take a look at Russia, they’re about one to one. The only difference is Russia has a heck of a lot of combat power than the Ukrainians.

And so there’s no way that the Ukrainians will ever destroy or defeat the Russians, and so we got to really figure out what does weaken mean in the end state here. And I will also tell you, Richard, there’s no way that the Ukrainians will ever have enough combat power to kick the Russians out of Ukraine as well, and so what does that look like in the end game.

There follows some discussion with other participants about potential outcomes the U.S. would like to see, like Ukraine in the state that it was in before 2014.

Twitty then explains why those ideas are all unrealistic and that what is needed instead are immediate negotiations:

TWITTY: Yeah. So I got a couple of things for you, Richard. So I want to go back to what you said. Pre-2014—I want you to think about that one, because I’ve had time to think about it hearing others here, and what I will tell you, Richard, you know, I learned from the National War College there’s something called ends, ways, and means.

So if that’s your end state—pre-2014—then I’m interested to hear the ways and the means because, from a military standpoint, if that’s the way then the means would be the Ukrainians lack, again, the ability to pull that off to pre-2014. They just lack that ability. They don’t have the combat power.

And I also want to remind you we hear a lot about Russian casualties and Russian losses. We hear very little about Ukrainian losses, and keep in mind they’re losing soldiers throughout this war as well. They started at approximately two hundred thousand. Who knows where they are today?

And so it’s hard to recruit and maintain that level of professionalism in that military. So that’s my first point. The end, ways, and means, they lack that, to be able to go back to the pre-2014.

The second point that I would make is, you know, as you look at the DIME—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—we’re woefully lacking on the diplomatic piece of this. If you notice, there’s no diplomacy going on at all to trying to get to some type of negotiations. And I don’t think that we can lead that, given where Putin thinks about us.

But if you sit back and think about those that could possibly be a part of this negotiation team, you know, you have the—two of them are in—that I’m going to list are in NATO. One is President Orbán out of Hungary. Perhaps he can help out in the negotiation effort. The other one is President Erdoğan of Turkey. Longtime friends of President Putin, although some view that relationship as transactional. I don’t know. Let’s put it to the test and see.

Remember that Russia generally follows Clausewitz, and Clausewitz sees war as an extension of politics and a means to achieve political aims. That is why, as some commentators pointed out early on, it made perfect sense for Russia to negotiate with Ukraine even as fighting was underway. Thus the breakdown in negotiations and Zelenksy’s outrageous requirements for resuming them1 constrains Russia’s options for achieving a favorable resolution.

But, but, but…you might say if you have a keen appreciation of the military situation. The Russian forces are slowly grinding down the Ukraine forces in Donbass without deploying overwhelming forces, despite the fact that Ukraine has heavily bunkers and its best troops there. And Ukraine has been repeatedly caught out trying to depict as best small and typically fleeting tactical wins as big successful counteroffensives. The latest was just this week, when Serhiy Haidai, governor of Luhansk, claimed Ukraine was ousting Russia from Severodonetsk, just as Zelensky was visiting (cynics thought to prevent desertions). That within days turned into mumble mumble shuffle shuffle that it would be too costly to retake the city. Alexander Mercouris reported that this volte face was widely seen in Ukraine as an admission that the story of the offensive was a fabrication and the reaction on social media was harsh. It appears that the citizenry is increasingly critical of his conduct of the war.

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Many experts also think that the when Russia has taken Lugansk, particularly if it also captures a lot of Ukraine troops in the process, that it will deliver a crippling blow to Ukraine’s morale and potentially also to its battlefield effectiveness. And when Russia no longer has to deal with extended and well defended positions, it could also capture terrain much more quickly. Mind you, Russia’s aim is not to control territory but to destroy Ukraine’s army. However, map-oriented Ukrainians and Western pols would find Russia eating up Ukraine even faster to be disconcerting.

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It’s not hard to think that Putin hoped to achieve demilitarization (as in an agreement to neutrality) and denazification politically. That’s why it’s short-sighted to view the first phase of the war, when Russia spread itself thinly by sending troops to Chernobyl, Kiev, Kharviv, the South, and Donbass, as a big fail. It may have been executed in a manner that cost too many soldiers’ lives, but it was a convincing enough show of force to bring Ukraine to the negotiating table pronto. Ukraine had made important concessions at the March 30-31 round in Istanbul. A deal was on its way to getting done until the UK and US aggressively intervened.

So unless something significant changes (more on that soon), Russia has what looks to be a high class problem, but what is a potential trap. Russia is going to determine when the war is over. That means it is going to have to decide how much territory to conquer, to hold, and what to do with them administratively. For instance, I suspect from a “try not to annoy the neighbors any more than absolutely necessary” perspective, Russia would rather have had freed parts of Ukraine that were Russia-friendly become a quasi-independent Novorossia. But Russia is having to stabilize the parts of Ukraine that it occupies, and that includes paying salaries to local government officials and pensions, which means converting banks to roubles. That sort of move sets strong expectations that the territory is joining Russia, whether or not that was the original plan.

Why is this a problem? Recall what created this mess in the first place, the stoking of hostilities between ethnic Europeans and ethnic Russians. Putin acknowledged this issue at the start of the special military operation, by saying something to the effect of, “We won’t stay where we aren’t wanted.”

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Even if Russia didn’t have to contend with the politically charged dynamics of widening the war beyond Donbass, there’s also the practical argument of where to stop. If Russia wants to convert areas that are pretty likely to be natively friendly, one strategy regularly discussed would be to take the entire Black Sea coast. That would have the advantage of placating the more hawkish factions in Russia that see taking Odessa as important. Even though this would still leave a lot of Ukraine to its own devices, it would be hostage to Russia for sea access, which might give Russia enough of the upper hand.2

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Others of a more maximalist view suggest taking Ukraine up to the Dnieper, which has a certain logic except that Kiev straddles the river. I personally see taking the West of Ukraine as exactly the sort of mess the West hopes Russia will walk into. I can’t imagine the locals would be happy. Subduing a resentful population (even absent actual insurgency) is toxic to the occupier.

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Despite Zelensky’s intransigence and the US and EU unwillingness to even consider concessions, some important things are breaking Russia’s way. The first is the fact that Ukraine is losing is becoming harder and harder to cover up, and more and more media outlets are staring to report on its poor prospects, not just not winning but even preventing further territorial losses.

Second is that the sanctions blowback is already imperiling governments. Boris Johnson’s days are numbered. The proximate cause is the dramatic fall in living standards in the UK. Some of that is due to Brexit, although the British press is loath to admit it. Some is due to global supply chain woes. But UK business leaders were surprisingly noisy about warning of food and fuel price jumps and shortages underway and getting even worse this winter. The Estonian government fell, and they so hate Russia that no one there would acknowledge sanctions blowback played a role. Estonia’s annual inflation rate in May was 20%.

Macron is worried about losing his party’s majority in parliament in next month’s elections. Scholz’s leadership looked wobbly even before Germany’s inflation numbers got scary (producer price index increases of over 30%) as industrial production fell. And as we’ve discussed, Italy hasn’t been all that keen about backing Ukraine.

But the biggest break has come from Turkey. Russia looked to have worsened its long-term position with Sweden and Finland wanting to join NATO and having been expected to be approved this June. But that’s gone off the rails. NATO entry requires unanimous approval of all members. Turkey is arguably the most important NATO member by virtue of location and having the second biggest NATO army.

NATO completely dissed Turkey by not pre-consulting them. Turkey objects vigorously to Sweden and Finland entering because both, mainly Sweden, are too friendly to Kurds. Sweden has a representative office in Kurdistan. Turkey has said it wants a Swedish parliament member, Amineh Kakabaveh, who was a former guerrilla and is now a key swing vote, to be extradited. And Turkey has hardened its position when there’s no indication that that NATO or the EU have offered Turkey any bribes to get it to climb down. So NATO looks set to suffer a big embarrassment, and Sweden and Finland will have given up their vaunted neutrality and not gotten anything in return.

A final, and odd piece of the equation. It appears there are negotiations of some sort happening between Ukraine and Russia. I can’t find the original story in Izvestia, but it was reported by Alex Christaforu yesterday and also mentioned by Stratfor. Izvestia reported that Russia and Ukraine had agreed to terms of a peace deal in March but Boris Johnson scuttled them (some colorful detail on that).

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However, the interesting bit is the claim that there were negotiations on now. Dimitry Peskov, the Kremlin’s press officer, gave an ambiguous denial. Per Christaforu, starting at 1:10, there are talks underway now that would set a ceasefire with Ukraine to be neutral with various states would serve as guarantors. But the big new change would be that Ukraine would accept the status quo, in terms of Russian areas of control, as ceded territory. That means Ukraine would give up parts of the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

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In other words, this means there is no bargaining overlap since Putin would be unlikely to stick his neck out that far beyond what men and women in the street would accept. But the flip side is that this suggests that Ukraine privately is making significant suggestions, in stark contrast to Zelensky taking such an extreme posture as to make talks impossible.

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So that is a long winded way of saying that Zelensky may not have altered his stance, but that instead he is no longer driving the train. And it may also be that some in the Ukraine government are also trying to get the UK’s and US’s hands off the wheel. It may be too early for that to happen, but if they keep trying to shore up Zelensky when his own senior staff (and the military) are turning against him, they could find they bet on the wrong horse. Again, I’m not saying this is a likely outcome, but the fact that it is even conceivable is a big change in the state of play.